Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/320

280

systems constituting the Hindenburg Line (greatly improved during the course of the year) with fortified posts in advance, such for example as La Vacquerie and the north-eastern corner of Havrincourt Wood. Behind this again were two other de- fensive lines known as the Hindenburg Reserve Line and the Beaurevoir-Masnieres Line. That portion of this front which lies between the Scheldt canal and the Canal du Nord offered an opportunity for a tank drive to the N. which would include the capture of the important position about Bourlon. The full force of tanks together with five divisions (i2th, 2oth, 6th, sist, 62nd) and a portion of another (36th) were allotted to this front extending from Gonnelieu on the right to Havrincourt Wood on the left. Two divisions were, moreover, to be held in reserve behind this front ready to move forward, and the cavalry was to be at hand ready to exploit a success towards the N. and turn the enemy's defences from the rear. In order to make the front of attack more imposing, to deceive and hold the enemy, gas and smoke attacks, dummy attacks with dummy tanks, artillery fire, raids and subsidiary attacks were to be carried out on an extensive scale both on southern and northern flanks.

All preparations were carried out with the greatest secrecy, and during the evening prior to the battle troops and tanks were moved forward into positions of assembly, great care being taken to muffle the noise to the utmost. This was rendered particularly difficult owing to the hard and frosty weather. Each tank was provided with a compressed brushwood fascine some 8 ft. in depth, for the purpose of assisting it in crossing the main Hindenburg trench, which was of abnormal dimensions.

At 6:20 A.M. on the morning of Nov. 20 1917 the tanks and troops moved forward to the attack on a front of about 6 m. from E. of Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord opposite Hermies. At the same hour the subsidiary and feint attacks took place. On the principal front of attack the tanks rolled on, protected by a smoke barrage from the enemy's artillery. The Hindenburg Line was rapidly overrun. The izth Div. after severe fighting at Lateau Wood captured the Bonavis spur. The 2oth Div. captured La Vacquerie and stormed Welsh ridge, while the 6th Div. entered Ribecourt. The surprise was complete, and the enemy surrendered in considerable numbers. The 2pth Div. which had been in reserve moved forward and, passing through the 6th and 2oth Divs., entered Masnieres and captured Marcoing and Neuf Wood, securing the passages of the canal at both villages and the bridge intact at the latter. In this neighbourhood it was not possible to enlarge the footing gained on the E. bank of the canal, owing to the arrival of hostile reinforcements in the neighbourhood of Rumilly where severe fighting took place.

Meanwhile the 62nd and sist Divs. attacked the Flesquiercs ridge, the latter being stubbornly opposed and seriously delayed by the defence of that place. The 62nd Div. however pressed forward and captured Graincourt, its advanced troops entering Anneux. Flesquieres continued to hold out throughout the day against the 5ist Div., but troops of the 6th Div. entered Noyelles before nightfall. But for the delay at Flesquieres and the destruction of the bridge at Masnieres the operations would have been completely successful, and would have opened up a great field for exploitation on the following day.

On the morning of the 2ist the attack was resumed. But little progress was made on the Masnieres-Rumilly front. Farther W. the village of Flesquieres, turned from the N., fell at 8 A.M., and the sist and 62nd Divs. with tanks and cavalry moving rapidly forward captured Cantaing and Fontaine- Notre-Dame, and reached the southern edge of Bourlon Wood. Throughout the day infantry and cavalry were heavily engaged at Noyelles. On the extreme left the 36th Div. cleared the Hindenburg Line as far N. as Moeuvres.

By the evening of the 2ist the British had gained possession of the Bonavis spur, a bridgehead E. of the Canal de 1'Escaut including Masnieres and Noyelles, the whole of the Flesquieres ridge and the ground to the N. as far as the southern edge of Bourlon Wood including Cantaing and P'ontaine-Notre-Dame.

It was now nearly 48 hours after the commencement of the attack, and hostile reinforcements might be expected; at the same time it was necessary from the lie of the ground to decide whether to go on and attack the heights of Bourlon or to with- draw to the Flesquieres ridge. Owing to the importance of the possession of the Bourlon heights and the visible signs of with- drawal of the enemy, having regard also to the situation in Italy, it was decided to proceed with the attack.

On the 22nd, while the British were carrying out reliefs with a view to the prosecution of the attack, the enemy recaptured Fontaine. On the 23rd the 4oth Div. with tanks attacked and captured the whole of Bourlon Wood, but the attempts to. secure Bourlon and Fontaine, after a severe struggle, failed.

The struggle for Bourlon resulted in several days of fierce fighting. On the morning of the 24th the Germans counter- attacked and were repulsed; in the afternoon the British attacked, captured the village and beat off a counter-attack, but the resistance on the Fontaine-Bourlon-Moeuvres front was very considerable. On the 2 5th and 26th the enemy again counter- attacked in force and succeeded in recapturing Bourlon and the wooded spur between that place and Fontaine. The situation in the wood was now somewhat difficult; on the 27th an organized British attack succeeded in improving the position in the wood, but the troops which at one time had entered Bourlon and Fontaine were obliged to fall back again.

During the 28th and 2gth no attacks took place, the troops, which had been heavily engaged were relieved, and on the whole front efforts were made to strengthen the position gained. During the ten days' fighting 10,500 prisoners and 142 guns were taken, but the main objective, the Bourlon locality, which would turn the whole of the enemy's positions S. of the Sensee canal and river Scarpe, had not been secured. This was primarily due to the initial failure at Flesquieres village.

In the last days of Nov. signs were not lacking on the whole of the front between Vendhuille and Bourlon that the Germans intended to regain the positions which they had lost. On the whole of this front they had carried out artillery registration, but the importance of Bourlon to them and the massing of their troops indicated that their main attack would be delivered on the Bourlon front.

Measures were taken accordingly by the British command;, this front was strengthened, while five divisions were disposed on the right flank from Cantaing to the Bauteux ravine. Farther S. the original front was held as before, the frontage being wide for the number of troops available. The Guards were in reserve, about Villers Guislan, the 62nd Div. on the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the 6ist Div. assembling in rear, while four cavalry divisions were available in the neighbourhood. Practically all these troops had already been heavily engaged. All troops were warned to expect an attack.

On Nov. 30 the Germans attacked about 8 A.M., delivering their main assault, as anticipated, on the Bourlon front, and a subsidiary attack on the Cantaing- Vendhuille front. The former was successfully repulsed after the most severe fighting, but on the Bonavis spur and in the direction of Villers Guislan the- Germans made rapid progress. On this latter front their attack was in the nature of a surprise assault, without any previous bombardment, but accompanied by a hail of gas and smoke shells and bombs. Villers Guislan, Bonavis, Gonnelieu and Gouzeaucourt rapidly fell into their hands, but their advance was stayed by the resolute action of the Guards, assisted by tanks, which resulted in the recapture of Gouzeaucourt and part of the ridge between that place and Gonnelieu, while the troops holding La Vacquerie succeeded in keeping their opponents at bay. Meanwhile on the N., from Fontaine to Moeuvres,. the enemy's main assault, delivered between 9 and 10 A.M.,. and preceded by a heavy bombardment, was repulsed with heavy losses and at close quarters. This assault was repeated during the morning and afternoon, but all attempts of the Germans to gain any important success either on this front or about Masnieres failed completely. On the following days, Dec. i, 2 and 3, there was severe fighting in the open in the