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The bombardment began at two o'clock on the morning of Oct. 24, in wild autumn weather. There was a drizzle of snow on the high ridges, rain below, and mist everywhere. The bombardment opened with a shower of gas shells, mainly directed against the artillery positions. It was only later that a very heavy fire was opened on the trench lines and upon all the zone to the rear of them. Towards dawn the fire died down, and it was thought on some parts of the defending front that the bad weather had counselled a delay in the attack. The wind had risen, the rain was blown in sheets, and the snow was whirling thickly on the mountains. But the attackers were to make skilful use of the weather conditions. Only on Monte Rombon, on Krauss's extreme right, an attack in conjunction with the left wing of Krobatin's X. Army had to be given up owing to the snow.

Krauss's main attack was a straight drive through the Italian lines in the Plezzo basin, his first objective the Saga defile. But he calculated that this position, too, must be carried in the first rush, so that he could reach without delay the great ridge of the Stol (6,467 ft.), which stood athwart a further direct advance. For this attack he detailed the 22nd Schiitzen Div., followed immediately by a Kaiserjager and a Kaiser- schutzen batt., which were to go straight for the Stol, and by six battalions of the 3rd (Edelweiss) Div., which were to make for the Val Fella by way of the Val d'Ucosa. Krauss's left-hand division, the 55th (Bosnian), attacked the Vrsich-Vrata ridge, with the object of breaking through to the Isonzo and Caporetto.

Krauss's main drive, after hard fighting, broke through the three lines held by the soth Italian Div. in the Plezzo basin, but the attacking troops were checked at the Saga defile, where the Isonzo turns at right angles round the end of the Polounik ridge. When evening fell the position was still in the hands of the Italians, but the battle had gone badly for the defenders further south, and a retreat to the Stol became necessary. Krauss's Bosnians had met with no success against the left wing of the Italian 43rd Div., being driven back by counter- attacks after capturing the front lines, but Stein's group had car- ried all before it. Stein opened his attack with his right wing, the Austrian 5oth Div., at 7:30 A.M., attacking the Italian 46th between Monte Nero and Vodil Vrh. A little later the Bavarian Alpenkorps, advancing from Tolmino, attacked the ridges below the Passo di Zagradan, while Berrer and Scotti attacked farther south. When both Stein's initial attacks were under way, the 1 2th Silesian Div., under the command of Gen. von Lequis, was sent in between them. Lequis attacked in two columns, one on each side of the river, with instructions to drive straight for Caporetto, where, it was hoped, he would join with Krauss's Bosnians. Both columns were completely successful. The right- hand column, aided by the strong attacks of the Austrian 5oth Div., pierced the extreme right of the Italian 46th on the E. bank of the river and pushed N.W. with all speed. On the opposite bank the attack was equally successful. The Alpenkorps were making good headway on the slopes above the road, where the Taro brigade, surprised in the mist, made a feeble resistance, and Lequis's left-hand column quickly reached the Italian second line, where the valley narrows below the hamlet of Foni. This line, running up to Monte Plezia, had been held, until the eve of the battle, by a Bersaglieri brigade which formed the extreme right wing of the IV. Corps, but at the last moment this sector was transferred to the command of the XXVII. Corps, the Bersaglieri were given to Cavaciocchi as an additional reserve, and Badoglio received the Napoli brigade for the purpose of holding this important point. Only one battalion, however, was placed on Monte Plezia ; the rest of this regiment (the 76th) lay at Passo di Zagradan, high upon the ridge to the west, and the other regiment of the brigade (the 75th), together with the brigade command, was nearly three m. away, on the western slopes below Zagradan. The single battalion, of which only a platoon was down by the river, seems to have been taken com- pletely by surprise. It was run over by the German attack, and the Silesians proceeded on their way up the valley practically unnoticed. The rest of the regiment had seen and heard nothing

in the mist (they were being heavily shelled), and the VII. Corps, of which the 3rd Div. was waiting on the Kolovrat ridge, appears to have been equally unconscious of the course of the battle.

Meanwhile the Alpenkorps, Berrer's two divisions, and Scotti's right wing were breaking up Badoglio's left, while the latter's right, across the river, and Caviglia's XXIV. Corps were being strongly attacked by Scotti's left and the right wing of Henriquez's II. Isonzo Army. The attack from Tolmino was carried out with skill, speed and resolution, and by a capital error which has never been satisfactorily explained the Italian guns remained silent until too late. Definite orders had been given both by Cadorna and by Capello that immediately upon the opening of the enemy's bombardment the Italian artillery should reply with a fire of " counter-preparation " upon the enemy's trenches and zones of concentration, and that they should lay down a violent barrage as soon as there were signs of movement. This order was not carried out as intended. The guns of the IV. and XXVII. Corps, and particularly those backing the ipth Div., were apparently ordered to hold their fire till the word of command came from Corps headquarters. The word did not come to the batteries until too late, some never received it at all. The heavy mist, and the fact that the weight of the enemy bombardment had worked great destruction among the telephone wires, combined to prevent any effective reply on the part of the Italian guns. When the guns began, their fire was fitful, uncertain, blind, and they were too late. The enemy's attack had already developed when the Italian guns opened on his trenches. Taken by surprise, puzzled by the comparative silence of their own guns and blinded by the mist, the troops of the ipth Div. opposed only a weak resistance to the Austro-German attack. They were heavily outnumbered, but they held strong positions which should have enabled them to delay the enemy advance until the reserves could come into play. Some of the troops fought with all their old stubbornness, but others gave themselves up or abandoned the trenches when the enemy columns came out of the mist.

Henriquez's attack on the Bainsizza plateau, although it met with some initial success, was readily repulsed, and Badoglio's troops captured several hundred prisoners in a strong counter- attack. Badoglio had hoped to hold the enemy attack from Tolmino, and turn the scale by a counter-attack on the Lorn plateau with his three divisions on the left bank of the river. He seems to have had the idea of doing on a smaller scale what Capello had wished to do in large, and it certainly appears as though he had kept his left unduly weak in the hope of being able to deal a heavy counter-blow. If he had obeyed in the letter Cadorna's order that the greater part of the forces belong- ing to the XXVII. Corps should be brought back to the right bank of the Isonzo (the igth Div. and its reserves counted five battalions more than the three divisions across the river), it can hardly be said that the spirit of the order was carried out. In any case, Badoglio was not afforded the chance of attempting any such manceuvre as he may have had in mind. It was long before he received any news of how the day was going on the front of the i^th Div., and from the beginning of the action he was unable to communicate with his divisions on the left bank of the river. Telephones had broken down; the mist prevented signalling, and despatch riders do not seem to have been em- ployed. It was not until the afternoon that Badoglio heard that his front lines were gone and his main positions threatened. He knew nothing of the break through in the valley and had no news from the IV. Corps. In a message sent to Army Head- quarters at 4 P.M., he reported the enemy success south of Jeza, but said that he had no news from the commands of the i gth Div. and the troops farther N., and that he was unable to communicate with anyone.

By 4 P.M. Lequis's Silesians were approaching Caporetto. The left-hand column was unmolested by the troops of Buongiovanni's VII. Corps, which were lying too far back and were very slow in coming on the scene. The right-hand column, which had cut in behind the Italian 43rd Div., was making the task of the Austrian 5oth comparatively easy, and brushing