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to the main attack will have denied to the enemy freedom of movement and initiative in attack, and that we shall be able to hope for the splendid day when we shall be able to bring into action our colonial forces." He pointed out to the commander- in-chief that, on a front of attack so difficult, without direct ground observation, it would be very nearly necessary to wait for fine days, when aerial observation is good and the ground hard.

These requests and observations were submitted to the High Command as an appreciation to be examined and compared with all others and to affect the final decision, which was the responsi- bility of the commander-in-chief alone.

General Nivelle never ceased repeating that it was necessary " to go on as far as possible " after the day of attack; Gen. Micheler fixed a first line to be reached in three hours and a second line three hours after. He went into too minute details which did not allow any initiative to his subordinate commanders; some differences arose which Gen. Nivelle had to smooth over.

To go on as far as possible implies that the attack continues until it encounters an obstacle which it cannot overcome without the help of new and methodical preparation; it is not by orders issued that the attack will be stopped, but by the action of the enemy; the High Command prepares itself to profit by the confusion brought about so often at various points of the field of battle, and, with this end in view, prepares its subordinates by pointing out very distant objectives. This is a principle second to none, and its application in 1918 brought victory to the French after giving the Germans their victories in March and May.

The necessity of foreseeing the exploitation of any success after a break-through is obvious; it was particularly evident in 1917. It was necessary to compel the general staffs and cadres of all formations to study the requirements demanded in a war of movement (which for a long time were lost to view), to think out the equipment of the foot soldier and the lightening of kit, the formation of columns, their march and supply, to decide upon the grouping of the heavy artillery which should rejoin in succession each army corps and army, to study natural obstacles, the network of roads, etc.

General Micheler obviously went rather far when he contem- plated a threat on the enemy communications, " who would then be squeezed up between the Ardennes and the southern point of Holland," but this anticipation, realized in the following year, did not go beyond the general staff of the armies.

Military Situation. -The preparations for the offensive were in full swing when, on March 14, the withdrawal of the German line on the Hindenburg position commenced; this extended, on March 19, to the front between the Oise and the Aisne. The pursuit was immediate and vigorous. The Germans were hustled on to a prepared line, a line at which they had prepared to limit their withdrawal and to allow themselves time to organize at leisure the Hindenburg position. The completion of their field works, hampered by artillery fire, cost them considerable losses.

The German retreat had long been thought out and prepared. Only a small quantity of booty fell into the hands of the Allied armies. The evacuated zone had been systematically destroyed. It was not to be wondered at that all the roads of communication had been destroyed that was war; to destroy inhabited places which could be used as a shelter for troops and which were near to the firing line is admissible, although this practice is straining severely the demands of war necessity. But to devote a large quantity of explosive to blow up stately ruins, like those of the castle of Coucy, and much manual labour to cut down the fruit trees that is savagery.

It is essential to point out that important means of destruction were thus diverted from military use; by blowing up larger stretches of road, by felling a larger number of trees planted along their line of retreat, the Germans could have hindered to a great extent the advance and supply of the French troops. But not only against the Allied armies did the Germans wage war, but against the people of France, struck at in their past as in their future, in their artistic, industrial and agricultural wealth.

The plan of operations drawn up by Gen. Nivelle was necessa- rily modified by the withdrawal of the German line; the prepara-

tions in full course of execution of the army group under Franchet d'Esperey fell through, and on this front it- was necessary to be satisfied with pushing the enemy in the direction of St. Quentin. But the British attack took up the greater part of its strength. On the Aisne, between Vailly and Neuvilette, the French attack retained all its power to operate; Gen. Mangin pointed out that during the withdrawal the German line had formed a right- angled salient in the direction of Laffaux mill and that an attack to the N. of this salient, directed vigorously, would take the Chemin des Dames in rear. General Micheler, commanding the group of armies of reserve, after some difficulty transmitted this suggestion to Gen. Nivelle, who accepted it and sanctioned the employment of two divisions. The remainder of his unattached troops were employed in a new attack to the E. of Reims on the Moronvilliers massif, which the -IV. Army under Anthoine pre- pared to attack. General Nivelle calculated that the German withdrawal, which was a confession of weakness, only confirmed his desire to attack the German armies as soon as possible with all his forces. The modifications on the front of attack were sufficiently important, but on the whole he thought that they would improve a situation already favourable for an offensive.

Political Complications. -But two new events called into ques- tion even the principle of an offensive. On the demand of the German High Command, unrestricted submarine warfare had been decided upon by the Imperial Government, in spite of the formal declaration of President Wilson that the United States would look upon it as a definitely hostile act. All parties, even the most extreme, had approved of that resolution; the only reservation, entirely platonic, was made by the Socialists, and that was to throw the responsibility for it upon the Governments of the Entente who had rejected the German offers of peace.

The Central Powers faced the entry of the United States into the war with their eyes wide open; they calculated that their army would never be of more than very mediocre value and that its transport to Europe would be very difficult. The declaration of unrestricted submarine war was made to the United States on Jan. 30. On Feb. 3 President Wilson declared solemnly to Congress that relations with Germany were broken off; on April 5 and 6 the Senate and the House of Representatives recognized the state of war with Germany.

Almost at the same time the Russian revolution broke out. The Tsar Nicholas II., who had opened the Hague Peace Confer- ence, and who had granted to his people their first franchise, suppressed alcohol, and, during the war, had shown himself to be a faithful ally whose help had often been invaluable, had fallen under the influence of the Empress, a German by birth; and she was under the control of the monk Rasputin and of German influences. The Tsar had become more and more de- tached from his people. From March 7 to 12, disorders broke out and grew in intensity; the provisional Government, which had been formed, collapsed with the imperial throne, and Russia fell into the hands of a power both erratic and weak, incarnated in the person of Kerensky. He proclaimed loyalty to the Alliance, but his military power appeared to diminish with the loss of discipline in the army. The Allies could no longer count on the Russian offensive scheduled for the spring.

Whilst this was going on, an incident took place on March 20 at a sitting of the Chamber which led to the resignation of the Minister of War, Gen. Lyautey, and, in consequence, of the Briand Cabinet. His successor, M. Ribot, chose as his Minister of War M. Painleve, who, backed up by an important party in Parliament, had refused to enter the Briand combination be- cause he disapproved of the nomination of Gen. Nivelle as com- mander-in-chief, because he was not in favour of that system of war which Gen. Nivelle, to his mind, typified.

M. Painleve questioned those army commanders whom he pre- sumed capable of being able to provide him with arguments against the intended offensive, but not the others. He increased their hesitation without even understanding it. These con- ferences took place without the commander-in-chief, who was informed by his subordinates but not by the minister. General Nivelle was also aware that a superior officer had been deputed at