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pared to concede. Sonnino asked for wide territories and their immediate transfer to the Italians. Burian firmly refused the latter proposal, and only offered the greater part of Italian South- ern Tirol, and even this on condition that Italy should preserve a benevolent neutrality towards the Central Powers until the end of the war and leave Austria-Hungary a free hand in the Balkans. Sonnino rejected Burian's offers as insufficient, and during the next few weeks increased his demands. On April 10, on Sonnino's instructions, a memorandum containing Italy's new conditions was handed in at Vienna. They made it clear that Italy was no longer striving to complete her national growth while preserving her former relations with the Habs- burg Monarchy, but was aiming at the realization of her national unity and at the achievement of complete supremacy in the Adriatic. She demanded, among other things, the whole of S.Tirol, with the boundaries of the Italian kingdom of 1811, Gorizia and Gradisca, and the conversion of Trieste with its surrounding territory into a community independent of Austria- Hungary; the cession of a number of the most important islands in the Adriatic; the immediate occupation of these lands by the Italians; the recognition of the full sovereignty of Italy over Valona and its territory; and a declaration of Austria-Hungary's desinteressement as regards Albania. In return Italy was pre-i pared to promise neutrality for the duration of the war, and to renounce for this period the construction in her own favour of the provisions of the Triple -Alliance Treaty. In spite of the extent of these demands, they were not flatly refused by Burian, since the military situation compelled him to continue negotia- tions, and German statesmen and generals pointed out to him the disastrous consequences which would follow if Italy went over into the enemy camp. The fall of Constantinople was threatening, the Russians were pressing relentlessly forward, Hungary seemed at their mercy, and it might happen that a declaration of war by Italy would be followed by Rumania, and even by Bulgaria. Then the hemming-in of the Central Powers would be complete and the seal would be placed upon their ruin. Burian could not cast doubt upon these arguments; it was not without influence upon him that Conrad now advo- cated every concession to Italy. Burian therefore increased his concessions, but did not yield all that Italy demanded. He retreated, rather, step by step, always led by the hope that a new turn would be given to events in the theatre of war; he sought to hold the Italians in place without rebuffing them. But since the latter did not count upon achieving their demands from Vienna, and were convinced that the Habsburg Monarchy would take back again what had been squeezed from it in the hour of need, should the military situation take a more favour- able turn, they determined to bring to a conclusion the negotia- tions which they had long carried on with the Entente Powers. On April 26 1915 the Treaty of London was signed, which pledged Italy to enter the war by the side of her new allies at the end of a month's interval. As compensation for this, it contained the assurance of art extension of territory for Italy going far beyond that which she had demanded from Austria- Hungary as the price of maintaining neutrality.

Having eome to terms with the Entente Powers, Italy re- sumed negotiations with the Vienna Cabinet, not with the inten- tion of pursuing them to any profitable end, but rather in order to find in the refusal of the Vienna Government to fulfil Italy's demands just grounds for going over to the enemy camp, and time to complete her warlike preparations. It was, therefore, in vain that Burian, under pressure of both the Austro-Hunga- rian and German army commands and of the German Govern- ment, went further and further in concessions to Italy. On April 21 1915 Sonnino declared that the points of view on either side were too wide apart for the differences to be bridged over; and on April 25 the Duke of Avarna, the Italian ambassador, who had up till then worked untiringly for a friendly under- standing, expressed his opinion that a breach was inevitable. Even Prince Billow, who continued the negotiations at Rome up to the last moment, let it be understood that he no longer believed the Italians to be in earnest in seeking a compromise.

On May 3 1915, in fact, the Italian council of ministers resolved to denounce the existing alliance with Austria and to claim full freedom of action for Italy. In vain the Vienna Cabinet made yet further concessions, so that in the end these included almost everything that the Italians had demanded. Sonnino contin- ued indeed to negotiate, but he was always finding fresh reason for postponing a decision. On May ltaly 20 1915 the Italian Government received from the w ar. Chambers the extraordinary powers necessitated by the approaching conflict, and on the 23rd war was declared by Italy on Austria-Hungary.

One of the chief reasons which had decided Burian to offer such far-reaching concessions to Italy in April and May 1913 was the pressure from the military higher command, and espe- cially Conrad, who never ceased to insist in his memoranda that Italy's entry into the war would be followed by that of Rumania, and on this account adjured Burian to make every sacrifice in order to avert the otherwise unavoidable catastrophe by win- ning over Italy. That his fears were well grounded was all the less doubtful, since it was already known in Vienna by Feb. 1915 that on Feb. 6-23 the agreement concluded in Sept. 1014 between Italy and Rumania as to their Equivocal

.... i i. ii jr c Attitude of

attitude in the war had been renewed for four months Rumania.

and had received an extension to the effect that the two Governments bound themselves to render each other mutual aid in the event of an unprovoked attack on the part of Austria-Hungary. The negotiations as to the cession of Austrian territory, which had been begun with Italy under the impression of this news, had now as their result that Rumania, too, raised the price of her continued neutrality. It was no longer only the Bukovina that was mentioned, but also Tran- sylvania. But Tisza declared that he would not sacrifice a square yard of Hungarian soil, and the Vienna Cabinet agreed with him. The result was an increase of the influence of the Triple Entente in Rumania, which was further heightened by Russia's victories in the Carpathians and the breakdown of the negotiations conducted between Burian and Sonnino. The climax of this spirit of hostility to the Central Powers in Bucha- rest was reached on April 27 1915, when the Italian minister announced a declaration of war on the Habsburg Monarchy to be unavoidable. Only one thing could restrain Rumania, and decide her to maintain her neutrality: a great victory of the Central Powers over the Russians. And this now happened: the break-through at Gorlitz, on May 2 1915. Its effect was felt at once. Bratianu, the Rumanian minister-president, now declared that the position was indeed very critical, but that he hoped to contrive to maintain neutrality; further news of the successes of the German and Austro-Hungarian troops in Galicia and Poland contributed towards strengthening the Rumanian Government in their resolve not to give up their neutrality for the present. In these circumstances even the Italian declaration of war did not alter the Rumanian posi- tion, but the altered conditions of the war certainly influenced the attitude of the Vienna Government. Its interest in Rumania now sensibly declined, since her neutrality seemed assured by the military situation.

The desire of the Central Powers to arrive at a decision in their negotiations with Bulgaria became all the more urgent. Since Jan. 1915 the Turks had been successfully defending the Dardanelles against the attacks of the allied Western Powers, but their position was men- Bulgaria. aced by the fact that they lacked arms and munitions, which Germany had bound herself to provide by the terms of a treaty concluded on Jan. n 1915, with which Austria-Hungary associated herself on March 21 1915. It was therefore necessary to establish secure communications with the Turks, and since all the efforts of the Central Powers to obtain the transport of arms and munitions through Rumania remained fruitless, it was necessary to try and make sure of a way through Bulgaria into Turkish territory. The adherence of Bulgaria would also give a further advantage. With Bulgaria in alliance with the Central Powers, Rumania would be less inclined to risk join-