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men) from the S.E. against its southern slope. No reserves were allotted.

The attack was delivered after an artillery bombardment of several hours on Feb. 7. The fortified post of Muselimi fell with little resistance, but on the Great Bardanjolt the attack was shattered at the wire. A second assault on the 8th was no more fortunate. On the 9th however, with the aid of a Montenegrin battery that was got up to very close range, the trenches were carried after fierce hand- to hand fighting. The assailants, who had lost 2,000 men, were exhausted.

During the next few days the captured positions were consolidated and fiela guns brought up. During the main attack the Monte- negrins on the N. side had also pushed forward their lines from 3,000 to 1,500 yd. from the Turkish defenses. The lack of siege artillery and of unified fire direction was much felt.

Meanwhile a Serbian contingent under Boyovich had been sent to assist the Montenegrins and complete the investing line between Drinasa and Boyana. Between their right flank and the Monte- negrins on the Great Bardanjolt lay a stretch of marshy impassable country. In aid of the attack of Feb. 7 the Serbs delivered a feint- attack on the Tarabosh front, which reached the first Turkish line, but was then driven back. A small Montenegrin column also attacked Tarabosh but broke down at the wire.

South-west of Scutari there had been no change since November. The Montenegrins had made good their casualties and lay some 600 to 700 yd. from the Turkish lines, ensconced in carefully-con- structed trenches in the rocks. The Turkish positions here extended for some 4 to 5 m. from the strong point of Tarabosh south-eastwards to the Boyana. The besieging artillery (i2-cm. guns and 15 and 21- cm. howitzers) was concentrated in two groups around Oblika and Boboti, whence it could bring a concentric fire to bear on the lofty commanding peak of the Tarabosh. The counter-bombardment of the defense was weak and practically useless, owing to slow and faulty methods of fire.

The ammunition supplies for the Montenegrins, which were sent up across the lake, were amply sufficient for all needs.

The main attack on the Tarabosh began only on March 31, preceded by five hours' artillery bombardment and by feints on the remainder of the front. During the artillery preparation, the infan- try took up their positions of assault one and a half brigades against the northern and western forces of Tarabosh, and one and a half brigades against the south.

On the latter, the assault was repulsed, completely and with heavy losses. The western attack had been more fortunate. The first Turkish position Was broken through in one place, but progress was arrested by flanking machine-gun fire and counterstrokes, and everywhere the Turks held their third position firmly. On April I the attack was repeated but with no better success, and for the next 20 days, until the capitulation, Turks and Montenegrins here lay facing one another half-way up the slope at a distance of 60 to 70 yd. apart a situation which recalls in many respects the trench war- fare days of the World War. The attack had cost the Montenegrins i ,200 dead.

The Turkish position on the Tarabosh consisted of four lines of trenches, some 30 to 40 yd. apart, and each commanding the one in front of it. The third trench line extended into the country to the east, and the fourth to the north. Behind the fourth line a 7-5-cm. quick-firing gun was posted in a shelter on the crest of the hill. In front of the first and third lines were thick belts of wire. The whole position, which was intended for occupation by a battalion, was in fact held by only 00 men.

The Montenegrins, after their unsuccessful attack of March 31 and April I, confined themselves to the usual bombardment. The siege artillery was reinforced. The Serbian Gen. Boyovic now took command of the besieging army, but there was considerable dissen- sion between him and Vukotic. On April 16, however, the Serbian troops suddenly left Scutari, and the Montenegrins took over the whole line, under violent artillery fire from the Turks, who, how- ever, made no attempt at a sortie against the thin line of the be- siegers. And now, when the fortress seemed quite safe from further assault, it suddenly capitulated on April 22. For some time obscure negotiations had been going on between King Nicholas and Essad, and the brave Hasan Riza Pasha, who had refused to surrender despite the shortage of food, had been assassinated. But already Montenegro was under naval blockade by the Great Powers, who had decided that Scutari should belong to the new state of Albania, and on May 6 King Nicholas yielded and withdrew his troops.

