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winter of 1917-8, came more urgent demands for coal from all classes of consumers. New England in particular was in dis- tress, and large cities such as New York could get but little hard coal for heating. The great tonnage which the railways were called upon to handle congested the yards, terminals and equipment so that it became impossible to supply quickly even the most vital needs. Embargo followed embargo, and preferential shipment orders for sundry commodities further hampered transportation. Dr. Garfield stated that adequate coal supply depended in large measure upon more ample trans- portation. Every soft-coal operator reported a shortage of coal-carrying equipment, and although the clamour for relief was loud and long, no one seemed to know just what steps to take to ameliorate this condition.

The attempt was then made to deal with the problem by conservation. Estimates by the fuel authorities indicated a shortage of at least 50,000,000 net tons of bituminous coal. As there seemed to be little likelihood of output catching up with demand, reliance was placed on securing less waste of coal in large plants and in curtailing unnecessary uses of power. David Moffat Myers, advisory engineer of the Fuel Administra- tion, in consultation with conservation committees and en- gineers, formulated a plan to reduce fuel waste in power-plant operation, not by costly installations of more efficient apparatus, but by a more intelligent and careful use of existing equipment. It was proposed to ascertain first how far each plant complied with certain well-recognized standards in its operation and maintenance, and then, by a system of rating degrees of effi- ciency, to force on the attention of the" plant management such wasteful conditions as were disclosed. To supply a strong in- centive for improvement, it was announced that the relative rating of plants would influence the Fuel Administration's allotment of coal should a shortage occur. The plan further in- cluded a programme of education through lectures, Govern- ment publications, meetings of plant owners, engineers and firemen. This campaign in each state was to be in the hands of an experienced power-plant engineer who, with his staff of workers, should be a part of the conservation division of the state Fuel Administration. Printed " Recommendations of the United States Fuel Administration " were issued establishing the standards of plant operation and maintenance as well as a questionnaire to ascertain from the power-plant owner the condition of his plant with relation to these recommendations, and to obtain the initial information for rating. It was an essen- tial part of the plan that this information be confirmed or amended by an accredited inspector after investigation of the plant itself.

As a climax to Dr. Garfield's frequent statements, that the railways were chiefly responsible for the deplorable situation, came the proclamation by the President on the night of Dec. 26 1917, by which the Government took over the railways. At this time the efforts to relieve congestion on the railways were beginning to bear fruit in the shape of a slight improve- ment in the car supply at the mines. On Jan. 16 1918 came the order shutting down business for five days and closing up in- dustries on every Monday until March 25. The storm of pro- test which this evoked was far louder than any that had greeted the other revolutionary edicts of the Fuel Administrator. There had been no advance notice of the order, and following its pub- lication the U.S. Senate, with only 19 adverse votes, passed a resolution, introduced by Senator Hitchcock, requesting a five-day suspension of the order to allow those opposing it to be heard. Nevertheless, the order was obeyed with a promptness that clearly showed the resolution of the public. On Feb. 13 1918 the order providing for " heatless " and " workless " Mondays was suspended. Although it was admitted in official circles that little coal had been saved by the order, it was gen- erally acknowledged that it had stimulated the railway managers and had relieved to some extent the freight congestion.

After months of preparatory work, the Fuel Administration on March 22 1918 announced a zoning plan for the distribution of coal, to take effect April i 1918. Every state in the Union

was affected more or less. The aim was to confine coal pro- duced in the eastern section of the United States to eastern markets, and make it compulsory for states in the Middle West, as well as in other sections, to use coal produced in mines near by. The announcement was received by the coal-mining industry with mixed feelings. Many operators and shippers who had spent years in building up their trade suddenly found their best customers taken from them. Consumers who had been accustomed to burning certain kinds of coal were forced to use fuels with which they were less familiar. But producers and consumers alike readjusted their methods to conform to the new order of things. The coal trade was still further con- vinced that the Government intended to control the entire output of fuel, from the time it left the mines until it was in the con- sumer's bin, and even in the furnace, when Dr. Garfield on April i 1918 announced that coal jobbers must procure licences. Many abuses had arisen which the Government desired to eliminate, and the licensing plan was announced as fair to the operator, to the bona-fide jobber and to the consumer. The new system enabled the retailer to buy direct from the producer, whereas he had before been able to deal with the jobber only.

With the railways under its control, the Government had made material progress in the task of clearing the path for a quick movement of coal from mine to consumer. New prices had been announced, and the local fuel administrators had perfected their organizations to take care of distribution. In many producing districts the car supply was still below normal, however, and not sufficient motive-power was available. The railways had shown little improvement in the method of allotting empty cars to the mines. Before the Railroad Administration assumed control, it had been the practice of some railways to allot cars to those operators on their lines who favoured the carriers in respect of prices. John Skelton Williams, in charge of purchases for the Government-controlled railways, insisted that the Railroad Administration had the right to distribute cars where and how it pleased. This was a continuation of the old policy of using such control of shipping facilities as the rail- way possessed to force concessions in price from the coal pro- ducers, and it was in direct antagonism to the Fuel Administra- tion's endeavour to further the production of fuel. Thus one Government body set at naught the edicts of another.

This action on the part of the Railroad Administration served as did nothing else to bring to the support of Dr. Garfield many of the coal operators who had been inimical. With the warmer weather of May 1918 came admonitions from the Fuel Admin- istration that consumers would best serve their own interests, and those of the nation, if they laid in their winter coal supplies during the summer. The production of both anthracite and bituminous coal had been steadily increasing, though inadequate car supply still prevented a maximum output of the latter. By June 1918 it had become apparent to those interested that the coal industry was being organized as it never had been before. The Fuel Administration, under Dr. Garfield, was accomplishing the seemingly impossible. Weekly reports kept him conversant with the actual output and consumption of coal in each zone, and a watch was kept on the needs of each section. Coal was in many instances diverted in transit to provide for emergencies. Quotas had been fixed for cities that were permitted to burn anthracite, none of which was to be sent west of. the Mississippi or south of the Potomac or Ohio rivers. Industries deemed unessential to the winning of the war were being denied the use of any kind of coal.. By July 1918 the coal industry was hard and fast in the grip of govern- mental regulations and administration. Competition had ceased. The railways and the fuel authorities were working together in harmony, and the bituminous mines, under the stimulus imparted by Dr. Garfield's newly formed production bureau, were producing record tonnages. The difficult task of inciting the soft-coal miners to greater endeavours was placed in the hands of James B. Neale, who had been acting as ad- viser to Dr. Garfield. In Aug. the Department of Labor classified coal-mining as " war work," in order to keep the