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on finding nearly all the ammunition for their heaviest ordnance in the Narrows to be used up, viewed the prospect of a possible fresh fleet attack with some apprehension, as they were under the impression that the assailants had been beaten off on the 1 8th by the guns and not by the mines. This led to a mistaken idea that De Robeck's ships might have succeeded had they renewed their attack at once in spite of losses; the damage which they had done to the batteries had been almost insignificant, and they had not got within 5 m. of their objective.

The Allies had foreseen from the outset that land forces would have to be brought into play sooner or later in their campaign in this region. Even assuming that the fleet forced the Dardanelles, its communications would have to be safe- guarded, and there would still be Constantinople and the Bos- porus to be dealt with. Entente troops had already before March 1 8 been set in motion for the Aegean, and some were in Lemnos. A heterogeneous army, drawn largely from India and Australasia, had also been gathering in Egypt for several weeks past, of which portions could be made available for work else- where in the Near East. Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been chosen as commander-in-chief of the military contingents that were to cooperate in due course with the naval forces in this theatre of war, had moreover actually arrived on the day before the abortive fleet attack upon the Narrows and had witnessed the fight. In view of what had occurred the Allied Governments decided that in further operations full use must be made of the gathering army, and from this time onwards the military be- gan to assume the principal role in the effort of the Entente to secure command of the Dardanelles.

But Sir Ian Hamilton judged it to be inexpedient to initiate land operations at once. Reconnaissance had brought to light the extent to which the Turks were making preparations to repel attempted landings, both on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and on the Asiatic coast adjacent to the mouth of the Straits; and everything pointed to the expeditionary force having to start work by fighting its way ashore. A tactical operation of that character demanded most careful prior organization, and it called for a distribution of the attacking force amongst the available shipping based on purely tactical considerations. As a preliminary to his undertaking a serious land campaign on the shores of the Aegean, the general felt himself obliged to concentrate his forces in Egypt, and to prepare them there for the hazardous undertaking to which they were to be committed. A month was lost in consequence. 1 During that month the Turkish V. Army was formed (March 24) to guard the Straits, and Marshal Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission in Turkey, was appointed its commander-in-chief. Between the last days of March and the day of the landing the defence system was overhauled and greatly developed. 2

The Franco-British expeditionary force was to be composed of seven divisions three, the 2gth, the 42nd and the Royal Naval, furnished by the United Kingdom, two formed of Aus- tralian and New Zealand troops, and two composed of French colonial troops. At the time however when active operations began the 42nd Division and one of the French divisions could

'The chief naval incidents of this month were: a raid by the Turkish destroyer " Demir Hissar " which sank the British transport " Manitou " on March 16, but had to be blown up next day off Chios to avoid capture; an attempt of the British submarine 15 to enter the Straits, which led to her being forced ashore (April 16) and in the sequel to her destruction by a daring boat's crew from the "Majestic" (April 18); bombardments of the defences of Smyrna on March 28, April 6 and April 22; and operations at Gaza and El Arish on the Syrian coast by the French battleship " St. Louis " and other vessels (April 12-17).

From the Black Sea the Russian naval forces bombarded the Bosporus defences on March 28 ; some fruitless operations were then carried out against the " Goeben " and " Breslau " (in the course of which the Turkish cruiser " Medjidieh " was sunk off Odessa (April 3), and on April 25, the day of the landing in the Peninsula, and on May 2, the Bosporus defences were again shelled.

2 The coast defences themselves remained under the command of the German Adml. v. Usedom, who was also responsible for those of the Bosporus. The German naval forces were commanded by Adml. Souchon, who had brought the "Goeben" and " Breslau."

not be counted on owing to shipping for them not being available. Against this force Liman von Sanders could at the outset pit six divisions. Hamilton had resolved on making the Gallipoli Peninsula his objective, intending to secure high ground which dominated the Narrows from that side. He could conceal his design up to the very last. His adversary had perforce to disperse the defending troops, so that on the morning when the land campaign started two of the Turkish divisions (3rd and nth) were watching the outer coast on the Asiatic side, two (sth and yth) were near Bulair to provide against a landing at the neck of the Peninsula, while the remaining two (gth and igth) under Essad Pasha guarded the places where, in the event, the Allied army made its appearance. Still, if the attacking side enjoyed an advantage in this respect, the possible landing- places were few in number and were therefore well indicated, there had been ample time to protect them with earthworks and barbed wire, and in any disembarkation in face of resistance the tactical conditions favour the defence.

Hamilton contemplated two distinct major operations. One force was to be put ashore about the extremity of the peninsula an area which it is convenient to designate as " Helles." The other force was to land N. of Gaba Tepe, where there are ex- tensive beaches. Part of the one available French division was, furthermore, to effect a descent at Kum Kale opposite Helles as a subsidiary operation, partly to deceive the enemy and partly to neutralize Turkish guns, which otherwise might intervene in the Helles fighting. Feints were also to be carried out at other localities so as to bewilder the defenders. The effort at Helles was to be entrusted to the 2pth Division, supported by the Royal Naval Division, and ultimately to be reinforced by the French division. That at Gaba Tepe was to be carried out by the two Australasian divisions under Gen. Sir William Birdwood. The Anglo-French army concentrated in Mudros Bay, the great natural harbour of Lemnos, in the third week of April and, after a short delay enforced by bad weather, the armada put to sea during the nights of the 23rd-24th and the 24th-2Sth, so that the transports and the covering warships should arrive at the various rendezvous at or before dawn on the 2 sth. The day broke calm and still, after a placid night.

A firm footing was gained on shore by the assailants at three out of the five points where disembarkation was attempted, while the effort was also, within restricted limits, successful at the two remaining points. The beaches which had been selected were, enumerating from right to left, " S " in Morto Bay, " V " and " W " on either side of Cape HeUes at the south-western end, and " X " and " Y " on the outer shore; " V " and " W " were regarded as of primary importance, as those two beaches offered suitable landing places from the point of view of subsequent operations. The attacks at " S " and " Y " were intended to be subsidiary; but great importance was attached to that at " X " owing to the vicinity of this point to " W." The troops started for the shore in flotillas of boats soon after dawn at all points, their approach covered by the fire of battleships and cruisers, and in all cases the boats were not fired upon until almost the last moment.

As it turned out, the actual disembarkations at " S," " X " and " Y " were carried out without any very great difficulty; but the troops detailed for " W " beach only gained a footing after incurring very heavy losses and by a display of indomitable resolution, while at " V " the operation went very near to failing altogether. In the general scheme of attack the landing at this last point was of primary importance; the largest force had been detailed for it, and the troops were for the most part conveyed to the beach in a steamer (the " River Clyde ") which was run ashore; but only some scattered detachments cowering close to the water's edge had established themselves on land by nightfall, and the Allies' position here seemed to be highly critical. The troops detailed for " Y " beach had also got into serious difficul- ties, and as it turned out they had to be withdrawn next morning. But the forces which had landed at " W " and " X " be'aches had joined hands, the one battalion detailed for " S " beach had secured a good position, and during the night the troops still