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not quite twice that of a Turkish. The infantry strength of II. Ban divisions varied, but was usually three 4-battalion regiments. A number of supplementary regiments were formed from excess reservists, III. Ban units, for subsidiary operations. There was a cavalry division. At the completion of mobilization the ration strength of the field forces alone, exclusive of III. Ban units, was 287,000, almost exactly 10% of the population. In the whole war some 450,000 men are supposed to have been mobilized.

Greek Army 1 : Four active divisions of 9-11 battalions each (equal in number of units, and superior in effective numbers, to a Turkish division). Reserve units forming four weak divisions, each equal to two-thirds of a normal division. One cavalry brigade. Ration strength of the field army, about 1 10,000.

Montenegrin Army: A militia organized in four divisions of varying strength. Approximate total of field troops 47,000.

With regard to the proportioning of effort between the two theatres of war, contemporary military opinion, impressed by a sor of primacy which Bulgaria assumed in the league, by the more regular character of her army and her civil administration, and by the nearness of Constantinople to her eastern frontier, argued a priori that Thrace was not only the " principal " theatre, but the single important theatre in which practically all military effort should have been concentrated by both sides a judgment which ignored the relation of strategy to war policy, and one for which in the sequel Bulgaria was destined to pay heavily. For the objective of the war was Macedonia, as von der Goltz had foreseen in 1909 when he increased both the present and the potential strength of the Turkish forces allotted to that theatre. And when conquered, Macedonia would be conquered once and for all, for the possibility of a Turkish counter-offensive to recover the lost province was excluded by the Greek navy as effectually as the possibility of reenforcing Tripoli had been excluded by the Italian navy in 1911. A further important consideration for the allies was the obscurity of the ethnographic lines in central Macedonia. Here the population was neither definitely Bulgarian nor definitely Serbian, and unless the two allies concerned were both represented in the conquering army the absent member would certainly suffer when it came to drawing the frontier-line.

On the other hand, each of the allies had special objects which might, and in some cases did, conflict with the common object. Bulgaria cherished ambitions in Thrace which extended even to Constantinople, and she had to consider the- fact that sooner or later the Turkish forces in Thrace would be reenforced not only by their own allotted reserves but also by those, above alluded to, which the Greek navy prevented from going to Macedonia. Further, Bulgaria coveted not only a coast-line on the Aegean but the great port of Salonika itself.

Serbia, on her side, had to consider not only central Macedonia but northern Macedonia and the Sanjak of Novibazar. These provinces would infallibly revolt against the Turkish authority as soon as the Turkish forces withdrew to concentrate for battle in the S., and unless bona fide troops of the Serbian Government came to occupy the country, a state of disorder would arise that would equally certainly invite Austrian intervention. 2 Further, Serbia was determined to carve for herself a way to the Adriatic through northern Albania. Greece for her part had a minor objective in Epirus a region of which the northern limit was vague and as a major objective Salonika and the Aegean littoral beyond, not to mention more remote objects in Asia Minor.

Montenegro's aims were limited to local expansion southward into Albania and eastward into the Sanjak of Novibazar and north- ern Macedonia; in both of these directions some conflict of interest with the Serbian Government might arise.

All these things were, in their varying degrees, elements of policy upon which the Allied strategy must base itself if its war aims were to be obtained, and accordingly the military treaty between Bulga- ria and Serbia provided for a Serbo-Bulgarian army of 7 Serbian and 3 Bulgarian divisions to invade Macedonia, moving con- centrically against the front Uskub-Kumanovo-Kratovo-Kochana, forming the outer contour of the plain known as Ovche Polye which was assumed on both sides to be the natural concentration area of the Turks.

If the road system was judged by the staffs sufficient to permit of the augmentation of the left wing, this was to be made up of 2 Serbian and 3 Bulgarian divisions a force equivalent to 10 Turkish divisions, while the other 5 Serbian divisions (equal to about 8 Turkish) descended from Vranya upon Kumanovo. If not, the central mass of 5 Serbian divisions was to be flanked on the N. by 2 divisions moving by the Kara Dagh on Uskub and on the S. by the

1 The navy consisted of the " Georgios Averof," a powerful armoured cruiser, 3 old coastal battleships practically modernized, and 16 modern destroyers and other torpedo craft, including a sub- marine; as against the Turkish strength of 3 small battleships (ex-German), one modernized coastal battleship, 2 light cruisers and 20 effective destroyers and torpedo boats.

2 The relations of Serbia and Montenegro were not such that the Serbian Government could easily hand over to Montenegro the entire responsibility for the conquest of the north.

