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270 by this time, laid almost level with the ground; the British from Haisnes to Loos a far more ambitious effort than previous British trench-warfare operations. The main attack, however, was that in Champagne, Artois being only the scene of a diversion on a large scale.

The troops to be put in motion were Maistre's much-enduring XXI. Corps in front of Souchez, and on their right the XXXIII. Corps, now commanded by Fayolle, in front of La Folie. The French and German Higher Commands were the same, except that Maj. Gen. v. Kuhl was now chief-of-staff at Prince Rupprecht's headquarters.

Tactically, the operation was planned differently from that of May in that the attempt was made to crush the enemy by an intense bombardment prolonged throughout several days and that, therefore, no surprise could be hoped for. Objectives were to be strictly limited.

Accordingly on Sept. 20, with improved ground and air observation, and with guns and munitions available on a larger scale than ever before, there began a bombardment of the German works and rear areas, which continued day and night for five days. On the morning of the 25th the bombardment was intensified. At the same time the Germans began their counter-preparation and succeeded in inflicting some loss on the French infantry in their jumping-off trenches. The fine weather had turned to rain.

At 25 minutes past 12 the infantry attack began. The spirit of the German infantry had been broken by the bombardment so that there was little or no resistance, what little there was being due to imperfect "mopping-up." Meanwhile, the German barrage had been laid down too late, and afterwards ignorance of the situation made their artillery afraid to fire. On the other hand, the rain and the muddy, shell-torn ground made the advance very slow. Not until 5:30 in the evening of Sept. 26 were the ruins of Souchez completely cleared and the line carried a quarter-mile to the eastward.

Meantime, unknown to the French, the German command was passing through a crisis of anxiety. Their reserves had not yet come up and the positions on Vimy ridge were almost without defenders and trains were run at short intervals on the Douai-Mericourt-Rouvray line to simulate the arrival of reinforcements. But the bad weather, the abominable terrain, and the French policy of limited objectives saved the situation for the Germans. On the 27th their reserves arrived and the situation was reestablished. The action continued, but although the 28th saw the French lines advanced to include an important redoubt in front of Givenchy, the German front was no longer in danger of being broken, and after the 28th the French broke off the battle.

Early in 1916, British troops relieved the French in the sector, which had seen the longest, and (after Verdun) the most mur- derous battle of the entire war. The French are said to have had in Artois no less than 100,000 killed. The XXI. Corps alone, by Dec. 1915, lost 80,000 dead or wounded, 18,000 of whom fell in the six weeks from May 9 to June 20. (H. N.*)

(C). The objects with which Sir John French attacked the German lines in March 1915 were to obtain a more favourable position for his share in the major operations to be undertaken in conjunction with the French. The fighting of Oct. and Nov. 1914 had left the British right between the La Bassee canal and Armentieres in an indifferent position tactically. After gaining a foothold on the ridge which runs S.W. from Lille past Aubers they had been thrust off it into the more or less waterlogged low ground at its foot. To recover this ridge was essential if the German hold on the Lille-La Bassee line was to be effectively shaken and Sir John hoped, moreover, to stimulate his troops whose offensive spirit had found few outlets in the cramping conditions of trench warfare in a swamp. The point he selected for his attack was on the front held by Sir Douglas Haig's I. Army, where the Germans' capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle (Oct. 27 1914) had driven a salient into the British lines. This portion of the British front had always been particularly difficult and costly to hold and a substantial success here might not only gain a footing on the Aubers ridge but render the German positions opposite Givenchy and Festubert untenable.

The attack delivered on March 10 by the 8th Div. (IV. Corps) on the left and the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) on the right was successful in effecting a surprise. There had been no long preliminary bombardment to give warning of the attack, for the ammunition supply only sufficed for 35 minutes' shelling, and the infantry, finding the wire well cut except at the extreme ends of the line, stormed the positions with ease. The 25th Bde. of the 8th Div. carried Neuve Chapelle village and joined hands with the Gahrwal Bde., who had overrun the ground between the village and the cross-roads S. of it known as " Port Arthur." Many prisoners were taken, and it seemed that reinforcements had only to push on to achieve a substantial advance. Unfortunately, the stubborn resistance of the Germans at the ends of the line absorbed the attention of the troops in immediate support. On the left, S. of the ruined farm known as " the Moated Grange," the 2nd Middlesex were held up by wire, which a fold of the ground had concealed from the artillery- observing officers; on the right at Port Arthur a strong point held out for several hours, and was only carried when the 2nd Seaforths of the Dehra Dun Bde. reinforced the original assailants of the Gahrwal Brigade. Similarly, it was not till well past midday, and after heavy fighting, that the 2$rd Bde., improving the lodgment made by their right battalion, the 2nd Scottish Rifles, secured their second objective, and then only by utilizing two battalions of the 24th Bde. as well as their own supports, the 2nd Devons and 2nd West Yorkshires. Meanwhile the 25th Bde. had cleared Neuve Chapelle but found their left too much exposed to allow any advance beyond the village. More important still, the orders had been explicit that the reserves were not to be put in without sanction from the Corps, and the extreme difficulty of maintaining communications with the advanced troops prevented divisional and corps headquarters from keeping in touch with the progress of the attack and delayed the advance of the reserves. Not till the afternoon was well advanced did the leading troops of the 7th Div. pass through the 8th, and though the 2ist Bde. then cleared a substantial area N. of Neuve Chapelle and made some progress down the German trenches beyond the Moated Grange, German rein- forcements both of men and guns made their presence felt, and darkness stopped the advance before the road running N.W. from the Moulin du Pietre past Mauquissart had been crossed. On the right, meanwhile, two Gurkha battalions of the Dehra Dun Bde. pushed forward into the Bois de Biez, but their position was dangerously isolated and they had to be withdrawn E. of Riviere des Layes.

The chances of substantial progress on the second day, already diminished by the arrival of strong German reinforce- ments, were further reduced by weather conditions which made aerial direction of the British artillery fire impossible. This, combined with the interruption of telephone communica- tions between the forward observing officers and their batteries, prevented the cooperation between artillery and infantry needed to reduce the numerous machine-gun posts furnished by the houses which studded the area N. of Neuve Chapelle. Groups of these, especially along the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road, proved most formidable obstacles. Moreover, the Ger- mans, besides throwing in all the local reserves of their VII. Corps, together with the 6th Bavarian Res. Div. which was resting near Lille, brought up much additional artillery, so that the 7th and Lahore Divs. came under heavy fire and suffered severely in crossing ground in rear of the advanced troops, sometimes without even reaching the front line. The 7th Div. beat back counter-attacks and added considerably to