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332 To hinder this encirclement now became the principal en- deavour of Viennese statesmen, who were untiringly at work Balkan trying to compose the outstanding differences between Policy of Bulgaria on the one hand and Turkey and Rumania Austria- on the other, and if possible also to win over Greece Hungary. to a c i oser adhesion to the Central Powers. But all their efforts broke down owing to the divergent interests and the mutual distrust of the Balkan States, which came clearly to view during the negotiations conducted under the mediation of the Central Powers during the winter of 1913-4. The Turko- Bulgarian Treaty, which was nearly concluded in May 1914, did not come to anything; still less did the compromise between Rumania and Bulgaria, which had been furthered with such especial zeal on the part of Vienna. And the rapprochement of Greece with the Triple Alliance, desired by Emperor William, could not be realized, since the claims of the Greeks met with insuperable opposition both in Sofia and in Constantinople.

Not the least of the factors contributing to these unsatisfac- tory results was the difference of opinion in influential circles in Disa e- Vienna and Berlin as to the value of the various meat Balkan States in case of an international conflict.

between Emperor William was a resolute opponent of King aad Berlin. Ferdinand of Bulgaria, whom he did not trust; on the other hand, he was firmly convinced that in case of war Charles of Rumania would be true to his engagements as an ally. On this account he endeavoured to persuade the Vienna Government to bring Rumania over entirely into the camp of the Triple Alliance, even at the cost of sacrifices and of the danger that Bulgaria might join the opponents of the Central Powers. But Berchtold was afraid that the Bulgarians, left in the lurch by Austria-Hungary, might come to terms with Serbia, Greece and Rumania, and in company with them and with Russia fall upon the Habsburg Monarchy. Hence he held fast to his policy, which saw in the maintenance and exacerba- tion of the differences existing between Bulgaria and the other Balkan States the only means of preventing the formation of an alliance of all the Balkan peoples against the monarchy. The conflicting points of view of leading statesmen in Vienna and Berlin led to very lively debates, and threatened seriously to impair the good understanding between the two Governments. However, Berchtold gradually succeeded in bringing round the Emperor William and the German statesmen to his views. From March 1914 onwards it was determined that the union of Bulgaria with the Central Powers must remain the main object of their policy, and that agreements with the rest of the Balkan States must only be entered into in so far as they should not be in conflict with the just desires of Bulgaria.

The removal of this discord was hailed with all the more joy by the Vienna Cabinet since its relations with Italy were getting more and more strained. San Giuliano, it is true> mamta i ne d a correct demeanour towards the Vienna Government and worked for a compromise in the ever-recurring conflicts to which the divergent interests of the two states in the Balkans gave rise. It was even possible, in the discussions which took place between him and Berchtold at Abbazia in April 1914, to arrive at an agreement as to the policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Balkan question, based upon the maintenance of the autonomy of the Albanian state, which had been set up in the meantime and for the gov- ernment of which Prince William of Wied had been designated. But the attitude of the press and of the deputies with national- ist sympathies, not to speak of the Italian representatives in Albania, made it apparent that influential circles beyond the Alps were endeavouring to frustrate San Giuliano's policy.

In the eyes of leading Viennese statesmen the sympathy for

the Triple Entente which was displayed by the Italians with

ever-increasing frankness was all the more ominous

The " En- since they saw that France, Russia and England were

Banger?"'" taking steps to increase their own military strength, and

also had information of the negotiations which were

being conducted by all three Governments with those of Spain,

Italy and the Balkan States, which were believed to have as

their object the isolation of the Central Powers. At that time, however, the outbreak of a world war was not held to be immi- nent in Vienna, for it was known that negotiations were going on between Berlin and London aiming at the establishment of better relations. Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian am- bassador at the Court of St. James, did his utmost to further these efforts. But conditions in the Balkans pressed for a deci- sion. In Vienna it was believed that France and Russia had been successful in their efforts to bring into existence a Balkan League which should also include Turkey, and which would have threatened the existence of the monarchy.

On June 22 1914, before the assassination of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Conrad von Hotzendorff, as chief of the general staff, drew up a memorandum in which he described the existing conditions in the Austrla tor Balkans as intolerable, and insisted on the necessity Measures for using clear language at Bucharest. The Rumanian Government must be forced, he said, to declare openly whether it would make common cause with the Central Powers or not. In the latter case an attempt must be made to decide Bulgaria, by far-reaching promises, to bring to a conclusion the negotia- tions for an alliance which had been going on for a consider- able time. These views of Conrad's were shared not only in military circles but also by Austrian statesmen of authority. In a memorandum intended for the German Government, which was also drawn up before the murder of Francis Ferdi- nand, Count Berchtold l emphasized the urgency of making every effort to form a Balkan League, under the leadership of the Central Powers, which should include Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece and Turkey, and have as its objective the suppression of Serbia as a political power in the Balkans.

Before this document was dispatched to Berlin the news arrived in Vienna that Francis Ferdinand, with his consort, Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, nee Countess Chotek, Berlin had been murdered in Sarajevo. It confirmed the Agree- already settled conviction in this quarter of the necessity for coming to a reckoning with Serbia. On July 5 the Vienna memoire was handed to the German Emperor by Councillor of Legation Count Alexander Hoyos (b. 1876), who had been sent on a special mission to Berlin, in the presence of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Ladislaus Szogyeny- Marich (1841-1916), and on the following day to the imperial chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg. Authoritative circles in Berlin adopted the views of the Vienna Government, and gave it to understand that it might reckon on Germany's aid even in case international differences were to arise from the Austro- Serbian conflict.

It was in reliance upon these promises, which were repeated in the most emphatic way by the German ambassador at the Court of Vienna, Tschirsky-Bogendorff, that Berchtold, at the sitting of the council of ministers on July 7 1914, gave utterance to the opinion that they would be forced at last to a military reckoning with Serbia. His point of view met with general agreement; nevertheless Count Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian prime minister, who had already on July ist expressed his dissent and the reasons for it in a memorandum presented to Emperor Francis Joseph, desired not only the opening of diplomatic negotiations but also the formulating of demands possible of fulfilment. His first point he carried,

i. .1 / -i i TO. -i f. Ultimatum

but in the second he failed. The council of ministers to Serbia. decided to adopt the course of diplomatic negotia- tions, but at the same time to lay down conditions the rejection of which would be inevitable. In that case the Serbian question would have to be solved by the power of the sword. Tisza, ill content with this conclusion, reiterated his dissentient

"The basis of this document is to be found in a memoire drawn up by the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Baron Ludwig Flotow (b. 1867). It was later amplified by Rudolf Po- gatscher (b. 1859), who occupied the same position and was par- ticularly well informed as to the Balkan question. From the middle of June onwards it was revised by Baron Franz Matschenko (b. 1876), of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, and finally by Count Berchtold.