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Rh fighting effort of Zekki's 1 reserves that the frontal attack of Morava I. and Drina I. succeeded with little difficulty.

Threatened by the Greeks now again advancing on Fiorina and pursued on front and flank by the converging divisions on the battlefield itself, the Turkish army broke up entirely. Half of it was killed, wounded or captured, the other half, in units or small parties, made its way to the only friendly stronghold now remaining open Yannina (Janina) in Epirus. The victory was completely decisive, and all that remained for the allies to do in the western theatre was to carry out the march to the sea, to occupy and police the region of Okhrida-Dibra Elbasan, to reduce the two fortresses of Scutari and Yannina (the last refuges of Turkish authority), to ensure against Austrian intervention (for which purpose the main body of the I. Army was moved back to Uskub after a few days' rest) and to come to an agreement amongst themselves as to the division of the spoil.

On Dec. 3, Serbia and Montenegro joined in the armistice signed that day between Bulgaria and Turkey. Operations in Macedonia and northern Albania therefore came to an end. Greece, however, did not sign, and continued her operations, though these were in the nature of exploitation rather than of fresh effort, except in Epirus, where operations against Yannina were in progress.

Owing to the necessity of garrisoning Epirus, the Turks had normally maintained two divisions in this theatre. These, and the nature of the country were quite sufficient to make the progress of the Greek secondary army (Gen. Sapundzakis, 8th and gth Divs., both newly formed) a slow and difficult matter. From the opening of hostilities to Nov. 3, the Greeks were employed in clearing the Luros and Prevesa region. This done, the formidable Pentepigadia defile was attacked, and after four days' fighting cleared (Nov. 8). Sapundzakis then advanced to the outskirts of the fortress of Yannina (Nov. 10), while a column of irregulars from Metsovo in Thessaly and another small detachment from Santi Quaranta came in on his flanks to assist in establishing a loose blockade. But this was the limit of his offensive possibilities, and the weather presently brought operations to a close for the time being.

During the winter, however, the greater part of the field army which had completed its task in Macedonia was brought round by sea via Salonika. Active operations began afresh in the early spring. With adequate numbers and material resources, the Crown Prince was able to deliver a successful general assault on March 5 1913, and the Turkish garrison, numbering about 30,000, wounded and un- wounded, surrendered next day.

No further fighting occurred in the Albanian theatre, though the Greeks on the S. and the Serbians in the N.E. attempted without success to round up the few Turkish forces, rallied by Djavid, which had escaped from the catastrophes of Monastir and Yannina.

The Campaign in Thrace. Through the change of plan which Bulgaria forced upon her ally on Sept. 28, Thrace became for the public, military and non-military alike, the principal theatre of war. Nevertheless, the actual plan of campaign of the Bulgarians still remains obscure all that is known being the fact that the first successes caused it to be abandoned. On the Turkish side, equally little is known with certainty as to the original project, though it is probably safe to say that this consisted in a defensive concentration of the I., II. and IV. Corps on the line of the Ergene and of the III. Corps at or in rear of Kirk Kilisse, with the fortress of Adrianople and the works of Kirk Kilisse acting as breakwaters in front. The scheme, whatever it was, was abandoned at the last moment in favour of a general offensive, as in Macedonia. In these conditions, the facts must interpret themselves, at any rate in the initial stages.

Leaving the yth Div. on the Macedonian side, the Bulgarians formed three armies between Philippopolis, Trnovo-Seimen, and Yamboli, the latter with especial precautions of secrecy. The II. Army (Gen. Ivanov) on the right, concentrated the 8th and gth Divs. about Trnovo-Seimen, ana the 2nd between Philippopolis and Haskovo. The I. Army in the centre (Gen. Kutinchev) concentrated between Nova Zagora and Kizil Aghach, consisted of the 1st, 3rd and (newly formed) loth Divisions. The III. Army (Gen. Radko Dimitriev) on the left, or rather the left rear, about Yamboli, consisted of the 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions. In front of it was the cavalry division, with its main body in line with the main body of the I. Army. The nth Div. was still in process of formation at Philippopolis.

On the day after war was declared, the ensemble, whatever the objects of its movement may have been, began to move the I. and III. Armies southward and the II. south-westward on Mustafa Pasha (8th and gth Divs.) and due S. on Kirjali (2nd Div.). Siege artillery was entrained at Sofia for Trnovo-Seimen on the lyth. On the I9th, the 8th Div. on the right of the Maritsa, and the gth on the left, seized Mustafa Pasha, continuing their progress on the 2Oth. On that day, the 2nd Div. reached Kirjali on the Arda, while the I. Army crossed the frontier 3rd Div. on both sides of the Tunja, 1st Div. on its left, and loth in rear, all moving due south. On the 2ist and 22nd the same movements continued, while the III. Army in its turn entered Turkey at Ojakoi and Topchular, and the 2nd Div. turned E.S.E., heading for Demotika.

