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Rh assembled at Chantilly, on Nov. 18 1916, together with the commanders-in-chief, Joffre and Sir Douglas Haig, and all the heads of the British, Italian, Russian, Belgian, Serbian and Rumanian Missions.

The formation of new German divisions led it to be supposed that there would be a repetition of an attack during the early days of the spring, probably on the western front. It was there- fore decided that active operations should be pushed forward on each front in every possible way compatible with climatic condi- tions. " In order to deny to the enemy the initiative in resuming operations, the Allied armies will be ready to make a joint offensive from the "first half of Feb. 1917, with all the available forces at their disposal." The beginning of the offensive would be fixed according to circumstances and by common consent of the commanders-in-chief, who would maintain between them- selves the " closest liaison." The Russian High Command declared its willingness to undertake the task of putting Bulgaria out of action; the Allied army in Salonika, brought up to a strength of 23 divisions, should cooperate. The mutual support that the Allies gave each other during the preceding year should continue, and the Franco-British and Italian staffs should jointly study questions of transport and the cooperation of troops.

General Joffre therefore drew up from Nov. 27 a general plan of attack. From Feb. i the French armies were to be ready to attack between the Somme and the Oise, at the same time as British forces between Bapaume and Vimy; from Feb. 20, the group of armies forming the centre would attack in their turn in Champagne between Pontavert and Reims.

The method of these attacks is detailed in instructions dated Dec. 1 6 and based upon experience gained both at Verdun and on the Somme. They were to take place on as large a front as possible, to aim at carrying the enemy's artillery positions in or- der to disorganize the defence by the capture of their guns, and to follow each other with the shortest possible delay in order to gain the whole advantage of any results obtained. The break-through was to be exploited boldly and vigorously; for it is the strength and rapidity of attack which ensures success. The tactical de- velopment, which must be indicated in operation orders, is to be realized by the grouping of forces according to the lie of the ground, the strongest forces being reserved for those sectors where progress can be most rapid. The preparation of attacks with artillery support is moreover studied in detail in these in- structions; they indicate clearly, however, a change of method and consider the possibility of being able to break the enemy front by mass attack rapidly executed, carefully prepared and studied in its smallest detail.

The question of exploiting a successful attack is not forgotten, and its rapidity should embarrass the enemy and anticipate the arrival of his reserves; the attacks have a definite objective, but they are no longer forced to limit themselves to this objective.

M. Briand's Government strongly urged decisive offensive for the spring of 1917; political parties supported this. The effect produced on the public mind by the prolongation of hos- tilities and by a war of attrition was exaggerated; it was feared that German submarines would prevent the import into France of food and raw materials; lastly, the maintenance of combatant forces was, it was stated, becoming difficult. In the Chamber of Deputies the War Commission in Dec. handed to the Govern- ment the report of M. Violette supporting its conclusions: " If we are wise, we shall recommence active operations from the end of Feb. . . . the initiative in the great battle is a ques- tion of life or death for France."

It was in these circumstances that Gen. Nivelle took over the command of the French armies, in order to carry out the opera- tions decided upon by the Allied Governments, drawn up by the Allied general staffs, and in which the plan of attack had been decided upon in general instructions issued by his predecessor. He considered that the front of attack might be slightly extended, and that there would be a great advantage for the progress of the offensive in Champagne in capturing the Chemin des Dames, a formidable position which overlooked the whole plain, and which assured him a bridgehead on the right bank of the Aisne.

Furthermore, the attack on the Somme and that on the Aisne must be simultaneous, and not successive, as in the original plan.

The Anglo-French offensive in the N. was to begin with a considerable straightening out of the British front.

Sir Douglas Haig was to attack Vimy with his I. Army, at the same time the III. and V. Armies should reduce the pocket left between Arras and Bapaume after the success of 1916. Follow- ing this, a concerted action should be undertaken in conjunction with the northern group of French armies, which was to operate between the Somme and the Oise. General d'Esperey had re- lieved Gen. Foch of his command, the latter having been un- justifiably placed in disgrace after the battle of the Somme, the results of which were misunderstood.

On the Aisne the French offensive was to stretch from Vailly to Reims; Gen. Petain, having been consulted by the new com- mander-iri-chief regarding the offensive that had been planned, had very frankly expressed his criticism, which made it difficult to employ him in carrying out the operations. General Nivelle therefore entrusted their preparation to Gen. Micheler, who at this moment was strongly in favour of a lightning mass attack. The V. Army under Masel, which had occupied the front of the attack since 1914, closed up on its right in order to make way for the VI. Army, of which Gen. Mangin had just assumed command; the X. Army under Duchesne was held in reserve in order to exploit any success after the line had been broken.

The operation plans were drawn up for the various branches of the command according to the usual procedure. The general officer commanding, Gen. Nivelle, gave directions and indicated the form of attack; the commander of the group of armies, Gen. Micheler, fixed the objectives; the commanders of the armies, Masel and Mangin, shared the task amongst their army corps, and the instructions which were given to them were strictly limited to the role of their armies in the battle. It could not be otherwise, the commander-in-chief alone is in a position to con- ceive and draw up the plan of an offensive on a grand scale, as this presupposes a thorough knowledge of the general situation, of the possible cooperation of Allied armies, of the strength and resources of the national armies and of the enemy armies, as well as the instructions issued by the various war commissions and finally of the intentions of the Government.

General Nivelle had decided on a smashing attack, aiming with the first assault to capture the enemy positions and the entire zone occupied by the artillery; this idea was in accord with the orders issued on Dec. 16 and signed by his predecessor, carried out on two occasions under his orders at Verdun. Such an operation appeared quite feasible, and no one raised any ob- jection to it. He foresaw also, immediately after the break- through, the possibility of rapidly exploiting his success; the breach made would be immediately enlarged on both sides and the " arme de manoeuvre " brought into action: " the later development of the operations having as its object to bring the main forces as rapidly as passible in a northerly direction: the main pivot Craonne-Gmse."

General Micheler, in transmitting these directions, added that, in his opinion, the whole of the operations could be accomplished either on the day of attack or at the latest on the morning of the following day. As the objective to be reached he sketched a line passing to the farther side of the hills which overlook the north bank of the Ailette, reaching the plain of Laon to the N. and pushing in an easterly direction beyond the fort of Brimont. The first schemes of the operations called forth exchanges of opinion, as is always the case under similar Circumstances. The only reservations were made by Gen. Mangin, who asked that preparations for attack, followed by this actual carrying out, should take place on several other sectors of the front, in order to obtain at the very least a relative surprise; he asked for exceptionally powerful artillery in order to shorten the period of preparation without endangering the actual task of destruction; and he added: "Seasonable weather is of great importance; march rapidity demands good going of the roads; the development of the operation would be assisted when the days are long and the nights clear. It is to be hoped that operations carried out prior