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every opportunity of being prepared for the offensive. If he gives us the slip as he did to the east of Reims we would be unable to obtain a decision. Should he resist, his numerous reserves were in a position to stop us as on the loth and nth of June in the direction of Compiegne." Ludendorff appeared to admit that the mere fact of establishing a protective zone in front of a defensive position made it impregnable. His moral was affected as seriously as that of his troops. (C. M. E. M.)

VIII. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF AUG. 17-20 1918

Even before the French X. Army had reached the Vesle and the Aisne, the continuation of the offensive on the N. bank of the Aisne had been considered. The preparations for this scheme were taken in hand during the advance of the IV. British Army under Rawlinson and Debeney's I. French Army, which began on Aug. 8. Marshal Foch thought that the progress of this offensive would cause the Germans in front of the III. Army under Humbert to retreat, and then those opposing Mangin's X. Army. Foch then considered that the two armies could attack in succession in order to cover the right flank of the Franco-British advance, thus widening the front of this battle. In the operation plan of the X. Army it was expected that the attack would bring them into position along the Oise and the Aisne, and then, all efforts being concentrated on the right, the attack, facing E., would ensure egress from Soissons and would thus be developed in such a way as to outflank the position of the Chemin des Dames.

The British attack, however, met with steady resistance; the ground cost them more and more dearly, and was no longer proportionate to the losses in men. In explaining this state of affairs to Marshal Foch, Sir Douglas Haig pointed out that he would provisionally suspend his attack, which had been so brilliantly started on Aug. 8 to the S. of the Somme, but he would renew the offensive farther to the N. by two successive operations, the first of which would start on Aug. 20 against Arras. Marshal Foch informed Gen. Fayolle, commanding the group formed by the I., III., and X. French Armies, of the de- cisions, and asked him when his armies would be ready to renew their attack. On Aug. 16 Gen. Fayolle, in discussing this matter with Gen. Mangin, informed him that the I. and III. Armies were not in a fit state to attack, and that consequently the X. Army, whose effectives were not sufficiently strong to attack unaided, should content themselves with small local demon- strations. This was not the opinion of Gen. Mangin, who was convinced above all of the necessity of continuing the offensive. He said that the X. Army was ready to attack on the i8th with' ii divisions in the first line and 3 in the second line (3rd, nth and i4th Inf. Divs.), but that he proposed to postpone the operation to the 2oth, as the new British attacks were due to start on that day. He carried his point, though he had not sufficient artillery at his disposal for this attack: 1,138 guns, including 324 75-mm. guns, 540 heavy guns, and 274 long-range guns. This artillery strength, it is true, appeared weak in view of the extent of the front which had to be attacked, but the moment had arrived to set aside calculations based upon past experience and to consider the shaken condition of the enemy whose power of resistance had very much diminished.

The Offensive. Before the front of the X. Army the enemy had his chief line of resistance at a distance of between 2 and 3 km. from the front trenches. This scheme of defence, which was in accord with the ideas adopted by both sides, had enabled Gen. Gouraud's army to carry out its magnificent resistance on July isth, and the numerous prisoners taken had disclosed all the details of the scheme.

On Aug. 17 and 18, the divisions in line had seized all the covering zone, and had even gained a footing in a certain part of the line of resistance, taking over 2,000 prisoners.

From the evening of the i8th to the morning of the 2oth, for 36 hours, all the artillery was pushed forwa'rd in order to be able to support the advance of the infantry as long as possible with- out changing position. In the orders for attack it was laid down that, after the capture of the two enemy positions, the

infantry should be reformed at the foot of the slopes and should then push on as far as the banks of the Oise and Ailette. Gen. Fayolle had not wished that positions should be established in the valleys, where, as he remarked, trenches in marshy ground would be difficult to occupy during the winter; but the hour for such anxieties had evidently gone.

From the i7th, artillery preparations against the second German position had continued without stop. On the 2oth, at " 0710 hours " (7:10 A.M.), the X. Army attacked, and all the German positions were captured. On the 2ist, the French came into position against the support divisions which had been brought up to attempt to reestablish the situation, and on the 22nd they reached the Oise and the Ailette.

Gen. Mangin said: " The time has come to shake off the mud of the trenches." It was so. Ludendorff tells us with regard to these events that, in spite of all preparations, the battle had taken an unfavourable turn; the nerves of the German army were strained; the troops did not everywhere stand against the heavy artillery fire and the assaults of the tanks. " We received in this a fresh warning. We had suffered our more heavy and irreparable losses. The 2oth August was also a day of mourning. In truth, it encouraged the enemy to continue his offensive. I calculate that the enemy offensive will continue between the Oise and the Aisne in the direction of Laon. The direction of the attack was well chosen, as the position of the XVIII. Army to the N. of the Oise and that of the VII. Army to the N. of the Vesle should be made untenable thereby. The enemy maintained a strong pressure against the Soissons- Chauny line. Very severe engagements were fought here, marked by cruel alternatives if unsuccessful. One could not yet say what would be the issue." It is interesting to com- pare these remarks of Ludendorff with the considerations that influenced Gen. Mangin in bringing about his attack. These were: (i) that the employment of great forces between the Oise and the Aisne was justified for the reason that this region would always be the pivot of the manceuvre; (2) that the enemy sought to reestablish his position in making use of each of these lines in succession (a) the Aisne, (b) the Hindenburg line (Chemin des Dames), (c) the Ailette, (d) the Serre; and (3) that the hinge of enemy movement would always be approx- imately on the axis Soissons-Laon. Thus it was vital to apply the maximum force possible in this region in order to smash the hinge, and to compel successive withdrawals on each wing which would assume growing importance.

The advance of the X. Army facilitated that of the III. Army towards the Lassigny massif, and both armies joined up on the Oise. The X. Army continued to press eastwards between the Ailette and the Aisne. In spite of a strong resistance the advance was carried on by successive assaults. On the 3oth, the 32nd American Div. under Gen. Ham captured Juvigny in brilliant fashion. During Sept. 4 and 5 the Germans gave up the Ailette and the Vesle, and retreated to the borders of the Coucy forest. Between the two it only remained to capture the Laffaux position which linked them up. The X. Army only possessed weak effectives in infantry, artillery, and even in munitions; nevertheless, on Sept. 14 the I. Corps under La- capelle and the XXX. Corps under Penet broke into the Hinden- burg line on the Laffaux plateau, taking 2,400 prisoners.

The attack developed during the succeeding days, and the advance continued towards the Chemin des Dames, in spite of German counter-attacks; it was only stopped on the 2oth upon the order to " organize on the ground taken in such a way as to hold on to the advantages won and to take every step to cut down losses and prevent fatigue with a view to be in a position to pursue the enemy should he retreat."

But the general attack had begun. In the centre of the vast line, the X. Army hustled the enemy, who was beating a retreat; it reached the Ailette, and then changing front on the right threatened the Chemin des Dames to the E.; its right seized this redoubtable position after having crossed the Aisne; the Italian Corps under Albricci overcame all obstacles with great dash and reached the Ailette in its turn. On Oct. 12 the enemy