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repeated their view on April 3. If they no longer had confidence in the commander-in-chief let them remove him. Even if this confidence continues or if it diminishes after a change of com- mand on the eve of an attack, why take away so much of its chance of success by undertaking so hazardous a thing?

Assembled without rhyme or reason, this " extraordinary council of war " killed the confidence between the commander- in-chief and his subordinates, a confidence already affected; this ordeal, which had never before been inflicted upon a military commander, threw Gen. Nivelle into a state of anxiety, however impassive he might be before the enemy in battle.

The Offensive. In accordance with the instructions of Gen. Nivelle, the British offensive commenced on April g before Arras and was continued until April 14 with great success.

It is true it had not effected a break-through but the advance was important and the booty taken considerable: 14,000 prison- ers and 104 guns. The battle continued on this front. On April 14, the army group under d'Esperey had felt the Hindenburg line at the approaches of St. Quentin and had recognized its strength without being able to make any impression with the weak effectives available.

Fixed for April 12, postponed to the i4th and then to the i6th on account of bad weather, the offensive on the Aisne had been prepared in minute detail. First of all, it had been necessary to develop the lines of communication between the Marne and the Vesle and from there up to the front lines. A hundred and ten kilometres of ordinary gauge line had been constructed, 20 km. of metre gauge, 308 km. of 6o-cm. gauge; 25 km. of cart roads and existing roads had been broadened on a length of 55 km. Twenty-two thousand men had been employed on this task. Four thousand five hundred tons of transport with an effective personnel of 28,000 men represented the automobile sections.

Forty kilometres was the front of attack; the VI. Army under Mangin, with a front of 15 km., consisted of 17 infantry divisions, one cavalry division and one territorial division; the V. Army under Masel, on a 2o-km. front, consisted of 20 infantry divisions and one cavalry division. The VI. Army had 742 heavy guns, 846 field guns, 81 large-calibre guns, 594 trench mortars. The V. Army had 1,016 heavy guns, 860 field guns, 1,056 trench mor- tars, QI large-calibre guns. The plan of artillery employment allowed quiet registration from April 2 to April 4, counter- battery work on the 5th and 6th; then the destructive bombard- ment commenced on the 7th and was to have been complete on the nth; it was continued until the isth, owing to the postpone- ment of the attack. More than 3,000,000 rounds were fired.

The shooting, however, was hampered by rainy weather and by bad organization of the fighting planes, concentrated un- fortunately with the army groups. During the too rare flying hours, the range-registering planes were not protected, and Gen. Mangin's urgent calls for their protection by fighting scouts met with no response. The VI. Army under Mangin had not been able to receive the number of short-range guns that had been asked for to destroy the Hindenburg line on its left, nor the long- range guns that had been asked for to accompany the attack on its right. Nevertheless, and in spite of what may have been said, the preparation was good on the whole and the moral of the troops had risen to the highest pitch. The Hindenburg with- drawal was rightly considered an avowal of weakness; the Rus- sian revolution had removed a Court and a Government bound to Germany, and it was looked upon as an outburst both patriotic and liberal which recalled the dawn of the French revolution. The hesitations of the Government and of certain of the staffs had not had time to permeate the troops.

On the morning of April 16, the French infantry rushed from their trenches and captured the first German line on the whole. front. The right and centre of the V. Army advanced two to three kilometres. The tanks, used for the first time, were de- tailed for the capture of the third enemy position; their unex- pectedly slow progression left intact the observing posts of the Germans from which they directed the fire of their artillery on them; and owing to the too long distance which they had to cover they had loaded themselves up with extra petrol cans

which were set on fire by the shells. The infantry had not been trained to cooperate with them and profited little from their advance. They suffered heavy losses; in this first experience the heroism of their crews bought very dearly slender results.

The left of Masel's army was immediately stopped on the Craonne plateau. The loth Colonial Div. of the VI. Army under Marchand captured the position of Urtebize with magnifi- cent dash and some elements reached as far as the Ailette; but on the plateau of Craonne and Vauclerc, the enemy machine- gunners came up out of deep dugouts where they had remained under the shelter of the artillery. The struggle was very severe, and the detachments that had penetrated too far were taken in rear and compelled to retire. In the centre, progression was more satisfactory although difficult; the attack, stopped after an ad- vance of between 500 and 2,000 metres, was renewed; on the left the set-off was good, but the advance was rapidly held and even thrown back at certain points on to its initial line.

The battle had not assumed the aspect foreseen, but continued. It was not the rapid and tremendous success anticipated, but it was success. As in all dispositions for attack, there is a tendency to block in front; the reserves in closing up to the front lines are liable to get bunched together and to come under enemy artillery fire, thus suffering heavy losses; in the VI. Army, precautionary measures taken in advance enabled them to remain on the left bank of the Aisne. In addition the counter-battery work had been most efficacious and had much allayed the effects of the enemy artillery. Machine-guns had stopped the attack. The system employed at Verdun under similar circumstances was immediately remembered, the centres of enemy resistance should be attacked, after having concentrated on them the fire of the necessary number of batteries, but the attack should be continued. This is less wearing for the attacker than for the defence.

On April 16, commencing at 10 o'clock in the morning, Gen. Micheler took all the heavy artillery of an army corps from the VI. Army under Mangin, then three sections of i55-mm. guns; in the evening all his reserves were taken away and his ammunition supply reduced. On the morning of the i/th, Gen. Nivelle visited the headquarters of the army group, where he was in- sufficiently informed of the situation, and then he took the de- cision of stopping the attacks of the VI. Army towards the N. and of pushing those of the V. Army towards the north-east.

This order was fortunately somewhat delayed in transmission, and on the I7th the attack continued actively on the centre of Mangin's army, with a very noticeable advance on the front Braye en Laonnois-Ostel.

As the pressure continued on the front Vauxaillon-Laffaux, the Germans could no longer hold in the pocket into which they had been squeezed and they gave ground. But the order of Gen. Nivelle commenced thus: " i. The battle fought yesterday clearly indicates the intention of the enemy to hold fast on the front of the VI. Army and to make difficult and costly in conse- quence the advance of your army to the north. ..."

As the situation had changed, Gen. Mangin gave orders for a vigorous pursuit, which hustled the enemy and caused him heavy losses; the commander-in-chief approved of this action the following day. The fort of Conde was occupied. At the same time a very slow advance continued on the Chemin des Dames.

Commencing on the i7th, the IV. Army under Anthoine, be- longing to Petain's army group, had attacked the Moronvilliers massif and had secured important gains. The enemy counter- attacks were shattered on the igth. Splendid artillery observa- tion posts remained in the hands of the French. It was a limited success, but a very appreciable one.

From the i6th-2oth, 21,000 prisoners and 183 guns had been captured in the French offensive; little progress had been made, but the advance of from six to seven kilometres, on the Aisne front of 12 km., resulted in the capture of a dozen villages, to- gether with the fort of Conde and all the observation posts which overlooked the valley of the Aisne.

The railway from Soissons to Reims was fired. At last the evacuation of Laon began. Moral remained good at the front, excellent in the VI. Army, and the efforts of defeatist propaganda,