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572 ance, so much so that, as Ludendorff records, " the responsible military and political authorities of the Dual Monarchy were convinced that they would not be able to stand a continuation of the battle and a twelfth attack on the Isonzo. ... In the middle of Sept. it became necessary to decide for the attack on Italy in order to prevent the collapse of Austria-Hungary."

Though the Italian advance on the Bainsizza plateau had come so near to a definite break through, it had left the Italian II. Army badly placed for defence. South of Tolmino the Aug. fighting had bitten out a wide salient on the Bainsizza plateau. North of Tolmino the Italians were still in the positions they had occupied early in the campaign, among the mountains on the left bank of the Isonzo, with comparatively little room between the trenches and the river. Neither sector of the line was satisfactory for defence, and on the Bainsizza there had been little time to make adequate preparations, because of the rocky nature of the ground. But the real weakness of the situation was due to the enemy's possession of the Tolmino bridgehead. The bridgehead itself was strong, as it did not form a salient, the Austrian line running nearly due N. and S. from the great ridge of Rudeci Rob (6,250 ft.) by Mrzli and Vodil Vrh to the high hills of the Lom plateau, N. of the Bainsizza. The bridge- head was well protected by these flanking bastions, and for this reason it made an excellent point of departure for an attack. The ridges in front of it rose steeply, and were strongly held by the Italians, whose position, however, suffered from two grave drawbacks. In the first place it was impossible to support the defence by direct flanking fire against attacking troops; in the second place, there was little depth in the lines traced on the Zagradan-Jeza ridge, which fell rapidly to the head of the Judrio valley and the glens which carry the minor streams between the Judrio and the Natisone.

There was a clear difference of opinion on the Italian side as to the best way of meeting the forthcoming attack. Cadorna was convinced that he had to stand on the defensive, the more so as he was uncertain in which sector of the Julian front the chief blow would fall, but his instructions naturally included and recommended vigorous local counter-attacks. Capello, who commanded the II. Army, did not like the idea of the defensive. His army was in the main aligned for attack. Preparations had been made for a continuation of the offensive which had been broken off in Sept., and it was not possible, given the difficulty of communications and the risk of imminent attack, to take up those positions best adapted for defence. He felt, in addition, that opposite the Tolmino bridgehead he had little room for defence, and he was anxious to anticipate the enemy's move by an attack N.E. from his positions on the Bainsizza plateau. In this idea he had the support of more than one of his corps commanders, but Cadorna thought, and it is difficult to meet his reasoning, that he could not throw in the forces necessary for such an attack when he was uncertain as to the direction of the forthcoming blow. His first news from the enemy side spoke of an attack against his new lines on the Bainsizza. Later came the report of a more general attack, " from Plezzo to the sea." The enemy believed that Cadorna had been deceived by demonstrations made in the Trentino, and their belief was fortified by news that he was sending guns westward. But these were the French and British heavy guns (nearly 200 in number), which had been withdrawn when he stated that he could not renew his offensive, and a number of batteries now restored to the Trentino front, which had been stripped for the earlier fighting.

Cadorna was still preoccupied about the moral of his troops, and he made careful inquiries on this point, which received very satisfactory replies. He was especially anxious as the units which had suffered heavily during the last offensive were but newly filled with fresh drafts, and he had found reason before to fear the influence of some of the men fresh from the depots. But the answers of his corps commanders were thoroughly reassuring. He had enough men, though a number of his units were below strength, while others were battle-worn and others again had suffered much from an intestinal disease that had

been prevalent in the valleys of the Natisone and the Judrio; and he had enough guns, in spite of the withdrawal of the Allied artillery, though he would doubtless have been glad of a larger reserve. Between Monte Rombon and Monte San Gabriele, Capello had some 2,200 guns and nearly 800 trench mortars.

North of Tolmino the line on the left bank of the Isonzo was held by Cavaciocchi's IV. Corps, whose left wing held the Plezzo basin and was in contact with the Carnia Force on Monte Rombon. Next came Badoglio's XXVII. Corps, whose left wing, the igth Div., raised to the strength of an army corps, held the lines opposite Tolmino. The other three divisions which completed the XXVII. Corps were across the river S. of the Lom plateau. Behind the 46th and igth Divs., on the mountains W. of the Isonzo, lay the VII. Corps, newly recon- stituted with units from other corps, and commanded by Gen. Buongiovanni. On the right of the XXVII. , holding the line as far as the Sella di Dol between Monte Santo and Monte San Gabriele, were Caviglia's XXIV. Corps and Albricci's II. Corps, each' of three divisions, with the XIV. Corps in immediate reserve. The Gorizia sector, from Monte Santo to the Vippacco, was occupied by the VI. Corps (Gatti) and the VIII. (Grazioli). South of the Vippacco the Duke of Aosta's III. Army had three corps (seven divisions) in line XL, XIII., and XXIII.

The weak point of the Italian line was the Tolmino sector, the weakest part of this sector was at the junction of the XXVII. Corps (igth Div.) with the IV. (46th Div.), and the weakest position of all was that held by the right of the 46th Div., who were clinging to the slopes of Mrzli Vrh, completely dominated by the enemy, and badly off for communications with their neighbours. The Tolmino sector was chosen for the main enemy attack, and here, owing to a complex of circumstances, the Austro-German forces won a success that led to a great Italian disaster. In anticipation of the main drive in this direction, the II. Army reserves (XXVIII. Corps and various other units) were lying N. of Cormons, while three divisions under the direct control of Cadorna waited between Cormons and Cividale, at the foot of the valleys that run down S.W. from the threatened point. A further general reserve consisting of the XXV. (four divisions) and XXX. Corps (two divisions) lay about Palmanova, ready to be sent N. or E., according as the fighting developed.

The Italian preparations were much handicapped by the illness of Capello. From the beginning of Oct. the commander of the II. Army was seriously unwell, and though he had the assistance of Gen. Montuori, who was brought to Army Head- quarters from the II. Corps, the II. Army undoubtedly suffered much from Capello's physical unfitness. Montuori had only taken command of the II. Corps a few weeks before; he had come from the Asiago uplands and knew little or nothing of the II. Army front. On Oct. 20 Capello left for Padua, in the hope of securing a short rest, leaving Montuori in command. His rest lasted less than two days; for when the imminence of the enemy attack was confirmed by two deserting enemy of- ficers, of Rumanian nationality, he returned to resume his command, reaching Cormons late on the night of Oct. 22.

The main attack came in the direction anticipated, between Monte Rombon and S. of Tolmino, and was conducted by a mixed German and Austrian army under Gen. Otto von Below. The army, which was known as the XIV. Army, consisted of nine Austrian divisions and seven German, divided into four " groups." The northern group of four divisions (three Austrian and one German Jager) was commanded by Krauss, who had been called back from the Bukovina. Next came a group of three divisions (one Austrian and two German) under the German von Stein, and a group of two German divisions under the German von Berrer. South of these two central groups was a mixed group under the Austrian von Scotti (commander of the Austrian XV. Corps). This group consisted of one German and two Austrian divisions. Behind these, E. of Tolmino, lay four divisions in reserve, at Below's immediate disposal. Boroevi6 had 20 divisions in his two " Isonzo " Armies between Auzza and the sea. Below and Henriquez (II. Isonzo Army) had some 2,500 guns and 500 trench mortars.