3 Bulgarian divisions advancing on the front Kratovo Kochana. In both cases the envelopment of all the forces that the Turks could gather for battle was the object aimed at. It provided also that if the military situation in Thrace required it, troops not indispensable in Macedonia might be transferred thither, and vice versa.

The balance of the Serbian forces (about 3 divisions) were at the free disposal of their Government, and in fact were intended for the conquest of the Sanjak of Novibazar.

The 6 (or 7) Bulgarian divisions remaining were to form the army destined for Thrace.

The rdle of Greece, when she acceded to the league, was by offen- sive operations from Thessaly to bind as many hostile troops as possible, incidentally occupying the country which it was intended to acquire. The Greek navy was to -close the Aegean to Turkish transports. A minor Greek force in the Epirus theatre, and the Montenegrins in northern Albania, were similarly to absorb the attention of the Turkish garrisons (3 independent divisions) and to conquer territory.

On the very eve of operations, however, a drastic change was made (Sept. 28) at the instance of Bulgaria. Instead of 3 divisions, I only was to operate in Macedonia, and this was directed to move inde- pendently from Dupnitsa in the direction of Seres and Salonika. The striking wing of the allied army that which, directed upon Shtip,. would have come in upon the rear of the Turkish positions on the Ovche Polye was thereby deprived of a force of about 80,000 men. And Bulgaria, by evading at the last moment an obligation that was not merely part of a military scheme but was included in the basic political treaty of Feb. 29 1912, set up at once an atmos- phere of friction which was not likely to help her in her claims to the doubtful districts of Macedonia. Serbia, submitting rather than agreeing, redistributed her forces, and the strategic deployment and order of battle actually carried out was as follows:

Commander-in-chief, King Peter

Chief of the general staff, Gen. Putnik

II. Army Gen. Stepanovich Timok I. 3 and Army

(28,000 ration troops,

strength)

I. Army Crown Prince Morava I., Drina I.,

Alexander Danube I., Danube

(126,000 ration II., Timok II., Cav.

strength) Div., Army troops.

III. Army Gen. Yankovich Shumaja I., Morava II.,

(67,000 ration Drina II., Morava Bri-

strength) gade, Army troops.

Ibar Force Gen. Zhivkovich Shumaja II., Army

(18,000 combatants) troops. Yavor Brigade Col. Angelkovich (l mixed brigade).

(9,000 combatants)

The I. Army was cantoned in the Morava valley, about Vranya, with outposts on the frontier. The II. Army on its left (now reduced to one division) was concentrated along with the 7th Bulgarian Div. about Kyustendil, and the III. Army on its right, behind the frontier, on the various mountain routes E. and N. of Prishtina. The Ibar Force lay on the river of that name, just inside Serbian territory, opposite Novibazar. The Yavor Brigade was temporarily held back facing the Serbo-Bosnian frontier. The intention was that the III. Army should advance first and make good possession of Prishtina, and then turn S., leaving one division to hold the captured territory, and with the remainder advance rapidly S. through the Kachanik defile on Uskub, the unattached brigade meantime open- ing up communication over the Kara Dagh with the Central (I.) Army. This would have initially the difficult task of debouching from the narrow front of the Morava valley, while the sole remaining unit of the II. Army was to advance by Egri Palanka towards Kratovo.

The Ibar Force, and eventually the Yavor Brigade also, were to clear the Sanjak of Novibazar of Turkish garrisons and Albanian bands. The Montenegrins were to cooperate to some extent in this task, but their main effort was to be directed against Scutari.

Mobilization began in all the countries affected on Sept. 3O-Oct. I. Montenegro was the first to declare war, on Oct. 8. Ignoring the declaration of the Great Powers that " under no circumstances would they agree to any change in the status quo in S.E. Europe," the other three members of the league presented a joint ultimatum on Oct. 13. Turkey rejected this on the I5th, and on the I7th war was declared. By that date the movements of strategic concentration were nearly complete, and several frontier skirmishes had already taken place.

//. The Campaigns in Macedonia and the West. On Oct. 20, while the Serbian I. and II. Armies closed up on their advanced elements (the I. clearing some high ground beyond the frontier to facilitate the next day's work), the III., which had the greatest distance to cover, marched in several columns on Prishtina. Irregular fighting on difficult ground brought the army close to Prishtina by the 22nd, and the Turks evacuated the town on the evening of that day.

On Oct. 21, the I. Army advanced in three columns: Morava I., Timok II. on the right, with flank guards in the Kara Dagh, fol-

3 The 7th Bulgarian Div. was nominally under the orders of this army, but in fact obeyed orders only from the Bulgarian head- quarters.