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378 penetrated the Turkish front between Gechkenlia and Seliolu) brought the Bulgarian army victoriously to the Deremanlia-Kukiler- Gerdeli road by morning on the 24th. The Turks had disappeared. Owing to events on their right, they had given up their somewhat disjointed efforts to defeat the Bulgarian centre, and retired in a direction or directions which the victors were unable to determine.

Kirk Kilisse was a route-centre of importance, with a line of barrier works, partly permanent, on its N. side. Von der Goltz had intended that it should play the same part on the right flank as Adrianople on the left. Although the permanent works were few, and inferior to those of the great fortress, the natural positions afforded by spurs of the Istranja Balkan gave the place advantages of site which were lacking at Adrianople. The Bulgarians, on their side, allocated a whole army to the task of dealing with it, by investment, brusque assault or regular siege, or a combination of those methods.

Partly in order to develop the necessary frontage from the outset (in case of battle between Kirk Kilisse and the frontier), and partly in order to utilize the routes to the best advantage in a country much more difficult than that traversed by the other armies, Radko Dimitriev had formed his two leading divisions into four brigade columns (a) | 4th Div. from Ojakoi on Keremetlia (liaison with I. Army); (b) 4th Div., followed by part of 6th Div. by Devletli Aghach and Eski Polos on Petra ; (c) f of 5th Div. with remainder of 6th Div. from Malkochlar by Erikler on Raklitsa and Kirk Kilisse; (d) \ of 5th Div. from Topchular by Almajik on Kadikoi. Of these columns (a) became involved in the Seliolu fighting, and took no part in that of Kirk Kilisse.

Columns (a) and (b), forming the strongest part of the army, and also column (c) soon met with strong resistance (morning 22nd), and the country, the weather (stormy since the 2Oth) and tactical inci- dents making progress uneven, the front at nightfall of the 22nd was very sinuous, the Turks holding pronounced salients at Eski Polos, and also at Almajik, while the Bulgarians had penetrated nearly to Kadikoi in the centre and within 2 m. of Petra on their right. On the 23rd, however, continued pressure on the Kadikoi and Petra fronts forced the Turks to evacuate their salients, and at night the Bulgarian line, with its flanks somewhat advanced, ran roughly E.W. from the heights S.S.VV. of Petra, through that village, to height 1,506 N. of Akmacha and thence some distance south-east. From this line, in the night, assaults by parts of the two left columns (5th Div.) penetrated to Karakoi on the one hand and halfway to Raklitsa on the other. And thereupon, worn out by two days' hill fighting and lacking in internal homogeneity, Mahmud Mukhtar's Corps broke up, abandoning Kirk Kilisse and its fortifications, and streamed away in panic. The Bulgarians entered Kirk Kilisse on the 24th and possessed themselves of immense booty, including 55 guns.

Mystified and ignorant of the line of retreat of the enemy, both the I. and III. Armies stood fast on the 24th on their respective battlefields, while the cavalry division was sent out due south. On the 25th the horsemen reached the Constantinople railway at Baba Eski; next, pushing reconnaissances S. and S.E., they found the country S. of the Ergene all clear, but hostile forces between Lule Burgas and Muradli. At the same time the divisional cavalry of the 5th Div. from Kirk Kilisse appears to have established the presence of enemy forces at or near Bunar Hissar.

This information, showing that the Ergene line had been aban- doned, and that Abdalla was regrouping his forces and assembling his incoming reserve divisions in the Lule Burgas-Vaisa region, involved a complete change of front for the Bulgarians. Hitherto facing S., they had now to face E., pivoting on the 5th Div. at Kirk Kilisse. And while the necessary movements were being carried out, Abdalla again took the offensive, with the reorganized four active corps, and the XVII. and XVIII. Corps of new formation.

On the 27th the Bulgarian wheel began, but instead of its being carried out on a fixed pivot, the pivot itself was allowed to advance eastward, so that, instead of presenting a united line, the Bulgarians formed a loose echelon, left in advance, which led to successive instead of simultaneous engagements. On the evening of that day, the Turkish III. Corps (Mahmud Mukhtar) on the right, was on the road between Vaisa and Bunar Hissar, the II. at Kara Aghach, the I. at Turk Bey and the IV. partly at Lule Burgas, partly at Sakiskoi, the total front between the Ergene and the mountains being about 45 miles. The two new corps were a march in rear. A general offensive had been ordered.

