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720 place in the future. If the ships are intent on forcing a channel ranges will naturally become short and the fire of the shore guns will become very accurate. The small battery at Hartle- pool which fought the German squadron on Dec. 16 1914 undoubtedly left its mark on the enemy vessels.

The outstanding lesson of the naval operations in the Dar- danelles would seem to be a very old one that men are more than material, that even moderately armed and organized defences, when manned by stout-hearted troops, as the Turks undoubtedly were, although not well trained technically, can still have in them a very great power of resistance, provided the tactical organization of the defence is not radically unsound.

It has been mentioned with reference to the Dardanelles that minefields may play an important part in the defence of a channel. Such minefields, although they may, by the active power of the mines, do great damage to a ship which strikes one, may be removed by sweeping or countermining, and really form an " obstacle " in the military sense of the word which to be effective must be protected by fire. It will therefore be necessary to arrange that minefields are under the effective fire of batteries. The guns of such batteries would probably be about the same size as those for dealing with torpedo craft, as the vessels used in attempts to remove mines will not be large. If possible minefield batteries should be so sited that they are protected from the fire of the larger hostile ships. This was done at the Dardanelles by taking advantage of the projecting points of land on both the European and Asiatic shores. As mine-sweeping would gener- ally take place at night electric lights must be provided spec- ially for the use of the minefield batteries.

(3) Defence of a Lattding- Place. In certain cases it may be necessary to prepare defences against the chance of an enemy landing on a stretch of coast. It would rarely be possible to hold such a line in any strength, nor would such a course be desirable, as it would mean locking up troops for an indefinite period, while it is hardly likely that no warning of a possible landing would be received. Suitable defences can play an im- portant part by enabling small bodies of men to hold up an attack until reinforcements arrive, but for deliberate prepara- tions to defend all possible landing-places the expenditure of men and materials will always be prohibitive. Such measures can be taken only in the case of very important places.

The line of coast to be dealt with may or may not lie within the rayon of a coast fortress. If it does there may be some guns of the fortress capable of bearing on the water in front of the shore to be defended, and their fire will be of the greatest value against both the covering ships and the boats containing the landing force. The scheme of defence will have to be arranged so as to take full advantage of this fire and not to mask it in any way.

The works of fortification required on the stretch of coast-line will then fall under three heads: (a) defences on the actual coast so designed as to enable the minimum number of men to hold up any probable attack; (6) ample communications of all kinds to allow reenforcements to be sent up as quickly and as safely as possible to the threatened spot; (c) measures to be taken to deal with parties of the enemy who may succeed in effecting a landing and breaking through the defences on the shore. -

(a) The nature of the coast-line to be defended will naturally vary in many ways, but, as it forms an assumed landing-place there will always be a beach or strand of some sort, and in all probability the gradient of the slope into the water will not be excessively gentle. It is likely also that in most cases the landing-place will be a bay, with reasonable expectations of higher ground at the extremities of the bay. A long straight coast-line is an unusual case.

The backbone of the scheme of defence on the coast-line itself should consist of the provision of enfilading fire along the shore and the water close to it where the landing parties are expected. To economize men use should be made of all the machine-guns which can be obtained. Advantage must be taken of all promontories in siting these enfilading weapons in order to obtain cover for them from the view, and if possible from the fire, of ships covering the landing, but in any case it should be ensured that all the possible landing beaches are covered by a sufficiency of fire, and this fire should be as grazing as possible. Therefore, the enfilading posts must not be high up above the water.

Should there not be any natural protection for these posts from view from the sea they must be made as inconspicuous as may be,

their outline being Wended into their background, and their colour corresponding with it. As they will be very low structures this should not prove difficult of accomplishment. It would probably be advisable that the machine-guns should be given splinter-proof cover, the weapons firing through slit loopholes. For deliberate work the actual posts for the machine-guns might well be made of concrete. Their distance apart will vary according to circum- stances and ground, but a fair average distance might be taken as half a mile, allowing four enfilading machine-guns to each post.

