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of these now fled from Peking, and in the central and southern provinces " a war to punish Yuan " was begun. It lasted only two months and ended in a complete rout of the disorganized forces led by Generals Li Lieh-chun and Huang Hsing. Yuan was now firmly in the saddle.

After thus forcibly asserting his authority, Yuan proceeded to vindicate and consolidate it. In the first place, by the lavish use of money and the display of military force, he succeeded in secur- ing his election as President for a term of five years his title having hitherto been provisional. On Oct. 10 1913 he took the oath of office with much pomp and circumstance, in the throne room of the Winter Palace; and availed himself of the occasion to declare that, for the future, he intended to rule without inter- ference and in accordance with ancient tradition. Four weeks later, a presidential mandate, endorsed by his docile Cabinet, ordered the unseating of all the Kuo Min-tang members of Parliament, on the ground of their treasonable conspiracies. As half of the Senate and more than half of the House of Repre- sentatives were thus disposed of, no parliamentary quorum was left. All obstacles to the exercise of Yuan's autocratic au- thority were thus removed. He continued for a while to profess respect for the principles of constitutional government and loy- alty to the republic, but it speedily became apparent that the ideas which inspired his policy were those which he had frankly proclaimed during the crisis of the revolution.

The Parliament at Peking was replaced by a political council and " an administrative conference for the revision of the con- stitution," composed almost exclusively of officials and literati of the old school, selected by the President or by his agents and representatives in the provinces. The provincial assemblies were dissolved, on the carefully directed recommendation of the military governors, " for perversely usurping financial authority and obstructing the business of administration." By the begin- ning of 1914, it was evident that Yuan intended to restore the old orthodox autocracy and centralization of power in the metro- politan administration; it was also' evident that, so far as the great mass of the people was concerned, his policy evoked little or no opposition and that, so far, he was justified in his declared belief that they were " no lovers of changes that ran counter to immemorial custom."

When, upon the advice of his administrative council, the President Dictator announced his intention of performing the Winter Solstice ceremony at the Temple of Heaven and restoring the official worship of Confucius, he proclaimed himself to that nation as an autocratic ruler and gave the first indication of his own imperial ambitions. There is reason for believing that these ambitions had no place in his mind when, in 1911, he strove to uphold the Manchu dynasty, but that they gradually and insid- iously asserted themselves, partly as the result of the exercise of despotic authority and partly by reason of the death of the boy Emperor's guardian, the Empress Dowager Lung Yu (Feb. 1914). Even when his intentions had become unmistakably clear, he fully realized the dangers which confront the creation of a new imperial line under a political system in which the divine right of rulers is intimately bound up with the sacred institution of ancestor worship; but he took his risks and carried his principles to a conclusion for which there were precedents in history and justification in the situation itself. Had the question of his claim to the throne been decided simply as a matter of internal politics, he would probably have succeeded in establishing and extending his effective authority with the general consent of the nation, weary of civil strife and disorder. But Japan's assertion of her " special rights " and material interests in China, greatly in- creased after the outbreak of the World War and the expulsion of the Germans from Kiaochow, plainly indicated that Yuan Shih-k'ai would not have a free hand in the matter. His inability to discern the serious danger of intervention from this quarter was the weakest point in his armour; indeed, his failure to grasp the international situation afforded a remarkable contrast to the perspicacity he displayed in dealing with his own countrymen.

Within a year of the outbreak of the World War, the move- ment for the restoration of the throne in China had assumed

definite form and direction. The Chou-An-hui society, composed chiefly of Yuan's supporters, organized an energetic monarchical propaganda at Peking and in the provinces, but they, like the President, failed to draw from the " 21 Demands " (which Japan had forced upon the Chinese Government in May 1915) the obvious conclusion that the Japanese Government would strongly oppose Yuan's plans in the event of his advancing serious claims to the throne. During the negotiations which took place between Jan., when the " 21 Demands " were first presented, and May, when they were imposed by an ultimatum, the President's attitude towards the Japanese was evasively conciliatory, but it failed to reveal appreciation of the truth that since the days of his residency in Korea he had never been persona grata in Japan, and that the Government at Tokyo would therefore do its utmost to prevent his assumption of autocratic power. One of the ablest and most influential scholars in China, the famous political writer, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had strongly supported Yuan's fight for the preservation of the monarchy in 1911, stood forward boldly in Aug. 1915, to denounce the Chou An-hui's propaganda and to warn the President of the perils which threat- ened the course upon which he was embarking. Resigning his position on the State Council, Liang proceeded to publish his opinions in the Peking Gazette, opposing Yuan's accession to the throne, partly on grounds of classical orthodoxy and partly be- cause he perceived the inevitability of Japanese intervention. Yuan, well aware of the far-reaching influence of Liang's views, did all in his power to win his support. Failing in this, he made a pretence of constitutional procedure by referring the question of the monarchy to a vote of the provinces, or rather, to the vote of a number of individuals appointed by himself to represent them. The result, a foregone conclusion, was a practically unanimous vote (Nov. 5) in favour of Yuan's accession.

But Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's wisdom was rapidly justified. On Oct. 30, the Japanese minister, supported by his British and Russian colleagues, conveyed to the President, through his Foreign Office, friendly " advice " to the effect that the Japanese Government deprecated the idea of his restoring the monarchy in his own person, on the ground that the change would lead to serious in- ternal dissensions. Yuan's reply was dignified but short-sighted; he informed the Japanese minister that his Government was quite capable of preventing disorder in China, and that he looked to the Governments of friendly Powers to control the activities of Chinese revolutionaries within their territories. On Nov. 9 the Chinese Government, in announcing the result of the provin- cial " vote," intimated that no change would take place before the New Year; but this decision was rescinded, and matters hastened by an abortive insurrectionary movement which oc- curred at Shanghai on Dec. 6. The State Council thereupon memorialized the President to put an end to the prevalent uncer- tainty and unrest by proclaiming himself Emperor without further delay. On the i2th the monarchy was proclaimed, and the announcement was made that the inauguration ceremony would take place on Feb. 9.

It was not to be. Within a week of the proclamation of the monarchy, a rebellion broke out in the far-western province of Yunnan, led by Tsai Ao, a military official educated in Japan. On Dec. 27 the province, through its officials and local gentry, declared its independence in opposition to the monarchy. There- after, in spite of initial successes gained by the Government's forces, the insurrection spread with a rapidity which justified the foresight of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and emphasized the fact that, as matters stood, Yuan Shih-k'ai had not achieved either the per- sonal prestige or the pecuniary resources sufficient to command for his authority as Emperor the respect and loyalty of the semi- independent chieftains of the provinces. By the end of Jan. Kuangsi and Kueichou had renounced their allegiance and other provinces were wavering. His star was so rapidly declining that his advisers persuaded him to issue an official announcement (Jan. 22) postponing indefinitely the establishment of the mon- archy, in view of the country's internal dissensions. Having thus confessed to failure, when within sight of the summit of his ambitions, Yuan's fate as a ruler was sealed. By the end of