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532 with a revolver. The unfortunate journalist was well known for his interest in art, and possessed a fine collection of caricatures and engravings of the First Empire.

CAMBON, PAUL PIERRE (1843- ), French diplomatist (see 5.85), was appointed French ambassador in London in 1898. His career at the London embassy was brilliant in the extreme. He was one of the leading artisans of the Entente Cordiale, and played a very important part in frustrating the efforts made by Germany to separate France and Great Britain in 1914 on the eve of the World War and in maintaining good Franco-British relations during the peace negotiations. He resigned his post in Nov. 1920.

His brother, (1845- ), had become French ambassador at Berlin in 1907, and was there when the World War opened. He reached France from his post in Berlin after a journey in the course of which he was subjected by the Germans to many indignities. He had been a close observer of Germany's year-long preparations for war. He became General Secretary of the Foreign Office during M. Briand's war term of office, a post which he occupied with distinction. He was also elected a member of the French Academy.

CAMBRAI, BATTLE OF (1917): see ; also.

'''CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN, BATTLE OF''' (Aug. 26-Oct. 5 1918). The first stage of the British offensive in Aug. 1918, the battle of Amiens, had been successfully accomplished, and the second stage, the battle of Bapaume-Peronne, was making good progress (see ) when it was considered by British G.H.Q. that on Aug. 25 (to use the words of Lord Haig) "the proper moment had come for the third stage of the operations, in which the First Army should extend the flank of our attack to the north. By driving eastward from Arras, covered on the left by the rivers Scarpe and Sensee, the First Army would endeavour to turn the enemy's positions on the Somme battlefield and cut his system of railway communications which ran south-westward across their front." See map, Plate I.

1. Operations of the First Army (Aug. 26-Sept. 26). The forces at the disposal of Gen. Home's First Army for these operations consisted of the I. and VIII. Corps, to which the Canadian Corps was now added. This last-named formation began to arrive in the army area on Aug. 22, and was put into line on the right or southern wing of the army. Thus the front on Aug. 25, the eve of the offensive, was held as follows, from right to left: Canadian Corps (Currie) (2nd Canadian, 3rd Canadian and sist Div. in line, 1st Canadian Div. in reserve); VIII. Corps (Hunter-Weston) (8th and 2oth Div. in line, 24th Div. in reserve); and I. Corps (Holland) (ssth and i6th Div.in line, i5th Div. in reserve). Of these forces, however, only those astride the Scarpe, i.e. the Canadian Corps, were to be engaged, the main axis of the attack being the line of the Arras-Cambrai road; the two remaining corps were to stand fast, while making all endeavours to deceive the enemy and prevent him dispatching reinforcements to other threatened points. The VIII. and I. Corps therefore will not come again into this narrative.

Facing the right of the First Army were the German I. Bavarian Reserve Corps astride the Scarpe and the II. Bavarian Corps as far south as the Arras-Cambrai railway. These two corps formed the right of the Seventeenth Army and had divisions in line. They held the old German trenches of 1916 from W. of Gavrelle in the N., by Fampoux, Feuchy, and Tilloy to Neuville Vitasse in the south. Behind them lay a succession of strongly fortified zones first, the old British and German defences of 1917 covering all the ground W. of the Coieul river; next the Fresnes-Rouvroy line and the Vis en Artois switches and finally the Drocourt-Queant line. To the E. of this, the last artificial position, there lay the strong natural defence line of the Canal du Nord covering Cambrai. The task upon which the First Army was about to embark was thus no easy one.

The Canadian attack was timed for 3 A.M. on Aug. 26 that is, well before dawn. Some 45 tanks were available, and owing to the absence of some of the corps artillery only 600 guns covered the advance. Two objectives were assigned, the first running E. of Fampoux and W. of Monchy and Wancourt, the second including Roeux, Monchy and Guemappe, while exploitation was to be carried out beyond this latter line as far as possible.

The operation was carried out exactly as ordered. The Germans opposite the Canadians appear to have been warned of the attack and to have thinned out their front line, so that resistance was weak at first. Heavy fighting, however, took place for the second objective, particularly in the southern sector, where the 2nd Canadian Div. was operating; here the ridge E. of Wancourt and Guemappe was not finally secured till late at night. The 3rd Canadian Div. had pushed its troops beyond Monchy and up to the edge of Pelves by midday, while N. of the Scarpe the 51st Div., advancing at 9 A.M., occupied Fampoux and Gavrelle with little opposition. The Germans delivered counter-attacks S. of the river without success and at the end of the day the Canadians had penetrated into and maintained themselves within the enemy defences some two and a half miles to the E. of their starting points.

The operations were continued during the following two days by the same divisions in line. The 3rd Canadian Div., moving off at 4:55 A.M. on the 27th, met with steadily increasing hostile resistance, chiefly on the left in the Scarpe valley; the 2nd Canadian Div. commenced its advance only at 10 A.M. Both made progress, and by the evening had reached the line of the Sensee, between Cherisy and Remy. The Canadians now found themselves in front of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, which in this sector ran from N. of Hendecourt by Remy and Boiry to Biache, and the capture of this line was assigned as the objective for the 28th. The divisions again advanced at different hours, the 3rd at 9 A.M., the 2nd at 12:30 P.M., and the brigades and battalions also attacked in succession from the left, thus enabling all the artillery available to unite in covering the advance of each unit in turn. This method proved highly successful on the left, where by the end of the day the 3rd Div. was in possession of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line along its entire front; the 2nd Div., however, despite valiant efforts, was unable to make much progress.

That night the divisions in line were relieved, the ist Canadian Div. coming in on the right, the 4th British Div. on the left. The next few days were devoted to preparations for the attack on the Drocourt-Queant h'ne, timed for Sept. i but later post- poned to the 2nd. Artillery and bridging material were brought forward and wire-cutting commenced, while a series of partial infantry attacks took place with the object of securing suitable jumping-off ground. The XXII. Corps (Godley) was now brought in on the Canadian left; the nth Div. was put in on the N. bank of the Scarpe and the sist and 8th taken over from the Canadians and VIII. Corps respectively; the 49th Div. was retained in reserve. As a result of the local operations carried out on both banks of the river, Arleux and Plouvain fell into the hands of the XXII. Corps, and the Canadians completed the capture of the remaining German positions W. of the Drocourt-Queant line. By the evening of Sept. 1 all was ready for the morrow's attack.

This was to be carried out by the ist Canadian Div. on the right, the 4th Canadian Div. in the centre, and the 4th British Div. on the left on the front from N. of Hendecourt to W. of Sailly, measuring some 55 m. in width. Five hundred guns and 45 tanks were detailed off to assist. The first objective was to be the front and support lines of the Drocourt-Queant system; the second the W. bank of the Canal du Nord between the Arras-Cambrai road and the Scarpe, and the third a line just to the E. of that obstacle. The XXII. Corps astride the Scarpe was to secure the Canadian left. The XVII. Corps (Ferguson), on the left of the British Third Army, was to advance on the Canadian right, after the capture of the first objective, and by passing through the breach made by the Canadians to turn from the N. all the German defences in the vicinity of Queant, where the Drocourt-Queant line joined the main Hindenburg line.

The attack began at 5 A.M., rapidly overran all resistance and by 9:15 A.M. had possessed itself of its first objective on all its