1 'AH Riza had left Monastir, and Zekki was in general command on the field.

On the 22nd the first serious engagements took place in front of Adrianople. That fortress, with modernized permanent works, and a main defence line studded with infantry redoubts farther out and a full interval-organization, had a very considerable perimeter. It was naturally divided by its four water-courses (Upper Maritsa, Arda, Lower Maritsa, Tunja) into four sectors. On the Lower Maritsa-Tunja sector the 3rd Div. of the I. Army was advancing on the Tunja-Upper Maritsa, the 8th Div. (II. Army); and on the Upper Maritsa-Arda front the 9th, also of the II. Army. The last named, advancing S.E. from Kadikoi and Buldurkoi was vio- lently counter-attacked. Each side extended southward in search of the obher's flank till the Arda was approached. But the combat was really decided by the intervention of the 8th Div. artillery on the other side of the Maritsa. Enfiladed, the Turks retired to their prepared line. Counter-attacks on the 3rd Div. moving down E. of the Tunja had the same result. Thus the process of investing Adri- anople began at the very outset, three put of eight divisions available in the theatre of war being employed in it.

In the Tunja-Upper Maritsa sector the principal work of the main line was a group formed round Chiftlik-Ekmechikoi which has been compared to a " Feste." A group of the same character (Papas Tepe) occupied the ridge between Upper Maritsa and Arda, a forti- fied village barred the Ortakoi road in the Arda valley itself, and a third " Feste " had been constructed on Kartal Tepe. Similar groups of works at Pashachajir and Gunes Chiftlik continue the line of defence between Lower Maritsa and Tunja, merging in the line of the old permanent works at Fort Kuru Cheshme. The operations round Adrianople will be summarized later.

The movement of the I. Army brought only its 3rd Div. directly into contact with the Adrianople defences, the remainder (still with the loth Div. in rear) aiming at the line Deremanlia-Kukiler. On its left the cavalry division, after several engagements on the igth, 2Oth and 2 1st about Vaisa and Tashli-Muselim, found itself strongly opposed at and E. of Seliolu on the 22nd, on which day also the leading troops of the 1st Div. came in contact with important Turk- ish forces in front of Seliolu and Gechkenlia. At this time the 3rd Div. was fighting astride the Tunja at Biiyuk Sinailcha Murajilar Tausan-Ortakji.

Instead of concentrating behind the Ergene, the Turks were in fact advancing northward to battle in accordance with the same general order that had sent Zekki to Kumanovo. The army in Thrace, com- manded by Abdalla Pasha under the higher direction of Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, consisted of the I., II., III. and IV. active corps and of a number of reserve divisions which were only assembled slowly, forming a XV., XVI., XVII. and XVIII. Corps.

BATTLES OF KIRK- KILISSE & SELIOLU. I9I2E

erian positions cvenin60ct22 Bulf.1ll.Army evening 23." = Defence line of Adnanople & Kirk Kilisse works.

The original concentration points were for the I. Corps Yenije and Kavakli, for the III. Corps, II. Corps and IV. Corps (in that order from N. to S.) the zone Bunar Hissar-Lule Burgas, for the XV. Corps (garrison) Adrianople, while the XVI. Corps was to hold the middle Ergene and the XVII. and XVIII. Corps to constitute themselves behind Lule Burgas. In reality the assembly of the four active corps took place at Kirk Kilisse (III.), Yenije and Kavakli (I.), Karali (II.), and Havsa and Kuleli (IV.), with a cavalry division in front of the centre.

At Adrianople, the XV. Corps was duly formed but the XVI., XVII., XVIII. were far in rear and in an embryonic condition, the XVI. indeed never being formed as such.

From these positions the four corps advanced on the 2 1st and 22nd in accordance with the order to take the offensive, and two encounter- battles ensued, one of which, the engagement of the Bulgarian I. Army, is generally called the Battle of Seliolu, while the other, the first conflict of Radko Dimitriev's III. Army with Mahmud Mukh- tar's III. Corps, bears the name of Kirk Kilisse.

The front of the Battle of Seliolu is defined, roughly, by the line Keremetlia N. of Seliolu N. of Gechkenlia S. of Erjali-Ortakji-Kaipa (at which point it joins the front of the 3rd Div. beginning the envelopment of Adrianople). Heavy fighting on the 22nd and 23rd (of which the most notable incident was a night-attack that