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It is not yet known at what precise moment Ferdinand secretly promised his support to the Central Powers, but the Agrarian leader, Stamboliiski, as early as Aug. 1914 accused the Govern- ment of having bound itself to the Central Powers, and there are certainly indications that the decision had been taken in the early part of 1915. The Opposition press at the outbreak of war appeared to be decidedly pro-Entente, though non-inter- ventionist in tendency. Gueshov and Stamboliiski constantly pressed for an agreement among the Balkan states themselves.

During the year in which Bulgaria maintained her neutrality, the rival groups of Powers made considerable efforts to secure her cooperation. It may be that Ferdinand had from an early date committed himself to a line of policy, but among Bulgars it is thought that, had the Entente encouraged the Opposition, who represented the great majority of the people; had the men- tality of the people been better understood; had the Entente been definite in the proposals which from time to time were put before Bulgaria; had these proposals been made at propitious and not always at unpropitious moments; had the Entente been skilful and vigorous in its propaganda, it might well have been that the people would have imposed their will on the rulers whom they hated and despised. But the Entente policy pursued no certain course: the Entente Governments were slow to recognize the importance of Bulgarian cooperation; they were unwilling to pay the price which was asked for that cooperation ; they did not realize the importance of the personal element in dealing with the Bulgars and with the King. The best propaganda for the Entente was the declaration that they were fighting for the cause of small nations and for the principle of nationality, since to the Bulgar this declaration meant protection for the Bulgarian state and reunion with the Bulgars of Macedonia and Thrace.

The most propitious moment to secure the support of Bulgaria would have been at the time of the Russian successes in the Carpathians in 1915, as the old feeling for Russia had never died out among the peasants. The chances of winning Bulgaria for the Entente lessened after the failure to pass the Dardanelles in March. German propaganda was skilfully handled; war news came chiefly through German sources; Tarnowski, the Austro- Hungarian minister at Sofia, either from personality or from force of circumstances, apparently controlled the situation there. The Entente proposals were hedged about with conditions; at the^end of May 1915, they offered the Enos-Midia line and the uncontested zone in Macedonia, provided that, at the end of the war, Bosnia and the Herzegovina had been united to Serbia. Early in June, Austria-Hungary promised to Bulgaria, as the price of her neutrality, all Serbian Macedonia as well as the territory claimed by Bulgaria and now occupied by Rumania and Greece. On June 15 Bulgaria replied to the Entente note, asking for more specific guarantees. During July personal pressure was brought to bear at Sofia by special missions a British mission composed of Mr. O'Beirne, Sir Valentine Chirol and Mr. G. Fitzmaurice; a French mission, and, on behalf of Germany, by Prince Hohenlohe while active negotiations continued with Turkish delegates. On Aug. 3 the Entente answered the Bulgarian note of June 15; the Entente offered to Bulgaria, if she declared war on Turkey, the occupation of half the non-contested zone at once, the fate of the rest of this zone and of the contested zone to be decided at the peace; the immediate occupation of Seres and the promise of Kavalla, if Bulgaria would renounce all claims to Salonika, Kastoria and Vodena; and the promise of the Enos-Midia line. As these terms involved the retrocession of certain territories and places then occupied by Serbia and Greece, the allied representatives in Belgrade and Athens had the ungrateful task of trying to per- suade Serbia and Greece to give up what they had won by force of arms, as the price of Bulgaria's cooperation. Greece, inspired by Germany, refused absolutely to consider any cession of territory and Serbia, where the military party was at the time dominant, was equally intransigeant.

On Aug. 19 Gen. Fichev, Minister of War, who was thought to be averse to further military adventures, resigned, and was suc- ceeded by Gen. Jekov, who had lately been acting as negotiator

with the Turks. The Opposition, becoming increasingly anxious, in vain demanded that the Sobranye should meet. On Aug.

23 Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, and on Aug. 25 Venizelos returned to power. The moment had now come when the Central Powers desired the entry of Bulgaria into the war, and the Duke of Mecklenburg, who as special per- sonal representative of the Kaiser and from his ability and personality was known to have a strong influence on the King, was sent from Germany to make the final arrangements. On Sept. 6 a military convention and treaty between Bulgaria and the Central Powers was signed at Pless. By this convention Germany and Austria-Hungary each agreed to send six infan- try divisions within a space of 30 days, and Bulgaria four in- fantry divisions within 35 days, against the Serbs; F.-M. von Mackensen was to be commander-in-chief of the combined force. Turkey was, if so desired, to send troops to Dede Aghach to prevent an enemy landing. Germany agreed to advance 200 million francs to Bulgaria for military expenses, and to provide as much military material as she could spare. On Sept. 10 the existence of the treaty was admitted by Radoslavov, who stated that Bulgaria was " coming in on the side of the vic- tors." On Sept. 12 the Opposition issued a manifesto, signed by many notable Bulgars, protesting against the policy of the Government and urging all citizens to unite to prevent the fatal step; the manifesto was, however, suppressed and the Opposition then demanded an audience of the King. On Sept. 15 the Entente made a final effort to induce Bulgaria to declare war on Turkey; Macedonia was promised unconditionally and the allied troops would occupy Macedonia for the time being, if Bulgaria so desired, as a guarantee that it would eventually be handed over to Bulgaria. On Sept. 17, at n P.M., the King received the Opposition leaders in audience. Malinov warned the King that if Bulgaria remained neutral, she might become the battlefield between the Germans invading Serbia and the Allies who would land at Salonika; and that, if she joined the Central Powers, she would be fighting against three Balkan peoples and four Great Powers and that it would mean the end of her national existence. Stamboliiski it was the first time a representative of the Agrarians had entered the palace put the views of his party before the King with characteristic vigour and bntsquerie. The Agrarians, he said, desired to preserve neutrality; they demanded the convocation of the Sobranye and the formation of a national Government. He rejected all appeal to sentiment, whether on behalf of Russia or of Germany, and he warned the King that the people were still suffering from the terrible effects of the debacle of 1913 and that they had lost all confidence in their rulers, including the King himself. He told the King that after the Treaty of Bucharest, it was only the leaders of the Agrarians who prevented a general movement against the authors of the pogrom, among whom the King held the chief place, and that, should the King repeat the criminal act of plunging his country into war, the leaders would not check the revolt against him but would themselves head it. Tsanov, the Radical leader, spoke with equal emphasis and sincerity. An account of the audience was published, but its circulation was forbidden, and Stamboli- iski was condemned to imprisonment for life on a charge of lese-majeste. On Sept. 22 the terms of the Turco-Bulgarian agreement were published; the Bulgarian frontier was to follow the Tunja valley as far as the suburbs of Adrianople, in- cluding the railway station, and then to follow the left bank of the Maritsa southwards at a distance of about 2 km., thus safeguarding Bulgarian railway communication between Sofia and Dede Aghach.

Mobilization was decreed on Sept. 22, the Greek army being mobilized immediately afterwards. On Oct. 4, Savinski, Russian minister at Sofia, informed the Bulgarian Government that he had been instructed to leave the country if within

24 hours Bulgaria did not break with the enemies of the Slav cause and forthwith send away the military officers of hostile belligerent states. On Oct. 5 the Bulgarian Government replied that the mobilization was a measure of internal importance only, that the landing of Allied troops at Salonika did not tend to