On the 28th, as a natural consequence, an encounter battle began just E. of the Kara Aghach, in the forest of Sujak, between Mahmud Mukhtar's troops and the Bulgarian 5th Div., the latter finally drawing back behind the stream and occupying a line from Chiftlik Teke on the left to Mura Aghach on the right. Thereupon the various Bulgarian columns echeloned back to the right of this divi- sion, hastened their march, and part of the 3rd Div. from the Adrianople region was ordered up to support the 5th directly, which by a heavy forced march it was able to do on the evening of the 29th. 1 On the other side, confusion in the command and other causes made the general advance slow and disjointed; the initiative was soon lost, and the battle became one of the parallel fronts along the

1 This is all the more remarkable as the Bulgarian I. Army's movements were hampered by fears of a crisis at Adrianople, where a serious sortie-battle was being fought at the time.

Kara Aghach. On the 2gth (afternoon) the 4th Bulgarian Div. followed by the 6th were already on that line. On the 3Oth, the crisis of the battle, the I. Bulgarian Army came into action opposite Lule Burgas (ist Div.) and on and S. of the Ergene (loth Div.), while the cavalry returning from Rodosto formed up in advance of the

BATTLE OF LULE BURGAS 1912

Successive arrivals of Bulgarian divisions

Turkish corps DUD etc

right flank of the loth Division. At the same date, the III. Turkish Corps opposite Bunar Hissar and the XVII. Corps on its left, sup- ported by parts of the XVIII. Corps, were still exchanging attacks and counter-attacks with the Bulgarian 5th Div. and part of the 3rd about the W. edges of the forest of Sujak. Against the Bulgarian 4th Div. on both sides of Kara Aghach village, was the II. Corps; against the 6th, about Turk Bey, the I., while the Turkish IV. Corps held the line at Lule Burgas and down to the Ergene against the Bulgarian I. Army. Of this army, however, one division only was involved in the frontal fight, and it became evident to the Turks in the afternoon of the 3Oth that enough enemy forces remained over to roll up their left wing and interpose between the main body and Constantinople. Accordingly, Nazim issued orders for retreat. During Oct. 31 and Nov. I, with various tactical incidents, of which the most important was a successful night-attack of the Bulgarians at Turk Bey, the Turks disengaged themselves, beginning from the left, and by the 2nd the three corps on the right were also in retreat.

The victors were too much exhausted to pursue, and again the Turks vanished. The Bulgarian losses out of perhaps 110,000 com- batants numbered 15,000; those of the enemy, whose force was probably rather less, are not known with certainty, but are supposed to have been about 25,000 inclusive of prisoners.

Without further resistance the Turks retired into the famous Chatalja lines, a well-fortified position between Lake Derkos on the Black Sea and Biiyiik Chekmeje lake on the sea of Marmora. How- ever weakened by losses, they could hardly fail to maintain so short and strong a line as this.

On their side, the Bulgarians were tired, far ahead of their supply depots, and losing more and more men daily from sickness. On the other hand, drafts had come up, the gth Div.. replaced before Adri- anople by the new nth joined the III. Army, 2 and the combatant strength of the two armies together was about 140,000. Made optimistic by victory, Savov and his generals determined to storm the Chatalja lines by open force. So confident were they that Savov himself said: " in a week we shall be dining in Constantinople."

On Nov. 17, the Bulgarian infantry advanced and drove in the Turkish outposts and on Nov. 18, the assault took place. It was completely repulsed, with heavy losses, and the Bulgarian command, sobered, took care not to waste its reserves in renewed assaults. Armistice proposals were already under discussion, and the battle was broken off in the afternoon of the assault. On Dec. 3, without further fighting on the Chatalja front, a general armistice was signed, more favourable to the Bulgarians perhaps than their military situation warranted, for it gave them the use of the railway through Adrianople without allowjng the Turks to revictual that place.

While the main Bulgarian armies were fighting these battles, the 2nd Div. penetrating the difficult Rhodope country had carried out a vigorous offensive in several directions, as the result of which Adri- anople was invested on the S.W. side, Demotika and the coast from Xanthi to Dede Aghach occupied, and two Turkish divisions de-

2 Which also received the 3rd Div. from the I. Army in exchange for the 6th.