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Rh Religions. The Turkish conquest was followed by numerous conversions to Islam, so that the Mahommedan population (3,000,000) exceeds the Turkish element. More than half of the Albanians and 32% of the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herze- govina have adopted the creed of the conquering race. The great bulk of the Christian population belongs to the Orthodox Church, of which the oecumenical patriarch at Constantinople is the nominal head. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek Churches are in reality autocephalous. Most of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes of Slovenia, Croatia and Dalmatia, some of the Gegh tribes in Albania, and 22% of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the Roman Catholic Church. Some Bulgars belong to the Uniate Church, which keeps Orthodox rite and discipline under Roman authority. The Gregorian and Uniate Armenian Churches each have a patriarch.

Languages. The Slavonic and Greek Nationalists succeeded in preserving their language. Early in the iyth century, the Serbo-Croats in Ragusa had a common literature, written in Herzegovinian dialect. In the ipth century, under the influence of Vuk Karadjitsh, that dialect prevailed as the literary language. In Bulgaria, the actual language is that of Sredna Gora, for centuries written only in a few monasteries. The conventional literary language of the Greeks is a compromise. Albanian, a remnant of the ancient Thraco-Illyrian speech, belongs to the Indo-European family, but lacks literary distinction.

AUTHORITIES. For a general description of the whole region see Jovan Cvijic, La Pcninsule Balkanique (1918); Odysseus, Turkey in Europe (1900); Gaston Gravier, Les Frontieres historiques de la Serbie (1918); H. C. Thomson, The Outgoing. Turk (1897); Tjoanne, Etats du Danube et des Balkans (1895); R. Millet, Souvenirs des Balkans (1891); E. de Lavelaye, La PeninsuU des Balkans (1896); F. Toula, " Materialien zu einer Geologic der Balkan Halbinsel," Jahr. K. K. Reichsanst., vol. xxxiii., pp. 61-114^ (Vienna, 1883); A. Philippson, Der Peloponnes (1892); J. Cvijic, " Die Tektonic der Balkan Halbinsel," Camples rendus, Congres geologique inter- national (Vienna 1904) ; " Grundlinien der Geographic und Geologie von Macedonien u. Alt-Serbien," Erg. Heft., Pet. Mitt. (Gotha, 1908) ; Mackenzie and Irby, Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey (1866); A. Bone, La Turquie d'Europe (1840). W. Miller, The Balkans (1896), sketches the history of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Rumania and Serbia. See also Austrian, British, French and Serbian staff maps, and the ethnographical maps of Cvijic and Marinelli in the Geographical Review, New York (1919). (J. C. ; Y. C.)

BALKAN WARS (1912-3). This article gives an account of the wars of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro as allies against Turkey in 1912 and 1913, and the short war which followed between the former allies, with Turkey and Rumania intervening, in the summer of 1913.

I. The Balkan League. The formation of a military alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia, Greece and Montenegro in 1912 was the final step in an evolution which began in 1909, and in its last stages was hastened by the Italo-Turkish War of 1911. The imme- diate cause of war was the state of Macedonia under Turkish rule. On June 19 1912 a military agreement was made between the general staffs of Serbia and Bulgaria, in accordance with the previous politi- cal treaty of alliance signed on Feb. 29 1912. Greece followed suit with a political treaty in May and a military agreement on Sept. 22. Montenegro did the same in the course of the summer, and, while Turkey was still negotiating her peace with Italy at Ouchy, the four allies mobilized their armies (Sept. 30 and Oct. I N.S.). Turkey, since the Young Turk Revolution internally dislocated, was in no condition to meet their onslaught. Although the prestige of the individual Turkish soldier as a fighting man stood high, and the beginnings of many reforms in the education of staff and regimental officers had been made in the last few years, the military capacity of the army as a whole proved to be far below the reputation which it enjoyed amongst the military experts of Europe. Turkey's oppo- nents, on the contrary, had in recent years not only rearmed them- selves and secured their financial and political position, but also made those minute and careful preparations of detail which when the time comes translate themselves into smooth concentration, and regular, consistent operations.

Strategically no less than politically, Turkey was on the defensive. Her European possessions formed two separate theatres of war, Macedonia and Thrace, which were linked only by the coastal rail- way Dede Aghach-Seres-Salonika, and this line, open in its middle section to Bulgarian raids from the mountains on the N. and to Greek raids from the sea, 1 was of no high technical efficiency in any

1 The possession of one modern ship, the " Averof, " gave to the Greeks material superiority over the Turks at sea, and the maritime traditions and aptitudes of their race a certain moral advantage.

