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Rh developing. He went personally to Avesnes, where headquarters were, in order to supervise the preparations. The French attack of July 18 had not then as its result the stopping of the German attack. This was, moreover, not the aim of this Allied offensive. There was no question of a counter-attack, but of an operation thought out and prepared for its own ends, independent of the German offensive.

Gen. Mangin had taken over command of the X. Army on July 16 in place of Gen. Maistre. The latter had twice stopped the German advance between the Aisne and the Ourcq, and had, in a small operation on June 15, recovered nearly the whole of the ground lost on the i2th and i3th. It immediately appeared evident to Gen. Mangin that he now found himself in command of the X. Army under conditions similar to those that he had just left on the Mery-Courcelles plateau. Now, in his opera- tion orders of June 10, ordering the counter-attack for the follow- ing day at " noo hours " (n A.M.), Gen. Mangin concluded with this sentence, which he wished to be communicated to the troops: " To-morrow's attack should mark the end of the defensive battle which we have been waging during the last two months; it should mark the checking of the Germans, the resumption of the offensive, and lead us to success."

After having saved Compiegne and stopped the German advance, the counter-attack of Mery-Courcelles had been stopped by the French High Command, owing to lack of avail- able forces, but when Mangin found himself on the W. flank of a pocket of much larger extent, he immediately studied with his new staff the question of its reduction, to follow up with an offensive and finally to grasp from the enemy the initiative of the operations. On June 18 he received instructions to examine under what conditions the communications to the S. of Soissons could be disturbed: firstly by aerial bombardment, secondly by a rapid advance from this front, which would enable him to place his heavy batteries in a position which would command the bridges of Soissons and the main exits of the town. On the 2oth he sent his estimate of his requirements in infantry and artillery to carry through this operation, from which he foresaw a rapid extension southwards; and he asked the Command to consider how the success could be turned to advantage.

In order to start under good conditions, he suggested a series of minor operations which were intended to improve the positions from which he would attack. Without further delay he started carrying out his scheme, and vigorously pushed forward his preparations on the front of attack. Numerous battery em- placements and ammunition dumps were established.

All the ambulances and clearing stations, which had been placed so far back with excessive caution, were brought forward to within a reasonable distance, which would enable the wounded to be dressed without inflicting on them the miseries of transport. Minor operations followed rapidly one after the other on the front of this army, and enabled him to ascertain the degree of exhaus- tion of the German troops, whose heavy losses had only partially been made good. On June 28 a slightly more important ad- vance considerably improved the situation, and i ,000 prisoners were taken. On the 2gth Gen. Mangin received Gen. Petain's letter approving of the plan of action, which had already started to be put into execution, and which was agreed to also by the High Command, whose approbation had been obtained through liaison staff officers.

The X. Army's front likewise was improved to the N. of the Aisne by a minor operation, in which, on July 3, 1,100 prisoners were taken. It was indeed important not to draw the attention of the enemy to the position of probable attack, and it was clear besides that, having attacked eastwards, the X. Army would be called upon to attack in a northerly direction. Gen. Mangin was able to write on July 3: " The minor operations undertaken by the X. Army during the second fortnight of June have been carried out very easily. Without attaching to them more importance than they deserve, the proof can be seen that the enemy experienced the same difficulties as we do in defending himself against troops making use of methods of actual attack. There is ample reason for thinking that an attack carried out

on the plateau to the S.W. of Soissons, under conditions which were outlined in the scheme of June 16, would present not only the best chance of success, but could also bring about such a development that would result in the immediate exploitation of the factor of surprise and would lead to the elimination of the Chateau-Thierry pocket." The factor of surprise was now quite possible. On the one side the forests made it possible to conceal until the last moment the manreuvres by which the infantry were placed in position; on the other side the incessant movements of artillery which had taken place during the last three weeks on the X. Army's front would probably prevent the enemy from noticing the installation of new batteries in the Villers-Cotterets region. General Mangin asked for the selec- tion and putting in position of all forces necessary to enable him to carry out the intended offensive.

On July 8 a further operation improved the position of the X. Army to the S. of the forest of Villers-Cotterets. On July 9 Gen. Mangin received a letter from the commander-in-chief approving of his plans. It made no further mention of the elimination of the Chateau-Thierry pocket, but it said: " Undoubtedly this operation not only presents the best chance of success, but it can be profitably exploited. Further it con- stitutes a most efficacious demonstration against the German offensive." From now onwards it was necessary to prepare for the operation in the greatest detail, in such a way that the con- centration of forces and the launching of the attack could succeed one another within a very short time four days as a maximum. The concentration must be ready to start on July 15.

From July 9-13, the situation continued to improve to the S. of the Villers-Cotterets forest. The Saviere valley, which presented a serious obstacle in that area, was taken. On the I3th, Gen. Mangin, in pointing out these results, declared that these minor operations, which had been carried out at very small cost, had been sufficient to exhaust the five German divisions opposing him. They were replaced by other divisions, which only a short time before had been withdrawn from the front and had not had time to rest or reorganize; their strength having been reduced to 40-50 men per company instead of 150. The enemy was considerably weaker after these reverses; the in- structions which were issued to sector commanders, and which were captured, were quite clear: " Hold on at all costs, without hoping to be reenforced; the bulk of the German army is being kept in reserve for the great offensive." Accordingly, the situation was favourable for an attack.

The X. Army now consisted of 16 divisions, 10 of which were in the first line, with 780 guns, 530 heavy guns, 132 long- range guns. Except for the latter the means at disposal were inferior to those available for previous offensives, but the force had only hastily gathered formations opposing it, and the factor of surprise was being counted on. Finally, telegrams dispatched July 13 fixed the launching of the attack for July 18, and the beginning of the concentration for July 14.

On July 15, at " 0900 hours " (9 A.M.), important moves of concentration which had been commenced two days previously and were to be carried through on the following days were interrupted by order of the French C.-in-C., owing to the German offensive which had just started on the front of Gouraud's IV. Army. Gen. Foch, however, as he was visiting the head- quarters of the army groups, heard of this counter-order and annulled it. The preparations, which had been suspended for some hours, were resumed but so quietly that the enemy, who had thought up to the nth that an attack was probable, had meanwhile been completely reassured. " The troops had ceased thinking that an attack would come," said Ludendorff ; " one of my friends, a divisional commander, told me that from the 1 7th he had been in all the first lines and had gained the impres- sion that profound quiet reigned in the lines of the enemy."

The Offensive. On July 18 at " 0435 hours " (4:35 A.M.), the X. Army hurled itself against the enemy between the Aisne and the Ourcq on a front of 25 km. without any sort of artillery preparation. Three hundred and twenty-one tanks accompanied the infantry over all places where it was possible to go; they