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580 of Admiral Sir Frederick William Erskine Hamilton Nicolson, loth Bart. (1815-99). He was educated at Rugby and Brasenose College, Oxford, and in 1870 entered the Foreign Office, where he was for some time assistant private secretary to Lord Granville. In 1874 he was attached to the British Embassy in Berlin, and after occupying a succession of minor diplomatic posts became in 1885 charge d'affaires at Teheran. From 1888 to 1893 he was consul-general at Budapest, in 1894 secretary of embassy at Constantinople, from 1894 to 1895 agent in Bulgaria, and from 1895 to 1904 minister in Morocco. In 1899 he succeeded his father as nth baronet. In 1905 Sir Arthur Nicolson was sent as ambassador to Russia, where he remained until 1910, and in the latter year returned to the Foreign Office, being until 1916, when he retired, permanent Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs. He received the K.C.I.E. in 1888, the K.C.B. in 1901, the G.C.- V.O. in 1905, and the G.C.M.G. in 1906. He was raised to the peerage on his retirement, and took the title of Baron Carnock. He published in 1873 a History of the German Constitution.

CAROLUS-DURAN [CHARLES AUGUSTE EMILE DURAND] (1837-1917), French painter (see 5.381*), died in Paris Feb. 18 1917.

CARPATHIANS, BATTLES OF THE, 1915. In Jan. 1915 the E. flank of the continuous battle-front in the Carpathians lay around Baligrod. Farther to the E. as far as the Rumanian frontier, the Austro-Hungarian High Command had so far succeeded in preventing any Russian penetration into Hun- gary by means of measures improvised to meet the immediate perils such as the use of Landsturm and volunteers. All these means, however, no longer sufficed.

although the concealment of the concentration, which had to be carried out by means of a railway system of low efficiency, needed the utmost care and precaution. General Brussilov, at all events, spoke of the " whole position " being in jeopardy, in an order issued after the Austro-German offensive opened on Jan. 23.

West of the Czeremcha road 4 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions of the III. Austrian Army were to pin to their ground 5 Russian infantry and i cavalry divisions. On the E. flank Gen. von Borocvic had n infantry and 2\ cavalry divisions 1 against 9 Russian infantry and 4 cavalry divisions; Gen. von Linsingen 6 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions 2 against one Russian infantry and 2 Cossack divisions, and Gen. von Pflanzer-Baltin 6 infantry and one cavalry divisions against 2 to 3 Russian infantry divisions Reichswehr and 2 Cossack divisions. The Russian effective strengths were certainly the greater, but the Central Powers hoped despite all difficulties to keep the attack going. They were undeceived; and the battle in the Carpathians actually dragged on for some three and a half months.

After the Austro-Germans had opened their operations with brilliant initial successes, the winter became, as it were, an ally of their adversaries, and so confined the scope of operations that the Russians succeeded in taking timely counter-measures. The temperature fell 13 F. below zero, and as the troops were operating almost entirely in the open, exposed to all the severity of the weather and that without relief sickness and frost-bite soon took a heavier toll even than battle casualties, and the divisions had too few men to fill their battle sectors, which in any case were very wide. In view of the extent of the area of attack, the divisions had, almost without exception, to attack in a single

CARPATHIAN FRONT

MID JANUARY Russian Force! Austrian

Austrian Rainforctment* Single L.r.. R.llwsy OouUi

Y *

The security of Hungary and the relief of Przemysl were to be effected by an attack on a broad front across the Carpathians, which, if successful, would develop into a flank attack on a large scale against the whole Russian battle-line. In this operation there were to take part: the army group of Gen. Freiherr von Pflanzer-Baltin, from the Rumanian frontier to E. of Wyszkow; the German Southern Army, under Gen. von Linsingen (Aus- trian and German troops); thence to E. of the Uzsok pass; the reenforced right wing of the III. Army, under Gen. von Boroevic, thence to the Czeremcha road.

Success depended largely on the vehemence of the blow and on

line. After the melting away of their offensive energy no reserves were left for the continuance of the advance; after every action the strength of the troops, tried as they were by adverse circum- stances, grew weaker; by Jan. 27 the III. Army was no longer in a position to continue the offensive, and between Feb. 5 and 8 the Southern Army was in the same case. According to the unanimous conviction of both leaders and men the attack had literally " stuck fast in the snow," and thenceforward the battle became a defensive one. The Russians on the 26th had replied

1 Ten infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry divisions and one Landsturm Hussar brigade.

1 Five infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry divisions.

the Russians being surprised. This surprise was in fact secured,


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