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350 who were conscious of their responsibility, and the good temper of the German-Austrian populace. When it became clear that the Communist disturbances were to no small extent fomented by the Hungarian Mission in Austria, dissensions arose between Vienna and Budapest, which were not settled till the Hungarian Soviets replaced their envoy, who had been involved in the affair, by a persona grata.

On May 12 1919 the State Chancellor, Dr. Renner, had gone with a delegation to St. Germain-en-Laye to receive the terms of the dictated peace. With the exception of the Magyars, all the countries formerly under the same Government as the German-Austrians had " associated " themselves with their enemies in the World War. It was in no small degree due to their counsels that the Treaty of Peace turned out to be even more severe than that with Germany. In comparison with the loss of former German territory and of 3,000,000 German- Austrian subjects, combined with unprecedentedly heavy economic burdens and restrictions, the acquisition of the Burgen- land (German Western Hungary) and the promise of the Entente to assist in the reconstruction of Austria seemed but poor advantages, the value of which remained to be proved.

Otto Bauer recognized in the provisions of Article 88, which specifically forbade Austria's union with Germany, and in the fact that Italy, in spite of the Italophil attitude of the Vienna Cabinet, annexed German Southern Tirol for good, a complete defeat for his policy; and he resigned. Renner took over in per- son the charge of foreign affairs. The Treaty of St. Germain was signed on Sept. 20 1919, with a few small modifications of the original draft; on Oct. 17 it was approved by the Con- stituent Assembly; and in July 1920 it came into force. By his open adhesion to " Westernism " and the policy of the League of Nations, Renner made known Austria's honourable intention of taking her stand entirely on the basis of the Peace Treaty, in which case she hoped for help from the Entente in her destitution, which had been made even deeper by the operation of the Treaty. In Dec. 1919 the Chancellor found an opportunity of making personal representations in Paris as to the sufferings of his country; in Feb. 1920 other Austrian states- men were in a position to do the same. Indeed, on more than one occasion Austria received temporary assistance. Moreover, the general right of the Entente to a mortgage on all Austria's assets, provided for in the Peace Treaty, was so far limited as to facilitate the acquisition from abroad of those commodities which were most pressingly necessary for the moment. A special " Austrian Section of the Reparations Commission " was appointed to study the measures most necessary for a lasting cure for the ills of the body politic, and met in Vienna on April 17 1920 under the presidency of Sir William Goode. The inter- national commissions which were to supervise the disarming of Austria by land, water and air, also came into operation. And thus Austria's sovereignty no longer existed except in appearance.

Renner's first Coalition Cabinet was followed in Oct. 1919 by a second one composed of the same parties. It had also the task of establishing normal relations with the neighbouring states. The visit made by the Chancellor to Rome in April 1920 on the invitation of Italy on which occasion he was also received at the Vatican was a not unfavourable introduction to these efforts. Among the " succession states " it was chiefly Czechoslovakia to which the Social Democratic party, which was as influential as ever, felt itself drawn, not only for economic reasons but also owing to the many points of contact which existed between its standpoint, with regard to Central-European problems, and that of circles in Prague. The frontier questions raised by the Peace Treaty were not settled in favour of Austria, which lost among other places the important railway centre of Gmund. In the economic negotiations advantage was taken by the Czechs of Austria's dependence on the Bohemian coal supply. On the other hand, in certain matters (naturalization, option, protection of minorities, division of collections and archives) a compromise was arrived at.

On the southern boundary Yugoslavia had to give up the strip of Styrian territory which had not been assigned her by the Treaty of St. Germain. The Klagenfurt basin also re- mained Austrian, thanks to the result of the plebiscite of Oct. 10 1920, in which 60% of the votes were cast against Yugoslavia Trade relations were established with the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as with other states, at first on a basis of exchange of commodities, but were later regulated by commercial treaties.

A variety of disturbances occurred from time to time in the relations with Hungary, where, at the beginning of Aug. 1919, the Soviet system had broken down. While the Christian Socialists viewed the new course of events in Hungary with sympathy, the Social Democrats and those with Great German sympathies the latter because they saw their national aims endangered were anxious lest the revolution in Budapest might bring about a restoration of the Habsburgs in the basin of the Danube. Causes of discord soon made their appearance From the outset Budapest offered a scarcely veiled resistance to 'the cession of the Burgenland (German Western Hungary) to Austria. Austria declined to hand over Bela Kun and the other former " people's commissaries " who had taken refuge in Vienna; it even found itself bound; in consequence of the Copenhagen Agreement concluded with the party in power at Moscow, to aid the escape of the Hungarian Soviet leaders to Russia, in order to obtain the return of their own prisoners who were still kept in Russia. Only a few weeks before (June 20 1920) the International Trade Union Congress at Amsterdam had threatened Hungary with a boycott. Since this had only been exercised with severity in the case of Austria, the Hungarians regarded the Social Demo- crats of Vienna as having provoked it. The growing estrange- ment found expression in a few unfortunate frontier incidents, from the Hungarian side. It also had its effect upon the internal politics of Austria, for the Social Democrats sought to prove from documentary evidence that Hungarian Government officials, in their various conspiracies against the Austrian Republic, had relied on the support of the Vienna Christian Socialists.

At this point the coalition between the two great parties could no longer oe maintained. The Christian Socialists had gradually become sick of it since the Social Democrats would not allow them as much influence as seemed in accordance with the increasing tendency of public opinion towards the Right. On the other hand, the Social Democrats, by their participation in a " bourgeois " Government, gave the Radical elements in their own party, as well as the Communists, a handle for attack- ing them, which threatened the carefully preserved united front of Social Democracy with serious danger. In view of this tension, an occasion which was not in itself of any special im- portance sufficed to split the Government coalition on June 10 1920. Otto Bauer could justly remark, on reviewing the past, that his party, by its cooperation with the Christian Socialists, had achieved as much as was possible for a beginning. The Republican legislation had answered, in so far as that was within the bounds of possibility, to the desires and interests of the urban proletariat. 'The position of the labouring class had also been recognized by the State. In the militia question the Social Democrats had entirely triumphed. Under the impres- sion of the recent " Kapp-Putsch " in Germany they succeeded in forcing through a defense-law, which set up a machinery of soldiers' councils for the professional army provided for by the Peace Treaty; secured all political liberties, including also the ' right of coalition to those who had completed their service in the defense force, and by this means assured to the Social Democratic party for a long time to come predominant influence over the State's best source of power. As a set-off to these successes the Christian Socialists had managed with difficulty to protect their peasant franchise against inconvenient innovations, and to prevent questions of Church and State, education and the like from emerging in a critical form.

The place of the Renner Government was taken temporarily by a " Proportional Cabinet " ("Proporzkabinctt ") in which every party was represented by delegates without undertaking any responsibility for the Ministry as a whole; and it had to