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Rh merchandise was charged. It was clear that in these circumstances, with two rates of charge, the drawing of a merchandise bill at a fixed figure would have been difficult. Hence the very slow development of what was called the trade acceptance, and trade acceptances thus created tended to become in many cases long-term accommodation paper and fell somewhat into disrepute. In the case of the bankers' acceptance, although some bad practices prevailed during the war when the practice of renewing acceptances gained a foothold even with the best and strongest banks through the use of syndicate agreements which provided for the issuing and discounting of blocks of acceptances by groups of banks acting in common, the paper on the whole maintained its position of solvency and reliability. The chief trouble encountered in its development was early found in the fact that no genuine market existed for it and that the Federal Reserve banks had found it practically necessary to supply such a market by taking or re-discounting freely the acceptances of banks in their own district. Had they not done so, it appeared, the acceptances would have found no buyers on many occasions and the practice of making them and financing trade by that means would have been discontinued. This tended to transfer to the portfolios or holdings of the Federal Reserve banks an unduly large proportion of the acceptances at any time in the market, while the bad habit of some banks in discounting their own acceptances deprived the paper of much of its economic virtue as a basis for dealing in commercial credit under better market conditions. It had still in 1921 to be seen how far and to what extent it would be possible to overcome these bad elements in American banking practice and to resume the development of the acceptance upon the lines followed in the more advanced commercial countries of Europe.

History of Interest Rates.—After the panic of 1907 and throughout the whole pre-war period rates of interest on bank loans tended on the whole to move in the United States steadily to lower levels. A variety of reasons had been assigned for this drift, among them the rapid accumulation of capital and the intensity of the competition in the investment market. As had been the case with the American market throughout its whole history, the movement of interest and discount rates was by no means uniform, call loans on many occasions shooting up above the general level, while even commercial paper and bank rates tended to fluctuate sharply at different seasons. The tendency, however, was on the whole downward, and after the financial disorders attendant upon the opening of the World War had subsided and the new reserve banks had become thoroughly organized interest and discount rates fell to an extremely low level. This was partly the outcome of the release of credit by the Federal Reserve Act, and partly the result of scarcity of business due to the opening of the war and the transition it implied from a peace to a war basis. Low rates continued to prevail practically throughout the years 1914-6, indeed, until the entry of the United States into the war in 1917. The natural tendency of interest rates would have been to advance immediately after the participation of the United States in the war had become known. Recognizing this tendency, however, the Federal Reserve banks had in conjunction with the United States Treasury determined upon a low rate of discount for paper at Federal Reserve institutions, such rate corresponding closely to the coupon rate upon Liberty Bonds. This rate, however, was put into effect upon the condition that a correspondingly low rate should be made by member banks to their customers. Thus the whole interest rate system of the country was “stabilized” or “price-fixed.” In ordinary conditions this stabilization at a low figure would have given rise to an abnormal demand for funds, but this danger was in part averted through the control of industrial operations by the “rationing” of coal and materials for industries, which kept producers from drawing too heavily upon bank credit for support. In some cities, notably New York, a majority of the banks rationed in a similar way the stockbroking and speculative community, agreeing to furnish them with a limited amount of funds at a specified and relatively low rate of interest on condition that there should be no effort to use more than this specified amount in stock speculation and that a correspondingly low rate of interest should be charged to customers. Capital was also rationed by the use of analogous methods. Subject to these conditions the rate of interest continued on an abnormally low level until after the war when, as seen in another connexion (see ), the rate of discount at the Federal Reserve banks was sharply advanced. Commercial rates, which had already been on the point of rising in some directions, advanced immediately. The action of the Federal Reserve banks was the signal for a still further and subsequent advance in rates, and from the opening of 1919 on throughout the year 1920 there was a fairly steady advance in discount charges which brought the current charge for bank loans at

the close of 1920 up to the highest point it had reached for many years. Call loan rates, although fluctuating to some extent subsequent to the war, did not suffer the extreme variations which had been characteristic in other periods of stress. (H. P. W.)

Savings Banks.—According to the report of the comptroller of the currency for the fiscal year ending June 30 1920, there were in the United States 620 mutual savings banks with aggregate assets amounting to $5,619,017,000; there were 9,445,327 depositors with combined deposits of $5,186,845,000, an average of $549.14 for each depositor. On the same date the number of stock savings banks was 1,087, with aggregate assets of $1,506,413,000; there were 1,982,299 depositors with combined deposits of $1,349,625,000, an average of $680.86 for each depositor. These figures exclude stock savings banks of those states in which they were included with state bank returns: namely, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, and North Dakota. In the following table, for the years 1910 to 1919 inclusive, the figures are for mutual and stock savings banks combined:—

The establishment of postal savings banks was authorized by Act of Congress, approved June 25 1910. On Jan. 3 1911 depositories for experiment were opened in each of the 48 states and territories. At the close of the month deposits amounted to $60,252 and by the end of the year $11,000,000. The original plan was gradually to designate as depositories all post-offices doing a money-order business, but it soon became apparent that many small offices would not be utilized. In 1913 the number of depositories had reached 13,000, when a policy of retrenchment was adopted. At the close of the fiscal year June 30 1920 there were 6,314 depositories. Deposits made during that year amounted to $11,942,496; withdrawals $12,802,207; balance credited to depositors $157,276,322; number of depositors 508,508; average per depositor $309.29. On June 30 1919 there were 6,439 depositories with deposits totalling $167,323,260; the number of depositors 565,509 with an average deposit of $295.88. The majority of depositors are of foreign extraction and their deposits constituted in 1920 75% of the total. The original law allowed a depositor to have to his credit a maximum sum of $500; on May 18 1916 this was increased to $1,000; and on July 2 1918 to $2,500. Any person ten years old or over may make deposits. The minimum deposit is $1; but a postal savings card may be purchased for ten cents, containing nine spaces for affixing postal savings stamps, costing ten cents each, and a card when filled is accepted as a deposit of $1. The rate of interest is 2% annually, but deposits may be exchanged for postal savings bonds, issued in denominations of $20, $50, and $500, bearing interest at 2½%. As savings banks pay regularly 3% or 4%, and in some cases 5%, the postmaster-general, in his report for 1920, recommended an increase in interest on postal savings. According to the preliminary figures (Aug. 1921) on school savings, compiled by the American Bankers Association, covering the school year 1920-1, 236 cities reported school savings banks. There were 2,630 reporting schools; enrolment, 1,479,567; pupils participating, 666,478; average weekly deposits, $205,704; total collections for the year, $3,475,868; average saving per depositor, $5.22; withdrawals during the year, $1,393,230; average net deposit, $3.13.

 BANTOCK, GRANVILLE (1868–), English musical composer, born in London Aug. 7 1868, was intended for the Indian civil service and later for the career of a chemical engineer, but abandoned both for music; he entered the Royal Academy of Music in 1889. There he gained many prizes and was the first holder of the Macfarren scholarship. In 1893 he founded the New Quarterly Musical Review, a pioneer publication on modern lines, and during the following two years he toured America and Australia as conductor of a Gaiety company, after which, in 1897 he became musical director at the Tower, New Brighton. Three years subsequently he was elected director of the school of music at the Midland Institute, Birmingham, and in 1908 he succeeded Elgar as professor of music at Birmingham University. A prolific composer in nearly all forms, among his best known works are The Great God Pan (1903); Omar Khayyam (1906); Pierrot of the Minute (1908); the truly choral symphony Atalanta in Calydon (1912); Fifine at the