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During the infantry attack the principal task of the artillery was to protect the storming infantry while keeping down the opposing artillery fire, to protect the assaulting infantry by barrage advancing in front of them, as well as by the fire of the guns accompanying them. After the infantry attack, owing to the experience gained in former offensives, only so many batteries were to be brought forward as could certainly be sufficiently supplied with enough munitions. Provision was also made to meet the great difficulties which the steep ascent on the S. bank of the Aisne presented to the artillery, by preparing men and material for the building of roads.

All these measures demanded the most meticulous care for' every detail, and it was vital that nothing should be forgotten. The placing in position of the attacking divisions and the artillery groups, with all the other preparations, was completed by the evening of the 26th. The beginning of the attack was fixed for May 27.

The Artillery Battle. In the night of May 26-27 punctually at 2 A.M. the German artillery bombardment suddenly began, completely surprising the French and English. This went successfully from the start. The whole valley of the Ailette, the steep slopes of the Chemin des Dames, the Chemin des Dames itself, and the country lying far behind down to the Aisne, were in a short time thoroughly gassed, so that, as was later ascertained, a great part of the gunners left their batteries in panic at the beginning of the bombardment, and many pieces were destroyed at the very beginning by direct hits. In the first ten minutes observers announced numerous munition fires in the battery positions and ammunition dumps of the opposing armies. The fire against infantry and artillery positions was also well directed. Thanks to the powerful effect of the superior strength of the German artillery it was already clear, after an hour and a half's bombardment, that the opposing infantry and artillery were sufficiently subdued to enable the German infantry to venture the assault.

The Infantry Attack. Punctually at 4:40 A.M., while it was still quite dark, the German infantry advanced to the attack. Without difficulty or delay they crossed the Ailette valley which was covered with bushes in some places and marshy in others; during the ascent to the Chemin des Dames serious infantry fights only developed at Chavignon, Pargny and Fillain; on the other sections of the front the German infantry pushed forward almost without resistance on to the heights of the Chemin des Dames. Here the remarkable effect of the artillery preparations was already apparent: the steep slopes had been surmounted, and the first lines were taken almost without firing a shot. The rising sun saw the first files of prisoners descending into the Ailette valley. The procedure adopted in previous attacks by the infantry had also stood the test on this occasion. There were no innovations in infantry tactics.

By 7 A.M. the I. Army had already reached the canal, the objective of their attack, and part had crossed it. Since they were to await the left wing of the VII. Army before further advance, a halt had to be made there according to orders. Thus the opposing army gained time to reform their units and to rally, while those in front of the VII. Army were overrun by the advance of the attacking divisions so long as they felt the effect of overwhelming German artillery fire. This was an essential difference between the attack of the I. and VII. Army, and was to be -of decisive importance.

By 9 A.M. the German infantry, after breaking through the whole enemy system, had reached the line Vauxaillon-Jouy- Pontavert-Berry-au-Bac; on rapidly built roads, accompanying batteries and mine-throwers had also reached the heights of the Chemin des Dames and followed close on the heels of the infantry. Numerous aeroplanes attached to the infantry and artillery accompanied their advance over and before their fronts, while the battleplanes in repeated flights helped to break recurring resistance.

The Passage of the Aisne. The farther advance from the heights of the Chemin des Dames against the Aisne became a regular race between the divisions of the VIII., XXV., and IV.

Reserve Corps and the LXV. Corps. Without waiting for fresh orders each division, taking advantage of the successful surprise over their opponents, had on its own initiative pressed forward without halting. Soon after n A.M. the first German companies crossed over to the southern bank of the Aisne on bridges mostly intact. A vast and unexpected success had been gained. A wide and apparently impassable stretch of country, which had been for years the scene of the heaviest fighting, had been captured within a few hours after a short artillery preparation. Of the divisions of the defenders two English and three French had almost ceased to exist. The survivors streamed into the pris- oners' collecting stations, while countless guns stood abandoned in their positions, some of them undamaged.

In the afternoon and evening the attack on the principal fighting front of the VII. Army went forward without a pause farther in the direction of the Vesle valley. Engineering and road-making troops worked with the utmost effort to level a path for the columns following through the enemy positions and over the steep way up to and down from the Chemin des Dames.

On the two wings the advance was considerably slower; on the right, before the front of the LIV. Corps S. of Vauxaillon, and at Laffaux, the Command had not recognized so quickly the favourable nature of the situation, and had not attacked with such unsparing vigour as in the centre; otherwise Soissons would probably have fallen on May 27 and at latest on the 28th, and the French, before they could have organized themselves for resistance, would have been compelled to evacuate all of the ground lying between the Oise and the Aisne. Here, just as before the front of the I. Army on the heights of Cormicy and farther E., the French had time to take up a position and to rally for fresh resistance, so that the infantry engagements became gradually more and more severe. The machine-guns had to be taken one by one, and here and there the enemy artillery again became active. The VIII. Reserve Corps also could only take Vailly after heavy fighting. Here again rich booty in guns fell into German hands, among which were the railway guns, famous for their bombardment of Laon, which had been injured by the German long-distance guns and their withdrawal thus delayed.

The Vesle was reached by the XXV. and IV. Reserve Corps, and in the darkness sections of the XXV. Reserve Corps passed southwards of Courcelles and Paars, while sections of the IV. Reserve Corps occupied the steep slopes at Fismes and Magneux. On this very first day of fighting the Germans had penetrated the enemy positions over a front of about 60 km. to a depth of about 20 km. Over 15,000 prisoners and immeasurable army supplies had been taken. The German losses were proportionately small.

The second day of the battle, May 28, saw the first violent counter-attack of the opposing army against the right flank of the German attacking troops. The attempt was made in this to prevent a further widening of the breach on either side, and the first available reserves were flung against the German wings, divisions being hurried up by rail, motor and boat, in order to arrest and throw off the German thrust. Nevertheless the speed of the German advance was not lessened on this day. On the right wing the LIV. Corps, after repulsing French counter- attacks, captured the heights N. and N.E. of Soissons. On the left the German divisions pressed forward until midday, over the whole sector of the Vesle, from Missy on the Aisne by way of Lhuys-Courville on the Ardre as far as the northwestern fort of the fortress of Reims. The objective was thus reached after a day and a half's fighting. But in the ardour of the pursuit the troops stormed on without orders, though in agree- ment with the intentions of the higher command, in order to improve their success by determined pursuit. The order given by the Supreme Army Command at noon of the 28th to continue the attack as far as the line of heights S.W. of Soissons-Fere- en-Tardenois-the heights S. of Coulonge, reached the troops when they were already storming forwards. On the right wing of the VII. Army, the VII. Corps had already joined the attack on May 28 without waiting for the completion of the preparations begun at this point. Here, however, the resistance was so