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Emmanuel answered the telegram in which Francis Joseph expressed his expectation of seeing the Italian troops fighting side by side with those of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Still less gratifying to Vienna were the reports which came in at the same time from Bucharest. The hopes which the Emperor William had built on King Charles's faith- f u l ness to his treaty obligations were not realized. The Rumanian ruler evaded a decisive pronounce- ment as to his attitude in a world war; and Bratianu, the minister-president, did likewise. Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian minister at Bucharest, maintained that at first nothing but neutrality could be reckoned on on the part of Rumania, and insisted that the attitude of the Bulgarians and Turks, together with the course taken by the events of the war, would be decisive for any further action of the King and Government. It was significant that Bratianu spoke of the necessity of maintaining a balance in the Balkans, and at the same time pointed out the difficulties which would confront the King and the Government in consequence of the hostile attitude of influential Rumanian circles to the Magyars. It was in vain that Francis Joseph and William II. used their personal influence to try and per- suade King Charles to take action in the sense they wished. No effect was produced even by the promise made by them to the King on Aug. 2 1914 that they would help Rumania to obtain possession of Bessarabia, after the war had come to a suc- cessful end, if she would join in the struggle on the side of the Triple Alliance Powers. The crown council held on Aug. 4 decided that Rumania could not admit that the casus foederis had arisen. The assurance given by Charles at the same time, that he would safeguard the Rumanian frontiers and apprise Bulgaria that she would have nothing to fear from Rumania if she ranged herself, with the Central Powers, could be of no greater comfort to his disillusioned allies than his solemn declara- tion that he would never consent to Rumania taking the field against Austria-Hungary.

The Central Powers were rather more fortunate in their quest for new allies than in their attempts to persuade Italy and Rumania to fulfil their engagements. On Aug. i Alliance 1914 the representatives of Germany and Turkey had signed a treaty by which they bound themselves to remain neutral in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; but the casus foederis would arise at the moment when Russia entered the war. In this event Germany promised Turkey military support, and guaranteed her existing territorial position as against the Russians. By identical notes of Aug. i 1914 Austria-Hungary adhered to this treaty, which was to last till the end of 1918. But for the time being the Turks did not actively intervene, for their army was not yet properly equipped, and the influence of the friends of the Entente at Constantinople was still too strong. In order to strengthen the Government, which was friendly to the Central Powers, and to make it possible for them shortly to take an active part against the Entente, Germany promised them, as early as the first weeks of Aug. 1914, though only verbally, that in the event of a complete victory of Germany and her allies, their wishes should be furthered both in the matter of the abolition of the Capitulations and of final settlement with Bulgaria; that all Turkish provinces which might be occupied by the common enemy in the course of the war should be evacuated; a series of rectifications of the frontier to her advantage would be made, and they would receive a proportionate share in the war indemnity which was to be expected. Direct inquiries from the Turks were met by Berchtold with the same prom- ises in the name of Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, the efforts of the Central Powers to decide Bulgaria to an alliance broke down. At first, indeed, it looked as if the negotiations which had already ^ions'with k een conducted by Austria-Hungary at Sofia for a Bulgaria. long time in this sense would speedily lead to a profit- able result. Austria-Hungary showed herself inclined, in return for Bulgaria's adhesion to the Triple Alliance, to guarantee her existing territorial possessions, and, in the event

with Turkey.

of a favourable outcome of the impending conflicts, to gratify Ferdinand's aspirations towards the acquisition of "ethnico- historical boundaries" against states which had not joined the Triple Alliance. By the early days of Aug. 1914 the negotia- tions had advanced so far that the signature of the treaties with Germany and Austria-Hungary seemed imminent. Berchtold and Bethmann Hollweg pressed for a decision, the latter more especially on the ground that he still hoped to win over Rumania definitely to the side of the Central Powers. If this could be achieved, then Bulgaria, assured against attacks from the Rumanian side, might be prompted to draw the sword against Serbia, and the majority of the Austro-Hungarian troops which were marching against Serbia could be diverted against Russia. But Ferdinand of Bulgaria refused to embark on a war against Serbia. He laid stress on the dangers which threatened his kingdom in such a case from Greece, Rumania and Turkey; he also alluded to the large offers which had been made him by Russia, and held that he could only come to a decision after his relations with Rumania and Turkey had been cleared up and the negotiations for a treaty with these Powers had been concluded. It was clear that Ferdinand of Bulgaria, too, did not wish to enter the war before the preponderance of the Central Powers over their opponents could be assumed with greater confidence. But successes in the field remained to seek in the Eastern theatre of war. After promising beginnings, the campaign of the Austro-Hungarian armies took an unsuc- cessful turn, and decided Ferdinand to be prudent. He declared that he would remain neutral, but for the present he could do no more.

But the ill success of the Austro-Hungarian armies did not produce an effect on the Bulgarian Government only. WitL the advance of the Russians and their approach to the central Rumanian frontiers, the influence of the friends of the Powers Entente at Bucharest increased. The news arriving at *? a Berlin and Vienna at this time caused the worst to be feared. It was believed that an overthrow of the dynasty was imminent, together with an immediate alliance of Rumania with the enemy, and an advance of Rumanian troops into. Transylvania. The most pressing advice reached Vienna from Berlin in fayour of far-reaching concessions, even of a terri- torial nature. But, strongly influenced by Tisza, Berchtold refused any concessions in this direction. Under the advice of King Charles, who was already seriously ill, and was torn by a terrible conflict between personal honour and the wishes of his people, the Central Powers sought to work upon public opin- ion in Bucharest by a declaration that the defection of Rumania would be met by an immediate advance .of troops into the country. But their threats remained ineffectual, for it was. known in Bucharest that the troops necessary for such an enterprise were not forthcoming. In reality Germany was coun- selling Vienna not to oppose the march of Rumanian troops into Transylvania by force of arms, since for the moment a defence of the frontiers was impossible; but rather to tolerate the advance, and to announce that it had taken place in order to defend the territory from occupation by Russian troops. Berchtold refused, and Tisza, whose acrimony over the Ger- man proposals knew no bounds, declared that he would rather see the Russians than the Rumanians in Transylvania. Mean- while the tide of warlike enthusiasm at Bucharest mounted higher and higher. The Government entered into a written agreement with Italy providing for common action on the part of both of them. A crown council was summoned for the early days of Oct., which was to come to a decision against the Cen- tral Powers. Only at the last moment was it possible to avert the danger. The crown council was cancelled, and Rumania for the time being remained neutral. A few days later, on Oct. 10 1914, King Charles of Rumania died. He had not ful- filled the engagements into which he had entered, but he had at least successfully prevented his troops from fighting against the Central Powers.

One of the chief reasons which had delayed the Rumanians, in going over to the camp of the Entente was the fear enter-