case. The dispersion of a large part of her army and notably of her reserves in Asia Minor, where rail communications were few, and roads ill-developed, made any reenforcement of the European theatres a matter of time and difficulty ; in the case of Macedonia, such reenforcement was practically impossible save by sea. After a new survey of the situation in 1909-10 by Marshal von der Goltz it was decided to treat Macedonia as a self-contained theatre of war garrisoned at all times by a large army with Shtip (Slip) as its area of war concentration, and to constitute in Thrace a covering army which would be reenforced by the troops from Asia as they suc- cessively arrived, up to the strength adequate for offensive opera- tions against Bulgaria. To assist the defense in the first, or waiting, period Adrianople was organized as a modern fortress, and Kirk Kilisse, an upland town on the edge of the Istranja Dagh, re-equipped with barrier-forts. The line of communication with Asia was secured against the Greek fleet by the Dardanelles fortifications, which en- abled Rodosto to be used as an advanced base.

The peace-time distribution of the Turkish forces in Europe (other than garrison troops) was as follows: In Thrace were the I. Ordu (Constantinople), with the I. Corps (Constantinople), II. Corps (Rodosto), III. Corps (Kirk Kilisse), and IV. Corps (Adri- anople). These constituted 12 active divisions, plus, on mobiliza- tion, II first reserve divisions and 6 second reserve divisions. In Macedonia were the II. Ordu (Salonika), with the V. Corps (Salo- nika), VI. Corps (Monastir), VII. Corps (Uskub), and the independ- ent 22nd Div. (Kozani), 23rd Div. (Yannina), and 24th Div. (Scutari).

These constituted 12 active divisions, plus, on mobilization, 10 first reserve divisions and 3 second reserve divisions. Administra- tively, the reserve formations of Smyrna, and both the active (VIII. Corps) and reserve formations of Damascus, belonged to this II. Ordu. Under favourable circumstances, and especially if Greece were neutral, these forces, totalling 3 active and 15 first reserve divisions, would be available. In the alternative, they would be available, with some delay in point of time, to reenforce the army in Thrace. The III. and IV. Ordus, with headquarters at Erzinjan and Bagdad respectively, could be grouped as an army of the Caucasus in case of a Russian war, but were practically unavailable for Europe. So also were the forces in Hejaz and Yemen, and Tripoli. Neglecting second reserve formations, therefore, the paper disposi- tions gave Thrace 23 and Macedonia 22 divisions, to either of which might be added a further 18. But, as usual in Turkish military history, this imposing paper total of 63 divisions represented far more than the real and available strength. Internal difficulties, low transport capabilities, and the necessity of garrisoning almost all parts of Albania and Macedonia to prevent local risings, added to the customary slackness in administration and training and the customary dishonesty in supply and equipment matters, resulted in the putting into the field of two armies which were numerically in- ferior, unequally trained, and poorly equipped possessing indeed few assets beyond the solid fighting-worth of the individual Mahom- medan Turk. 2

With all this, however, the prestige of a great Power facing a group of small states, whose mutual hatred and rivalries had only just been composed, stood high, especially in Germany where the positive effects of the Turkish army reforms initiated by von der Goltz and others were overrated. In the Turkish army itself, con- fidence was unbounded : only a few had their misgivings.

The actual strengths of the two Turkish armies, owing to inexact and defective returns, cannot be stated. But it appears to be true that the Thracian army had no more than half of its nominal strength of 226,000 men, while the Macedonian army short of the VIII. Corps and the Damascus and Smyrna reserves and scattered as it was, can hardly be credited with more than 200,000 of its nomi- nal 340,000, of whom no more than 50,000 combatants were in fact ever assembled on one battlefield.

On the side of the allies, administration being regular and senti- ment uniform within each army, the paper strength and order of battle represent realities, and can be summed up thus :

Bulgarian Army: Nine divisions (l Sofia, 2 Philippopolis, 3 Steven, 4 Shumla, 5 Ruschuk, 6 Vratsa, 7 Dupnitsa, 8 Stara Zagora, 9 Plevna) each of two brigades plus a reserve brigade formed on mobilization. (The regiments being each of 4 battalions, the infan- try strength of a division was 24 battalions, i.e. that of a normal European army corps, and 2j times that of a Turkish division.) 3 A loth Div. and an nth Div. were formed on mobilization out of surplus reservists and of such Macedonian volunteers as enlisted in the regular forces (these had two brigades each instead of three). There was also a cavalry division. Ration strength of the field armies, about 280,000.

Serbian Army: Five divisions of the I. Ban and five of the II. Ban, each designated by the regional name (Danube, Morava, Drina, Shumaja, Timok and the Ban numeral, e.g. Timok I., Timok II., etc.). The infantry strength of a I. Ban division (four 4-bat- talion regiments) was two-thirds that of a Bulgarian division and

2 Even solidarity within the unit had been seriously shaken by the incorporation, under new conscription laws, of Christians allied in race and religion to the enemy peoples.


 * The 6th Div. had only two brigades.