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Rh critic on the Saturday Review. He married in 1910 Miss Florence Kahn, of Memphis, Tennessee, and afterwards took up his resi- dence at Rapallo, Italy. His published writings include The Works of Max Beerbohm, containing the famous essay on George IV., and also A Defence of Cosmetics (1896); The Happy Hypocrite (1897); More (1899); Zuleika^ Dobson (1911); A Christmas Garland (1912); Seven Men (1919), and And Even Now (1920). He also contributed to and edited the Life of Sir Herbert Beerbohm Tree, published in 1920. He is well known by his caricatures, of which exhibitions have been held in Lon- don at the Carfax Gallery (1906) and the Leicester Galleries (1911, 1913, 1921). In 1917, a Modern Loan Exhibition at the Grosvenor Galleries included a group of 15 caricatures entitled " Rossetti and His Friends." Many of his caricatures have been published in Caricatures of Twenty-five Gentlemen (1896); The Second Childhood of John Bull (1901); The Poets' Corner (1904); A Book of Caricatures (1907); Fifty Caricatures (1913). His delicate and incisive satire has found its best material in the peculiarities of individuals in every section of society. Movements he almost invariably typifies by some well-known personality. Pledged to no party, his friends have occasioned some of his most characteristic work, notably the series dealing with the New English Art Club and with Mr. Balfour. Like Forain and Steinlein in his detachment, he lacks their univer- sality; and complete appreciation of his art implies an intimate knowledge of current affairs. As a draughtsman he is not fault- less, and sometimes resorts to the veriest conventions; but his freedom of line, feeling for delicate colour and sense of design are remarkable, especially in his later work. (W. G. C.)

BEERE, MRS. BERNARD [FANNY MARY] (1856-1915), English actress, was born at Norwich Oct. 5 1856. She was the daughter of Wilby Whitehead and was trained for the stage by Herman Vezin, appearing first in the Opera Comique, London, in 1877. Later she played Emilia in Othello and various old English comedy parts at the St. James's theatre. In 1883 she was engaged by the Bancrofts to play leading parts in Fedora and other dramas at the Haymarket. In 1891 she played Lady Teazle in Charles Wyndham's production of School for Scandal, and two years later Mrs. Arbuthnot with Herbert Tree in Oscar Wilde's A Woman of No Importance. She was three times married, but for stage purposes retained the name of her second husband. In 1900 she married Mr. A. C. S. Olivier. She died in London March 25 1915.

BEESLY, EDWARD SPENCER (1831-1915), English positivist (see 3.644), died at St. Leonards-on-Sea July 7 1915. BEGAS, REINHOLD (1831-1911), German sculptor (see 3.652), died Aug. 3 1911.

BEHAVIOURISM. In the earlier article on INSTINCT (see 14.648) and also, though perhaps less obviously, in that on INTELLIGENCE IN ANIMALS (see 14.680), the stress was laid on behaviour. In later years attention has been turned more and more to what has become known in this connexion as " be- haviourism." What then is behaviourism? It has features in common with pragmatism and with neo-realism. It is however (as is the case with these other 'isms) somewhat difficult to define. If we seek to elicit from the writings of this or that behaviourist a clear statement of the doctrine he champions or accepts, we find not a little divergence of opinion. And per- haps each would remind us that J. J. Thomson has spoken of science as a policy rather than a creed. What then is their common policy? One may reply without much fear of misin- terpreting their aim: A resolute application of radical empiri- cism in the scientific interpretation of all behaviour and conduct.

In this interpretation a good deal turns on the relation of behaviour to consciousness, in some sense of this word. " Critics of behaviourism," says Weiss (1918), " do not recognize clearly enough that the term ' consciousness ' varies in its meaning with nearly every person who uses it. There is no generally accepted definition or description; and the fact that psychologists and philosophers have been unable to reach an agreement is one of the conditions which has precipitated behaviourism." As to behaviourists themselves he tells us that, thus far, they have

agreed that the most convenient procedure is not to use it at all. It needs, however, but little acquaintance with their writings to realize that, so far is this from being a matter of common agreement among them, there is much discussion of the sense in which the adjective " conscious " as applied to behaviour is to be understood. Here again opinions differ. But let us put the question in a rather different form. Let us ask: In what sense is the word " consciousness " to be rejected by every behaviourist? As to the answer to this question there is a far larger measure of agreement.

In 1904 William James asked the question: Does conscious- ness exist? His reply was that it does not exist as an hypos- tatized entity with the unique privilege of activity, but that it does exist as a function. In its negative aspect his answer excludes " the hypothesis of trans-empirical reality," i.e. that from which proceeds what is sometimes spoken of as " an alien influx into nature." The transcendental Ego of the philosophies, he urges, shows how " the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition." And he says roundly: " I believe that ' consciousness,' when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappear- ing altogether. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing ' soul ' upon the air of philosophy." There is no activity of conscious- ness in this sense. " The healthy thing for philosophy is to leave off grubbing underground (in the realm of the trans- empirical) for what effects effectuation or what makes action act." Activity in an empirical sense there is in plenty. It is change in progress referred to some " storm-centre " of change. It is change intrinsic to some system and not merely imposed upon it from without. But there is for scientific treatment no activity of a trans-empirical entity which may be regarded as the source of such change. When therefore a behaviourist says that " we need a psychology of human conduct to supplant the psychology of consciousness" (G. A. Tawney 1911), that which he seeks to supplant is a psychology which invokes what James spoke of as trans-empirical agency. It is probably not going too far to say that this marks a distinctive feature of behaviourist interpretation.

It should here be added that though this may with some confidence be said to be a distinctive feature of behaviourist interpretation it does not follow that if this be accepted one may infer that a writer who accepts it is to be ranked as a behaviourist. It is, for example, fully endorsed by Howard C. Warren in his Human Psychology (1920). But he says: " The behaviourist contends that the data of consciousness should be ruled out of science altogether because they are not causal factors. This narrowing of the scope of science has not justi- fied itself up to the present. Self-observation has proved more useful than the study of behaviour in investigating the phenom- ena of human mental life." It is questionable, however, whether all who label themselves behaviourists do contend that the data of consciousness should be ruled out altogether. R. M. Yerkes would not agree that this is so in animal psychology. And E. B. Holt, though he sails under the behaviourist flag in his Freudian Wish, assuredly does not rule out consciousness.

Let us broaden our outlook- If we extend the use of the word " behaviour " so as to include physical events, their modern treatment tends more and more towards behaviourism. " Our sole task," says A. N. Whitehead, "is to exhibit in one system the characters and inter-relations of all that is observed. Our attitude towards nature is purely behaviouristic so far as concerns the formulation of physical concepts." His attitude towards organic events and their mental concomitants may be different. But his rejection of any " bifurcation of nature " and his polemic against a doctrine of " psychic additions " (Concept of Nature, ch. ii.) is in line with the neo-realistic atti- tude of those behaviourists who deal with organic life. His percipient event is the homologue of the organism under the treatment of radical behaviourism. Neither the one nor the other stands in need of any " psychic addition " ab extra for the adequate interpretation of the facts. Each is set in a field