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ing their enemies, as in that case she would have to reckon with Bulgaria, which had not forgiven the wounds inflicted by the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913.

It was not an easy matter for the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to win over the Bulgarians. Both the King and Rado- slavov distrusted the Rumanians and Turks, and feared the Greeks and Russians. Moreover, the far-reaching offers of the Entente Powers were not without influence upon them. Their attitude in their dealings with the representatives of the Cen- tral Powers was guarded, and they kept increasing their de- mands. As early as the end of 1014 the Vienna Government, in view of the unfavourable military position in Serbia and Galicia, and in consequence of the pressure exerted upon it not only by the German politicians and military commanders, but also by Conrad, had declared its readiness to concede to the Bulgarians, in the event of their entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the possession of those Serbian territories to which they advanced historical and ethnographical claims; only, however, so far as they should occupy them with their own troops during the course of the war. The negotia- tions started at the beginning of 1915 on this basis were pro- tracted by the Bulgarians, for in view of the unfavourable mili- tary situation of the Central Powers at the time, King Ferdinand and Radoslavov did not think it expedient to enter into per- manent engagements. They therefore declared that they could promise only to remain neutral, but demanded in return consid- erable extensions of territory in Macedonia, increasing their claims in March and April under the impression of the Russian victories in the Carpathians and the danger threatening Turkey from the Western Powers. Burian, however, held firmly to the position that he could make territorial concessions only in return for active participation on Bulgaria's part. The break- through at Gorlitz and the subsequent victorious advance of the Germans and Austro-Hungarian troops also produced their effect in Sofia. The negotiations with the Central Powers were carried on with more zeal; but they failed to reach a settle- ment, since the demands of the Bulgarians continued to be out of all proportion to any services which they seemed disposed to offer in return. They declined to attack Serbia, refused a military convention proposed to them by the Central Powers, but at the same time increased the price of their continued neutrality. The entry of Italy into the war against the Central Powers, and the increasingly extensive offers on the part of the Entente, added to the difficulty of the negotiations between Vienna and Sofia. But gradually the conviction gained ground in Sofia that adherence to the Central Powers would serve the interests of Bulgaria better than an alliance with the Entente. For it would be easy for the former to concede the extensions of territory desired by Bulgaria in Macedonia at Serbia's expense, whereas the Entente Powers were bound to fear that similar concessions on their part would give offence to their faithful ally Serbia. The Triple Entente failed in their efforts to persuade the Serbs to consent to this sacrifice by promising them, in the event of ultimate victory, the possession of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia, for Bulgaria demanded immediate possession of the Macedonian territories promised her, while Serbia wanted the transfer of these territories to be postponed until she herself should have secured the extension of territory promised to her by way of compensation.

It was only when the continued victorious advance of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in Poland made the prospects of the ultimate victory of the Central Powers in the World War seem very favourable, that the advantage Bulgaria, to be gained by joining them was definitely recognized at Sofia. From July 1915 onwards negotiations were energetically carried on. The Central Powers insisted on the signature of a military convention in addition to the treaty of alliance, and that Bulgaria should at the same time conclude a treaty with the Turks. After innumerable difficulties had been surmounted, the treaties between Austria-Hungary and Bul- garia were signed on Sept. 6 1915. The most important article of one treat}' contained a guarantee by Austria-Hungary of

the independence and integrity of Bulgaria against any attack not provoked by Bulgaria herself, this guarantee to be valid for the duration of the alliance, i.e. till Dec. 31 1920, and after that for a year, and so on until .the treaty should be denounced in proper form. Bulgaria, for her part, undertook to give Austria- Hungary proportionate armed assistance in the event of the monarchy being attacked by a State bordering on Bulgaria, and demanding her aid. The second agreement, signed on the same day, contained a pledge from Bulgaria that she would take the offensive against Serbia, in return for which what is now Serbian Macedonia the so-called "disputed" and "non- disputed" zones, as established by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of March 13 1912 was promised to her. In the meantime it was agreed that, in the event of an attack by Rumania on Bul- garia or her allies including the Turks which should not have been provoked by Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary would con- sent to the recovery by Bulgaria of the territory ceded by her to Rumania by the Peace of Bucharest, and a rectification of the Rumano-Bulgarian frontier as defined by the Treaty of Berlin. A similar promise was made to Bulgaria, under the same conditions, with regard to the territory ceded by her to Greece by the Peace of Bucharest. The military convention signed on the same day settled the provisions for the carrying- out of the impending joint offensive against Serbia. The nego- tiations between the Turks and Bulgarians, which had been going on for a year past, were also brought to a conclusion on Sept. 6, thanks to persistent pressure from the Central Powers. Turkey gave in on the essential point by agreeing to a rectifica- tion of the frontier in favour of Bulgaria on both banks of the Maritsa.

The significance of the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers lay in the facts that it secured their communications with Turkey, and also the possibility of a victorious campaign against Serbia. The campaign now began and proceeded according to programme. Though valiantly defended by the Serbs against overwhelming numbers, their country fell, towards the end of 1915, into the hands of the Central Powers and Bul- garia. Shortly afterwards Montenegro shared the same fate.

The year 1915 also brought "Congress Poland" into the possession of the Central Powers. After the fall of Warsaw (Aug. 5 1915) General Governments were set up on behalf of Germany at Warsaw and on behalf of Austria-Hungary at Lublin, to which all govern- mental powers were handed over. At first the Central Powers had not contemplated the permanent acquisition of " Congress Poland." It was merely considered as a pawn and an item for compensations at the end of the war. But after the fall of Warsaw, the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin tried to arrive at an agreement as to the future destiny of Poland. The most diverse solutions were discussed, but no definitive agreement was arrived at by the end of the war. The idea of handing Poland back to Russia was indeed repeatedly advanced by Germany both in the year 1915 and again very actively after July 1916 when Sturmer was at the head of foreign affairs in the empire of the Tsar. But since the condition of such a solution namely a total separation of Russia from the Entente could not be brought about, it was allowed to drop. The plan of dividing the whole of the conquered territory of Poland between Austria- Hungary and Germany was also considered. But insuperable difficulties arose in the course of the negotiations, particularly with regard to the frontiers of the respective territories. It was also foreseen that the Poles would not voluntarily submit to a new partition of their country and that they would struggle for its reunion. It was feared, moreover, that far-reaching differences between the Allies would be revealed the moment economic and military questions should come under discussion. The idea of annexing "Congress Poland" to Germany, first ventilated by a section of public opinion and in military circles in Germany, was rejected not only by the Vienna Cabinet but also by the German Imperial Chancellor, since he feared the increase of Polish influence in Germany that would be bound to follow. The plan advocated for a time by Bethmann Hollweg.