An effective obstacle along the shore is of the greatest importance. This will usually be barbed wire, and it should extend all along the line to be defended as thick as circumstances will permit. The machine-guns must be able to enfilade the obstacle. If it is possible to erect any wire actually in the water this will greatly assist in impeding a landing and in breaking up the formations of the enemy. But the wire along the shore is the more important, that in the water being considered an addition.

The machine-gun posts should be protected by and should form part of small infantry posts, say for a platoon. These are primarily intended to protect the enfilading guns, and must therefore be pre- pared for all-round defence. At the same time they should be able to fire over the water and along the shore between them. These works must be quite inconspicuous, but this should not prove diffi- cult to arrange. Each post should be completely surrounded with a wire obstacle, and as they may be shelled by the covering ships it would be well if some deep dug-outs were provided for the garrison. If not, the trenches themselves will give very fair protection.

Trenches actually facing the sea, in the case of a long coast-line, require a large number of men and should be used only sparingly. But it might be well to prepare some of these for occupation by some of the reenforcing troops, although the action of the latter is more likely to take the form of counter-attacking any hostile troops that have succeeded in landing. If such trenches can be enfiladed from the infantry posts so much the better, as then they would be of less value to the enemy should he manage to land and seize them before the defence reenforcements arrived.

In addition to any coast batteries that may be available field artillery and trench mortars should be ready to play their part in repelling the attack. These weapons should also, as a rule, be used for enfilading,' and emplacements should be prepared for them together with shelters for their ammunition and detachments. Full advantage must be taken of any natural cover to secure protec- tion for them from the fire of the ships.

(6) The provision of ample means of communication for reen- forcements must be complete. They will depend on the local con- ditions, but it must be borne in mind that the covering ships will probably shell these communications and this must be prepared for. Points such as bridges on the line of route, road crossings, etc., must receive special attention in the way of providing alternative routes, and roads exposed to view from the sea should be screened, especially near the shore. Movement along such roads will always be liable to be noticed by hostile aerial observers, but these can be countered only by offensive action of the defending aircraft.

(c) Some works are also necessary to localize any successful attempts at landing. These should take the form of lines running back from the shore (" switches "), starting from one of the infantry posts on the coast. These switches would generally be inclined at an angle to the coast-line. If any coast batteries are included in the area the switches should be utilized to add to their defences, as the capture of such batteries would certainly form one of the objectives of the enemy. The actual work to be executed on these switches would consist mainly in providing a line of wire entangle- ments, but posts should be prepared at intervals which could cover this wire with their fire. (J. C. M.*)

COATS, the name of a Scottish family, which established at Paisley the Ferguslie cotton-thread mills, as well as mills in the United States, Canada, Mexico, South America, Russia and other European countries (now J. & P. Coats, Ltd.) and, with the fortune thence acquired, became munificent benefactors of their town (see 20.520). JAMES COATS (1803-1845) and SIR PETER COATS (1808-1890), first and third sons of James Coats of Paisley, were the founders of the firm. The younger but eldest surviving brother was knighted in 1869, and his eldest son, SIR JAMES COATS, 1st bart. (1834-1913), directed the fortunes of J. & P. Coats, especially in Canada and the States, his younger brother, ARCHIBALD COATS (1840-1912), being chairman of the company at Paisley. Sir James Coats was created a baronet in 1905 and died at Ayr Jan. 20 1913. His son, SIR STUART AUCHINCLOSS COATS, 2nd bart. (1868- ), was for a time a member of the old firm and of the associated American and Canadian Thread companies. PETER COATS (1842-1913), third son of Sir Peter Coats, and brother of Sir James Coats, another director of the firm, died at Whitney Court, Hereford, Sept. 16 1913. SIR THOMAS GLEN COATS, ist bart. (1846- ), second son of Thomas Coats