(F. C. E.)

The Siege of Adrianople. In the first operations of Oct., already described, Adrianople had come within the ambit of the general battle, and it was not till after the Turks had retreated away towards the Kara Aghach line that operations in front of the fortress assumed the typical siege characters of investment and concentric attack.

The general outline of the defences has been described above. But it is important to add that the permanent forts were old and conspicuous, and, except in a few cases where modernization had been actually begun, possessed only brick vaulting that was not proof against 6-in. shell. The only modern works were a certain number of safety-armament batteries distributed in the intervals,

of installations for 5-7 mm. close-defense quick-firing guns under armour, and of concrete shelters and magazines. The general prin- ciple of defense adopted was that common to Europe in the period before the rise of the " group " or " Feste " idea that is, the forts were infantry redoubts for close defense and the fighting artillery was entirely in the intervals. Unfortunately for the Turks many of the " redoubts " were open at the gorge. The whole system of the main line was well wired in.

Outside the main position, and coinciding with it only on the N.E. front (left bank of the Tunja), was an advanced position, or rather a discontinuous series of field positions on selected sites astride the saddles of ground which separate the rivers (Tunja and lower Maritsa, Maritsa and Arda, Arda and upper Maritsa, upper Maritsa and Tunja). From these advanced positions the Turks had delivered the first sorties above mentioned and to them they had retired under the pressure of the II. Army's and 3rd Div.'s advance astride the Maritsa and Tunja on Oct. 22. In the days following, the 8th, gth and 3rd Divs. extended the investment, and the nth Div. and siege artillery were brought up via Mustafa Pasha, as well as some aero- planes. Presently parts of the 2nd Div. lately operating in the Rhodope came up, some by the Arda and some via Demotika on the S. side. On the other hand, both the 3rd and the gth Divs. were withdrawn to join the field army in the crisis of Lule Burgas. 1 After establishing their line generally close up to the Turkish advanced positions (in the course of which, on Oct. 25, Kartal Tepe was captured, and Papas Tepe won and lost again), the Bulgarians sat down to await the Serbians, whose II. Army, set free by the victory of Kumanovo, was being withdrawn from the Vardar to assist their allies. Already on Oct. 27 some Serbian troops had arrived and on Oct. 31 Gen. Stepanovich took over the whole W. front of the invest- ment with Timok I. and part of the Bulgarian nth Div. from Tunja to upper Maritsa and Danube II. between upper Maritsa and Arda. Gen. Ivanov, commanding his II. Bulgarian Army as well as the whole siege force, had his 8th Div. between Arda and lower Maritsa and the I ith with part of the 2nd in the broadest sector, the eastern.

At this point the armistice suspended operations, but Shukri Pasha was not authorized by its terms to revictual his garrison and the defenders continued therefore to consume their resources. After hostilities were resumed on Feb. 3 it soon became evident, from attempts at sorties and from increase of desertion, that the garrison was weakening, and it was decided to force home the attack.

Want of transport resources, however, delayed the preparations till the third week in March 1913, when parts of the 3rd, gth and 4th Divs. having been brought into the Bulgarian II. Army from Chatalja 90,000 Bulgarian and 30,000 Serbian infantry were

SIEGE OF ADR1ANOPLE.I9I2-13

Situation before final attack Permanent work n +

Main infantry line Advanced positions

actually available for the attack, which would be prepared and covered by the 125 Bulgarian siege guns and howitzers of 12 and 15 cm. calibre (the latter, as mentioned above, being capable of penetrating most of the Turkish vaults) as well as some 250 or more field guns. At this period possibly 50,000 of Shukri's original 60,000 combatants were still available for duty. There were 216 field and 178 heavy guns (including some 2l-cm. mortars) distributed in the defenses.

1 A Turkish sortie with the intention of preventing this was, as before mentioned, repulsed.