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prevent the transfer of reserves to the main point of attack. This object they achieved, even if they nowhere resulted in permanent gains of ground, for it was only by prompt and vigor- ous use of reserves and hard fighting that the Germans recovered their initial losses at Hooge, at Bridoux and at Mauquissart where the Indian Corps made a fine fight.

In the preliminary bombardment the field guns were em- ployed to cut the wire, while the heavier guns battered the other defences. Considerable damage was inflicted both on the trenches and their garrisons, though in places deep dug-outs allowed the defenders to escape lightly. Most of the wire was effectively destroyed, but at several points folds of the ground concealed it from observation, and at two at least this had far- reaching effects, parts of the attack, which was delivered at 6:30 A.M. on Sept. 25, being held up by uncut wire. More- over, the wind proved too weak to carry the gas forward quickly, and thus made it in places worse than useless. This was nota- bly the experience of the 2nd Div. at Cuinchy, and its attack, though gallantly pressed, proved unsuccessful and costly. Better success attended the gth Div. E. of the railway to Ver- melles, though its left brigade, the 28th, found the wire practi- cally intact and was repulsed with heavy losses, a second attack by the supporting battalions faring no better. The 26th Bde. had to assault the formidable and important Hohenzollern Redoubt, which protruded in front of the slag heaps and miners' cottages at " Fosse 8," S. of Auchy. With great gallantry and at a heavy cost the Highlanders carried the Redoubt and swept on over the German main line, clearing the cottages and slag heaps behind. Some of the supports were absorbed in securing this first objective, but the remainder pushed forward and established themselves just short of Haisnes in the Pekin trench, part of the German second line. With prompt support Haisnes might have been carried, but the 2yth Bde. were much delayed by the returning wounded and German prisoners who crowded the communication trenches, and before its leading battalions could reach the front the opportunity had passed; German reserves had arrived. All the gth Div. could attempt was to maintain its gains against the counter-attacks.

Opposite the yth Div. the chief tactical feature was a group of quarries W. of Cite St. Elie. These were reached and taken by the 22nd Bde., but at a cost which left it too weak to carry its second objective, Cite St. Elie. The 2oth Bde., however, penetrated much deeper into the German position, capturing eight guns, and reaching the cross-roads between Cite St. Elie and Hulluch. But it was out of touch with the 22nd Bde. on its left, and as the division's reserves, the 2ist Bde., were partly absorbed in consolidating the quarries sufficient reinforcements were not forthcoming to carry the attack any farther. Thus despite its substantial initial success the advance of the I. Corps came to a standstill. The detachments which had established themselves in the German second line were scattered and isolated, and needed both reinforcements and artillery support. But information was scanty and slow to get back to headquarters and without accurate information artillery support was impos- sible; the immediate reserves had been used up, and as no more were forthcoming the opening could not be exploited.

On the left of the IV. Corps the ist Div. had as its objective the line from Hulluch to Bois Hugo, N.E. of Loos. Its left brigade, the ist, was most successful: it stormed the front line and pushed on to Hulluch over several lines of trenches, captur- ing three guns. But here it found itself unsupported, for the zd Bde. on its right had been stopped by uncut wire several hundreds of yards long and its repeated assaults proved equally unsuccessful and costly. The reserves of the ist Div. had, therefore, to be used against its first objective, and not till the afternoon were they able by crossing the German trenches on the flanks of the untaken portion to compel its defenders to surrender. By the time, therefore, that the 2nd Bde. finally reached its objective at Bois Hugo the delay had had serious consequences: the ist Bde. had already been forced back 500 yd. from Hulluch, and the left flank of the next division to the right, the isth, had been insecure all day.

Nevertheless, the 1 5th Div. had achieved remarkable success. Attacking with the 46th Bde. on the left and the 44th on the right, it carried the German front line, swept on over a second trench system into Loos and through it, and pushed on over " Hill 70," E. of Loos, until brought up by the defences of Cite St. Laurent, one of the suburbs of Lens, and by a railway embankment farther north. But their rapid advance had car- ried the men beyond the reach of artillery support; mixture of units had destroyed cohesion, and touch had been completely lost with the headquarter formations in rear. Moreover, though some of the 46th Bde. had reached and occupied Puits 14 bis, a mine S. of Bois Hugo, the 2nd Bde.'s failure had left the isth exposed to counter-attacks from the N., and reserves which might have secured the advanced position had to be diverted to that flank. On its other flank, however, the i5th Div. had no cause for anxiety. The 47th (London) Div. had as its task the formation of a defensive flank from the S.E. of Loos back to the British front line. This task it had accomplished to the letter, capturing three guns and several hundred prisoners, and after consolidating all its objectives it maintained them against vigor- ous counter-attacks.

About noon, then, on Sept. 25 the prospects of a break- through seemed bright. If reserves could have been promptly pushed in, the arrival of German reinforcements might have been forestalled and the advanced troops not only supported but carried farther forward. Unluckily, neither Gough nor Rawlinson had reserves available, and at noon the leading troops of the XI. Corps were still 3 m. from the original German front line and had to thread their way forward through an area congested with transports and with traffic of every description. More guns meant larger ammunition columns, while additional machine-guns meant additional limbers, and the rapid expan- sion of the British army had not only meant increased impedi- menta but had brought into staff posts many officers without staff training or experience. The congestion of the rearward areas was a serious handicap, but hardly to be wondered at.

By the time the leading units of the XI. Corps reached the front matters had already changed for the worse. At nearly every point German counter-attacks had thrust back the most advanced troops, and though the Germans had had to pay heavily for their gains the fact that their reinforcements were arriving in strength was even more serious than the loss of ground. At Hill 70 in particular there had been desperate fighting, and only with great difficulty had the isth Div. main- tained a position on its western slopes, thanks largely to the initiative of a battalion commander who, arriving there after the advance had swept on over the crest, had promptly en- trenched a position on which the remnants of the advanced troops were able to rally when the counter-attack drove them back. But now that the XI. Corps was up it was hoped to push on again next morning.

The plan for Sept. 26 was that the IV. Corps, reinforced by the 2ist and 24th Divs., should renew the attack from Loos to Hulluch. As a preliminary portions of the I5th and 2ist Divs. were to recover the crest of Hill 70. However, as their attack started the Germans began a series of heavy counter-attacks from Bois Hugo southward, and succeeded in driving out of Bois Hugo the brigade of the 2ist Div. which had just relieved the 2nd Bde. there. Profiting by this they pressed in on the left flank of the I5th Div. and gradually forced it back. Far- ther S. the efforts of the 4$th and 6znd Bdes. to carry Hill 70, were held up by wire which the Germans had rapidly put up, and by a redoubt on the crest. Moreover, when the main attack was delivered it was mainly by enfilade machine-gun fire from Bois Hugo that the 24th Div. was repulsed and driven back. All efforts of the 2ist Div. to recover Bois Hugo failed; the ist Div. could effect nothing by itself, and it was largely the pos- session of Bois Hugo and of Puits 14 bis which finally enabled the Germans to thrust the defenders of Hill 70 down the hill in upon Loos. That village, however, was secured by the arrival of the 6th Cav. Bde., and N. of Bois Hugo the Germans did not attempt to advance beyond the La Bassee road.