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afternoon of Oct. 25 Capello, who could fight no more against an illness to which he ought perhaps to have given in sooner, and had been told by the chief medical officer of the army that he must resign his command, proposed to Cadorna an immediate retreat to the Tagliamento. His argument was that it was useless to send in more reserves to the chaos among the hills west of the Isonzo; that the only way to remedy the situation was to withdraw the bulk of the armies " from close contact with the enemy under the protection of vigorous rearguard actions," and so make possible the organization of a solid defence and eventual counter-attack. Cadorna agreed as to the probable necessity of retreat, but he was doubtful as to whether it should be immediate. He felt that unless he could delay the enemy advance down the Natisone and Judrio valleys by more than a mere rearguard action he ran the risk of having his centre and right, and all the mass of troops in the Udine plain, cut off from his bases. Montuori, who now succeeded Capello in command of the II. Army, was of opinion that he could hold on a line from Monte Maggiore to Monte Carnizza and thence across the valleys to Monte Korada. Cadorna decided to attempt the further stand, and, as the II. Army was obviously too large for movement, the left wing was given to Gen. Etna, late of the XXX. Corps, and the right to Gen. Ferrero, late of the XVI., while Gen. Sagramoso, who commanded the XIV. Corps, in reserve on the Isonzo, was charged with the duty of organizing a reserve line of defence on the river Torre. Tassoni, Di Robilant (IV. Army) and the Duke of Aosta were all warned to hold themselves in readiness for retreat, Di Robilant being told to send his big guns at once W. of the Piave to between Pederobba and Montebelluna. The VIIl. Corps was detached from the II. Army and given to the Duke of Aosta, who was already forming a reserve line on the western rim of the Carso, preparatory to the withdrawal of his main body. Gen. Di Giorgio was sent northward, with two divisions from the general reserve, to occupy both banks of the Tagliamento in the region of Pinzano.

Cadorna hoped to hold, for a time at least, but at midnight on Oct. 26 he was wakened to hear the news that Monte Maggiore had fallen. He at once drew up the orders for a general retreat beyond the Tagliamento, and his plans were already matured for the longer retreat, across the Piave, which he foresaw would probably be necessary. Next day the weak resistance of the II. Army rearguards and the increasing number of disbanded soldiers confirmed his impressions. He saw, too, that there was, literally, no room to bring the II. Army back in good order. He was determined to keep the southern roads clear for the III. Army, and this meant that the retiring units of the II. Army would be so hampered by disbanded soldiers and fugitive civilians that most of them could scarcely hope to get back as units. In the circumstances he had to count out the greater part of the II. Army and fall back on a line that could be held by a smaller number of troops. It was only to gain time that he attempted a stand on the Tagliamento. Provisional orders and plans for a retirement to the Piave were issued on Oct. 29. The mournful retreat began on Oct. 27, and the prospects were rendered still more serious by the fact that the Tagliamento came down in sudden and violent flood. The fords could not be used; several existing bridges were carried away, and attempts to throw new bridges were unsuccessful. The danger of losing more men and guns on the retreat became still greater.

Fortunately for Italy, and for the cause of the Entente, the Germans and Austrians were, in part at least, outrunning their transport. Krauss complains that only he and Krafft von Delmensingen, Below's chief-of-staff, had been inspired by adequate ambitions for the attack. The objective had been Cividale, or, at best, the Tagliamento. Krafft thought they should have had the Adige in view. Krauss expressed the opinion that the real objective should have been Lyons. Without taking Krauss's aspirations too seriously, it may well be believed that if the German and Austrian Commands had worked out a bigger plan they would have done even more than they did do. But the transport difficulties were very great; Germany could

not spare troops or material to make an unlimited effort on the Italian front, and the unexpectedly weak resistance of the Italian II. Army could hardly have entered into the calcula- tions of those who were bound not to take too many risks. Krauss himself admits that if the Italians had held the Stol in strength his own move would have been frustrated.

Krauss, Stein, Berrer and Scotti were very quick in their pursuit, and Berrer paid for his haste with his life. He was shot by an Italian carabiniere at the gates of Udine on Oct. 28, the day on which his advance guard entered the town, less than 20 hours after Cadorna and his staff left for Treviso. His place was taken by Hofacher. The Italian covering troops were delaying the enemy advance, and giving time for the III. Army, fighting a strong rearguard action, to come back across the Tagliamento. Henriquez had difficult mountainous country to cross before he reached the plain, and both he and Wurm were held up on the Isonzo, where the bridges had been destroyed by the retreating Italians. The critical days for the Italians were Oct. 30 and 31, when the pressure from the N. and E. threatened the flank and rear of the III. Army, whose task had been rendered more difficult by the fact that the permanent bridges at Casarsa had been blown up prematurely, owing to a false alarm. Many guns had to be left on the eastern bank, including 46 heavy batteries, which had been brought all the way from the Bainsizza. The Tagliamento was falling, however, and a number of troops succeeded in fording the river. It had been impossible to keep the Casarsa bridges for the III. Army, as several units of the

II. and a large number of disbanded men had been forced down by the pressure from the north. But on the afternoon of Oct. 31 the Duke of Aosta was able to inform Cadorna that all of his rearguard, with the exception of four brigades, who were holding a defensive bridgehead covering Madrisio, had passed the Tagliamento. The bulk of this rearguard crossed the same evening, and only a small bridgehead was held at Latisana. A considerable number of II. Army troops, having failed to cross the river at Casarsa, were coming down towards Latisana pursued by Scotti's vanguard and threatened on the flank by Henriquez. Some of these succeeded in crossing at the Latisana bridges, but the enemy attacked in considerable force the following day, and a large number of Italians were cut off and taken prisoners. By the evening of Nov. i, the left bank was entirely in the possession of the Austro-German armies.

Krauss tells a remarkable story according to which both Below, with Scotti's group, and later, Goiginger, with the right wing of Henriquez's army, wished on reaching the Tagliamento to swing S., and cut off the Duke of Aosta's army, which, Krauss maintains, was still some distance to the east. According to Krauss,, Boroevic refused to allow Scotti to encroach upon his line of march, and forbade Gen. Ludwig von Goiginger to come S. of the line marked out for the II. Isonzo Army. But before Scotti was in a position to carry out the manceuvre which Below is reported to have proposed, the bulk of the Duke's army was already across the Tagliamento, and his last four brigades were more than capable of dealing with anything Scotti could then bring against them. Before Goiginger was on the spot the whole of the III. Army had passed the river and there were on the eastern bank only the broken troops who had come down from the N. in a last attempt to find a way across. Krauss's remark, that " Boroevic had saved the Italian III. Army," has no foundation. Boroevic knew more about the

III. Army than the " German staff officers or Goiginger, who were Krauss's authorities." Krauss also asserts that the man- oeuvre would have led to the capture of the King of Italy and of Cadorna and his staff, a statement for which, though furnished by " a neutral crowned head," there are no grounds whatever.

Cadorna did not expect to stay long on the Tagliamento, but he did hope to hold up the enemy long enough to give adequate time for the retreat of the Carnia force and the IV. Army, and to organize a strong defensive line on the Piave. His weak point was the stretch of the river W. of Tarcento, for which Krauss and Stein were making with all speed. Two divisions under Di Giorgio had been dispatched to hold this line, but