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604 yd. from its starting point, while in the centre in less than an hour it was seen to be approaching Cabaret de Navarin farm, over 2, 500 yd. from Souain.

To the E. the Moroccan division (II. Colonial Corps) carried the first German line in the first rush and penetrated into the wood near the Souain-Tahure road. Parties of the 28th Div. (XIV. Corps) took part in this whirlwind attack. In 17 min- utes they had reached Trou Bricot, more than 1,000 yd. from their jumping-off trenches; by noon they had passed the Souain- Tahure road and reached the slopes to the W. of this latter vil- lage, having advanced some 4,000 yd. and made considerable captures of material (10 guns were taken by a single regiment). At this point they reached the hostile second position, which for the most part was sited on reverse slopes and was thus invisible save at a short distance. Before an attempt could be made to carry it a new artillery preparation was necessary.

In the Perthes gap French progress was quite as rapid. Two thousand yd. to the N. of the village the infantry reached the camp of Elberfelds, and captured some officers in their beds; they thus turned the left flank of the stormy redoubt N. of Le Mesnil; but the Germans held out in a switch trench for several days.

The XX. Corps attacked on the right of the XIV., the nth Div. to the left, the 39th on the right and the issrd in Corps reserve. The objectives of the nth Div. were the Cuisines ravine and Le Mesnil hill, involving an advance to a depth of 3,000 yd. on a front of 3,000. After carrying these defences it was to push a further 4,000 yd. to the Dormois valley.

The first part of this programme was speedily accomplished but the right of the XIV. Corps, held up by uncut wire, left the flank of the nth Div. in the air, and several enemy battalions, sheltered in two tunnels, running N. and S. under Le Mesnil hill, came out as soon as the French troops had passed on and fired into their rear; the left of the nth Div. was thus enveloped and destroyed in a desperate fight against superior numbers. An attempt was then made to push forward the right and turn the hill on the E., but the reinforcements asked for arrived too late.

To the right of the nth Div. the 39th had attacked, with its left moving on Maisons de Champagne. The crest on which this farm stood was taken and several enemy batteries surprised and captured. To the W., towards Bois Allonge, other batteries were rushed while in the act of limbering up. Further on two squadrons of mounted hussars intervened in a very unexpected manner; crossing the first enemy line despite a heavy barrage they de- bouched rapidly,Uttracting to themselves all the attention of the enemy, who to the number of 600 were then captured by the infantry who profited by the diversion caused by the cavalry.

On the extreme right the I. Colonial Corps was to capture La Main de Massiges, a complicated tangle of ridges, covered with trenches and dugouts. In the first rush the Colonial troops reached in 20 minutes the crater on the summit of Hill 101; the enemy counter-attacked but without success. The mopping-up of the captured ground was then begun and continued for several days. In the evening eight enemy trench lines had been taken, and on the Index, it was said, as many as nineteen.

Generally speaking the day had been highly successful, al- though at certain points the Germans still maintained their first positions. Almost everywhere the French had advanced some 2,000 to 4,000 yd., and Gen. de Castelnau believed that the road to Vouziers would soon be opened. But the French line was very sinuous, some units facing E. and some W. and the rest N. In the region of Perthes and Souain, Sept. 26 and 27 were devoted to straightening the line and in feeling forward up to the second German position on a I2,ooo-yd. front. The ad- vance went especially well between Auberive and Souain, N. of the Roman road, where the VII. Corps did brilliantly. By the 28th the total area reconquered from Auberive to the west- ern slopes of the Souain valley measured 16,000 yd. sq., and 3,000 prisoners and 44 guns had been taken.

To the E. the French troops succeeded in linking up, on the 27th, with those operating against Hill 193, W. of Tahure, sur- rounding and capturing a body of the enemy 2,000 strong; the camp of Sadowa and Hill 201 facing Tahure hill were taken also.

On the remainder of the front, as far as the Aisne valley, the pressure of attack continued by means of violent bombardments, bombing attacks and local offensives. But on the 26th the 3gth Div. was driven from Maisons de Champagne, and a fresh at- tack by the iS3rd Div. on the 27th in the same region only partially succeeded.

On La Main de Massiges the Germans received reinforcements drawn particularly from the XVI. Corps, and French progress henceforth became more difficult. None the less the I. Colonial Corps continued to advance between the 25th and the 3oth. To the N. it reached Mont Tetu (Hill 199), and pushed down towards Ville sur Tourbe, capturing prisoners and material.

By Sept. 28 contact was made with the German second posi- 'tion on a front of 13,000 yd. from S. of St. Souplet and Somme- Py. Westwards the line bent back towards Auberive, which was still in enemy hands, as was also the hill of Le Mesnil and the neighbouring woods to the E. But progress towards Tahure and Ripont and possession of La Main de Massiges secured the envelopment of this last position on both flanks.

On Sept. 28 and 29 the French succeeded in setting foot in this second hostile position at certain points such as to the W. of Le Mesnil hill and Navarin farm. In this last sector they had even breached this line, but on such a narrow front that the enemy easily succeeded in preventing any further penetration. All hope of a break-through had disappeared. The V. Cavalry Corps, which had been brought forward in view of seizing any chance of exploitation, returned on the 28th to St. Remy, without even having gone into action. A general order dated Sept. 30 an- nounced the close of the operations, the results of which included the capture of 25,000 prisoners of whom 350 were officers, 150 guns and a large amount of material of war.

On Oct. 6 the second German position was almost intact; the attack was held up in front of it in extremely difficult conditions; the French troops were in poor and half-finished trenches, hastily dug on bare slopes and exposed to flanking and enfilade fire. The attacks waich continued till Oct. 8 were difficult to carry out and cost many men. Tahure hill and the two Mamelles (Hill 187) N. of Le Mesnil were, however, taken, but Le Mesnil hill remained in enemy hands. Several attacks and counter- attacks took place at the end of Oct. and the beginning of Nov. without resulting in any material change in the situation.

According to Gen. Mangin the Sept. offensive in Champagne cost the French 80,000 killed and missing and 100,000 evacuated sick or wounded. It was therefore extremely costly, and one cannot say that the results achieved were in proportion to the sacrifices and efforts. The Allies had engaged in Champagne and Artois 52 French and 13 British divisions, more than were put into line at the battle of the Marne. These masses were sup- ported by i ,300 French and 300 British heavy guns. The consump- tion^ munitions by the II., IV., and X. Armies attained enor- mous proportions 3,980,000 rounds for the 75*8 and 987,000 for the heavy artillery. It was admitted that this last figure especially was too small for good results to be achieved; the Allied fire had been insufficient to destroy the enemy's accessory defences or the trenches of the second and third lines, especially on the reverse slope. Finally the front of attack, 25,000 yd., was not wide enough to prevent effective flanking fire.

In short, the offensive had not all the character of sudden- ness, rapidity and continuity that was desirable, and it went on too long, involving heavy losses without hope of decisive results. Thus there arose the conception of offensives with limited objectives, which when adopted as a general policy be- came fatal. In some quarters there became observable a ten- dency to adopt an even simpler method, that of " nibbling " at the enemy by partial attacks; it was forgotten that by this means the Allied troops used up their moral and physical strength at least as rapidly as that of their adversaries.

(B.E.P.)

Plan of the Offensive. The Allied plan of campaign for 1917 was drawn up, like the preceding one, at a conference which