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military party, in particular from the hostility of the creator of the German navy, Admiral von Tirpitz, who was once and again put forward by the more aggressive chauvinists as their candidate for the chancellorship. But Bethmann Hollweg him- self did not see that the influence of that powerful section of German opinion and its action in military and naval as in foreign policy furnished ample justification for such measures of precaution as the Western Powers and Russia concerted, measures which, indeed, proved hardly adequate to confront the first German onset in 1914.

The renewed conflict with France over Morocco in 1911, the dispatch of the gunboat " Panther " to Agadir, the consequent friction with Great Britain and the prolonged negotiations which led to the mutually unsatisfactory Franco-German Morocco agreement, mainly fell within the province of Beth- mann Hollweg's able subordinate, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, who at that time was Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. Here, as on other occasions, the Chancellor was probably pacific in his intentions, but in the means which were adopted to secure Germany's objects he showed either lack of judgment or inabil- ity to control his political and military subordinates.

In his book Bctrachtungen zum Weltkrieg (Reflections on the World War), written in his retirement at Hohenfinow after the collapse of Germany, he gives an account of the exchange of views which took place between him and Lord Haldane during the latter's visit to Berlin in Feb. 1912. This account ought to be read in conjunction with Lord Haldane's own report of his visit, 1 particularly with regard to the attempt of the two statesmen to find a formula for a treaty of mutual assurance calculated to allay apprehensions of war between Great Britain and Germany. Bethmann Hollweg wished to obtain an engage- ment from Great Britain to observe a benevolent neutrality in the event of Germany's becoming " entangled in a war with one or more other Powers," or, as he finally formulated it, " if war should be forced upon Germany." His conception of a war " forced upon Germany " was subsequently revealed by his defence of Germany's declarations of war upon Russia and France, accusing the one Power of having rendered war unavoid- able by its precautionary measures of mobilization and the other of having opened hostilities by air raids which never took place. In the exchange of views regarding the German and British naval programmes Lord Haldane received the impres- sion that Bethmann Hollweg was pursuing a different policy from that of Admiral Tirpitz, but that the latter had the sup- port of a powerful and certainly active party in the country and was able to get his way. Indeed, Bethmann Hollweg himself says in his book that " when differences arose between the Admiralty and the civilian leadership public opinion was almost without exception on the side of the Admiralty." There were from time to time evidences of a similar lack of continuous agree- ment and coordination between the policy of the Chancellor and that of the Secretaries of State in other departments, while the views of the Emperor William II. himself were notoriously liable to sudden and incalculable change. In a marginal note on one of the diplomatic documents of July 1914, the Emperor contemptuously referred to Bethmann Hollweg as the " civilian Chancellor," as if policy were the business of the generals. Yet the Chancellor was in evident agreement with the Emperor's view that it was legitimate for Austria, backed by Germany, to alter the balance of power in the Balkans and to put an end to the traditional and national Russian policy of protecting the small Slav nations. Germany's "expansion" in the Near East was similarly to be promoted and her supremacy at Con- stantinople established at the expense of Russia's interests in a sphere that was vital for the Russian Empire.

The interview between the British ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, and the German Chancellor, at their parting imme- diately before the declaration of war in 1914, when the latter in the course of " a harangue which lasted for about 20 minutes " spoke of the international treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neu- trality as a " scrap of paper " and asked whether the British

'See Before the War, by Visct. Haldane (1920).

Government had considered " at what price that compact would have been kept," furnishes the crowning evidence of Bethmann Hollweg's essentially Prussian conceptions of political morality. " In the moment of anger the true man stood revealed. . . . To break a treaty pledging the national honour seemed a natural thing to him, if to keep it involved sacrifice and danger . . . Herr von Bethmann Hollweg evidently thought that a plighted promise need not be kept, if the engagement involves momen- tous and unpleasant consequences. Not only does it throw the most unpleasant light upon his own notions of honour, but it makes the commentator ask whether it was possible to make any permanent settlement with a nation whose leading states- man obviously held the view that any treaty was only to be kept so long as it was profitable to the signatory parties." 2

There is evidence that at the time when Germany broke the peace Bethmann Hollweg was in a state of extreme nervous tension, due probably as much to the sense of the moral quick- sands on which Germany's case was based as to the collapse of all his calculations regarding the effect of his policy upon the other Great Powers. In the case of Great Britain his disillusion- ment was complete and confessed. In the case of Russia he had apparently hoped that a display of firmness would bring about the same public renunciation of Russian policy which Germany had been able to secure by the " bluff " of 1908-9 in con- nexion with the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador Count Szogyeny's report of his interview with William II. on July 5 is to the effect that in the event of action against Serbia the Em- peror Francis Joseph could rely upon Germany's support and " he had not the slightest doubt that Bethmann Hollweg would entirely agree with this view. . . . Russia's attitude would be hostile, but William II. had for years been prepared for this war, and, should it ever come to war between Austria and Russia, we could be convinced that Germany with her cus- tomary loyalty to the Alliance would stand at our side." In subsequent conversation with Bethmann Hollweg Count Szo- gyeny " ascertained that the Imperial Chancellor, just like the Emperor William, regards immediate action against Serbia as the most radical and best solution of our difficulties in the Balkans. From the international standpoint he considers the present moment more favourable than later and agrees that we shall inform neither Rumania nor Italy [both allies] beforehand of our eventual action."

Admiral von Tirpitz 3 testifies that upon his mind the ulti- matum to Russia and the declaration of war produced the im- pression of being ill-considered and due to a want of manage- ment. "Bethmann Hollweg was throughout those days so excited and irritable that it was impossible to converse with him. I can still hear him as with uplifted arms he repeatedly emphasized the absolute necessity of the declaration of war and put an end to all further discussion." He told Tirpitz that war must be declared because the Germans wished to send patrols across the frontier at once. Moltke, on the other hand, informed Tirpitz that there was no such intention and that " from his point of view a declaration of war was of no impor- tance." 4

During the war period of Bethmann Hollweg's chancellor- ship (Aug. I9i4-July 1917) his public speeches were designed to create the impression of Germany's invincibility. He was ac- cused by his political adversaries of having all the time enter- tained the secret hope of coming to a separate understanding with Great Britain and of having influenced military and naval policy through the Emperor with this object in view. In reality he never approximated to the elementary conditions of peace terms with the Allies, and in respect both of Belgium and France constantly referred to guarantees in the shape of an extension of power (Machtgrundlagen) which would be a neces- sary condition of a settlement. " History," he said, " knows no instance of the status quo ante after such tremendous events "

2 The Outbreak of the War of 1914-1918, C. Oman. 'Tirpitz, Erinnerungen, pp. 240-1. 4 ibidem.