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of founding an independent Polish buffer state, which should be in economic, political and military alliance with the Central Powers, also split upon the opposition of the Vienna Govern- ment. Thus the union of " Congress Poland " with the Habsburg Monarchy, which Burian had proposed in Aug. 1915, and which had been advocated by the writings of Count Andrassy among others, stood out more clearly as the only possible solution of the Polish question. But this, too, presented great difficulties on closer examination. There were adherents of the idea of a personal union and on the other hand of an actual union; among the latter were those who were in favour of a trialistic form for the new greater Austria-Hungary, and those who advocated the incorporation of Poland in the Austrian State.

Under the influence of the Hungarian Government, whose spokesman, Count Tisza, protested in the strongest terms against the organization of the monarchy on a trialistic basis, the idea now prevailed of annexing Poland to Austria-Hungary and granting to the united territory of Poland, with the addi- tion of Galicia, a far-reaching autonomy. This had the further object of diminishing the damage to the interests of the German- Austrians which was feared by wide circles in Austria and Germany. Since the autumn of 1915 negotiations were carried on between leading statesmen of Germany and Austria-Hungary on this basis. But the more deeply the question was gone into the greater were the difficulties which presented themselves. Bethmann Hollweg declared that the German people could only agree to such a strengthening of Austria-Hungary in the event of the German Empire coming out of the war with an equally large increase of territory. Economic and military objections were also advanced on the German side, and as a solution it was proposed to incorporate a small portion of " Congress Poland " with Austrian Galicia, and out of the greater part of the rest to create a Polish State independent in form but in reality under the protectorate of Germany. But this proposal was firmly rejected by the Vienna Government, which for its part advanced the idea of a genuinely autonomous State com- prising the whole of Polish territory, which should be allied by a long-term economic and military agreement with both the Central Powers equally. But it was impossible to win the con- sent of the Berlin Government to this plan.

Such was the position when the Austro-Hungarian troops were defeated at Lutsk. The result of this was that in Aug. 1916 the Germans carried the day with their proposal to found an independent State, practically comprising the former "Con- gress Poland" under a hereditary constitutional monarchy, but subject to the most far-reaching limitations in military and economic matters. On the Austro-Hungarian side the bestowal of the crown of Poland on a member of the family of Habsburg-Lorraine was waived. A more exact definition of the sphere of influence of the Central Powers was reserved for further discussion. But their subsequent course showed that the opposition of interests was too deep-seated for it to be possible to settle matters in a hurry. In Oct. 1916, therefore, they came to an agreement for the present to shelve the ques- tion of an independent Polish State. But in order to calm the Poles, who were anxious about their fate, and to secure the assistance of their armed forces for the Central Powers, a procla- mation was issued on Nov. 5 1916, in which a prospect was held out of the restoration of an independent Poland as a hereditary constitutional monarchy closely attached to the Central Powers. But the two military governments at Warsaw and Lublin continued to administer the country.

Even before this agreement had been arrived at, Rumania

had actually gone over to the Entente camp. The Central

Powers had indeed not been wanting in offers to

Rumania th e Rumanian Government between Italy's entry

Ea"ente. e i nto the war (March 1915) and the conclusion of the

treaties with Bulgaria (Sept. 1915), but had made their

concessions conditional on the active intervention of Rumania

on their side. But the leading statesmen of Bucharest would

not agree to this; for in spite of the great military successes of

the Central Powers, their final victory seemed to them doubt-

ful. They accordingly continued to insist on important cessions of territory in the Bukovina and Transylvania by Austria- Hungary in return for a continuance of their neutrality. To this, however, Burian, strongly influenced by Tisza, refused to agree, although not only the German Government but also Conrad von Hb'tzendorff actively supported Rumania's demands. Thus the negotiations, which had been reluctantly continued by Burian, remained without results. Even Bulgaria's adhe- sion to the Central Powers, and the successful campaign against Serbia, did not produce any change in the attitude of the two Governments. The majority of Rumanian politicians counted on a rapid change in the military situation, and the Entente diplomatists made every effort to confirm them in this belief. But the Rumanian Government maintained its conviction 'that it must for the present preserve its neutrality. It was the Russian victories at Lutsk and Okna which first led to a change in their views. At the end of July 1916 the Vienna Cabinet was aware, from its ambassador, Count Czernin, that preparations for war were being completed in Bucharest, that negotiations were being carried on with the Entente Powers as to the con- ditions of going over to them, and that the probability was that Rumania would draw the sword as soon as the harvest was garnered. In spite of this, and though the news during the next few weeks was more and more unfavourable, Burian firmly refused the demands made by Rumania for the mainte- nance of their neutrality, and was not to be moved from his resolve even by the German Government and Conrad von Hotzendorff. And so towards the end of August the union of Rumania with the Entente Powers was accomplished, in return for far-reaching territorial concessions granted by them to their new ally at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy. On August 27 on the day of Italy's formal rupture with Germany followed Rumania's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, and hostilities began without delay. But the hope of the Entente that Rumania's entry on their side would quickly decide the war in their favour was not fulfilled. After preliminary Rumanian successes against the weak troops of the Habsburg Monarchy, the armies of the Quadruple Alli- ance, fighting under German leadership, achieved a decisive victory. On Dec. 6 1915 Bucharest was taken, and at the beginning of Jan. 1917 two-thirds of Rumania was occupied.

Turkey's danger had grown through the entry of Rumania into the war on the side of the Entente Powers. She, therefore, addressed herself to the Central Powers with fresh ., demands. So early as Sept. 28 1916 Germany assured Agree- the Porte that, in accordance with her treaty engage- meats with ments, she would not conclude a separate peace, would allow Turkey a share, proportionate to her military efforts, in any territorial conquests, and would not agree to any peace so long as Turkish territory was occupied by the enemy. Soon afterwards, on Jan. n 1917, a further agreement was arrived at between these two Powers, in which the abolition of the Capitulations, which Turkey found oppressive, was contem- plated. The provisions of these two treaties were expanded in a manner favourable to Turkey on Nov. 27 1917. The Austro- Hungarian Government, after long hesitation, associated itself on March 22 1917 with the German settlements of Sept. 28 1916 and Jan. n 1917. But her ratification was not given. A treaty was signed between Austria-Hungary and Turkey on May 30 1918 as to the question of the Capitulations, which corresponded to the Turco-German one of Nov. 27 1917, and by which Austria-Hungary pledged herself not to sign any peace which should reestablish the Capitulations.

The success of the Central Powers in Rumania was a ray of light in the last days of the Emperor Francis Joseph I., who had entered the war with a heavy heart, and always remained full of anxious care as to the fate of his empire. His armies and those of his allies had achieved decisive victories in several theatres of war in the course of the year 1916; they had occupied new territories, and in other quarters had successfully repelled the increasingly formidable offensive of their enemies. The battles on the