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Rh and in their batteries many of the duties which the British consider can only be done by an officer are performed by warrant or non- commissioned officers. The six-gun battery in peace, on the other hand, makes for economy and it is doubtless on this ground that the British authorities have decided, since the war, to retain it for field batteries.

Distribution of Field Guns and Field Howitzers. In most armies, the divisional artillery consists approximately of 75 % of field guns and 25 % of field howitzers. It is a question whether the howitzers should be organized as a separate brigade, or whether each brigade should consist of three batteries of guns and one of howitzers. (It should be explained that the use of the term " brigade " to mean a group of three or four batteries of artillery is peculiar to the British army. Other nations restrict this term to the higher formations, commanded by a general officer, the unit corresponding to the British " brigade " being designated groupe, battalion, Abteilung, division, etc.)

The Germans, in 1915, distributed their howitzer batteries among the gun brigades, but later on, they reverted to separate howitzer brigades in the proportion of two gun and one howitzer brigade per division, the three batteries of each being all on the four-gun basis. The British broke up their howitzer brigades and distributed the batteries in 1916, and retained these mixed brigades to the end of the war. The difference in the training of the men is slight, and is concerned principally with the extra complication of .the divisible charge used in howitzers. Now that it is proposed in most armies to use half-charges and super-charges as well as normal charges for long guns also, this difference is tending to disappear. During trench warfare, a howitzer brigade was never used as a fire-unit ; its batteries were distributed along the divisional front. In mobile warfare, there are many occasions when the fire of field guns requires to be sup- plemented by that of field howitzers, and few, if any, when a field howitzer brigade would be used alone. Assuming that the field howitzer is a light piece of the same mobility as the field gun 1 it appears that the mixed gun and howitzer brigade, consisting of three batteries of guns and one of howitzers, is the better organiza- tion of the two.

Fighting Organization of Artillery during the War Period. For the standards of 1914, three types may be taken as representative: the German, the French and the British. Field and heavy field bat- teries only will be considered.

The German army corps of two divisions possessed 144 field guns and field howitzers, and 16 heavy field (6-in.) howitzers. Only the latter-named were corps troops, all field artillery being divisional. Each division possessed a field artillery brigade of two regiments, each regiment having two Abteilungen of three six-gun batteries each. One of the four Abteilungen in each division was armed with iO5-mm. (4-l-in.) field howitzers, the other three with the 77-mm. field gun. The corps heavy artillery formed a " battalion " of 4 four- gun batteries. In the field artillery, the battery, besides its six guns, possessed nine ammunition wagons, and in all 17 vehicles. The personnel was 150 of all ranks with 135 horses. The Abteilung had 480 officers and men, 400 horses and 53 vehicles. The light ammuni- tion column, of which there was one for each Abteilung, had 190 officers and men, 180 horses and 24 vehicles. In addition, there was the field artillery component of the less mobile ammunition column allotted to the division. The heavy battery (230 officers and men) in addition to its four guns had eight ammunition wagons and seven other vehicles, with 120 horses in all. The battalion of four batteries numbered 960 officers and men, 520 horses and 80 vehicles. A light ammunition column of 29 vehicles, 270 personnel and 190 horses carried the first reserve and a slow-moving column the second. Heavier artillery, some of which (21 -cm. mortar batteries) had for many years been organized for rapid movement, was allotted to armies as required.

The French artillery was divided into divisional and corps artil- lery, armed uniformly with the 75-mm. gun. The few heavy bat- teries available were army artillery and there was no light howitzer. The field battery had four guns and no less than 12 ammunition wagons, with six other vehicles. The personnel was three officers and 170 other ranks with 165 horses. The groupe consisted of three bat- teries, with a total of 544 men (including 16 officers), 514 horses and 71 vehicles. The first ammunition reserve was an " artillery ammu- nition section " of 20 ammunition wagons (half slow-moving) and other vehicles. Each division had a regiment of artillery consisting of three groupes and each corps, as corps artillery, a regiment of four groupes; there were thus 10 groupes or 30 batteries (120 guns) per corps.

The British army in 1914 did not possess the corps organization, and some elements usually under corps control were in this instance divifional, especially the heavy field artillery.

The divisional artillery was under the command of a brigadier- general and consisted of three " brigades " (of three six-gun batteries each) of i8-pr. guns, and one brigade (similarly constituted) of 4-5- in. howitzers, plus one four-gun battery of 6o-pr. heavy field guns. The battery had two ammunition wagons per gun, making with other vehicles a total of 20. The battery personnel numbered 200 including

The reservation is necessary as some nations have no light field howitzers, and use the 6-in. as the divisional high-angle weapon.

five officers, with 174 horses. To each brigade was attached per- manently a light ammunition column, consisting of a third ammuni- tion wagon per gun, and 13 vehicles of different sorts for infantry ammunition. 2 In all, the brigade with its ammunition column had 803 officers and men, 764 horses and 102 vehicles. The organization of the howitzer brigade was practically identical, except that its ammunition column did not supply infantry, so that the total of vehicles was smaller, viz. 89. The strength in personnel was 763 and in horses 719. The heavy battery had 19 vehicles including its guns, and possessed an ammunition column of its own, consisting of a third ammunition wagon for each gun and one other vehicle. Thus in all, the unit had 24 vehicles. The personnel of battery and column together was six officers and 192 other ranks with 144 horses. The divisional ammunition column consisted of 113 general service wagons (of which 81 were for artillery ammunition, 18 for infantry and one for special stores), personnel 15 officers, 553 other ranks, horses 709.

A general comparison of artillery strengths in men, horses and vehicles (excluding those allocated to the service of infantry ammunition) shows the following: Great Britain (two divs.)

7,640 officers and men, 6, 136 horses, 996 vehicles, incl. 152 guns. France (corps)

7,750 officers and men, 6,737 horses, 943 vehicles, incl. 120 guns. Germany (corps)

7,830 officers and men, 6,850 horses, 975 vehicles, incl. 1 60 guns.

(In all the above figures, supply and baggage wagons have been included.)

This organization, designed for mobile warfare, broke down under trench warfare conditions. The organic artillery allot- ment of the division proved to be too large for normal trench warfare fighting and too small for battle. The army corps itself, as a standard unit, gradually ceased to exist, and was changed into a new form of army corps which generally fixed in a particular area of the front constituted a permanent frame- work, in and out of which different divisions constantly passed from " line " to " rest " and vice versa. The exhaustion of the fighting energy of infantry and of artillery respectively when in the line proceeded at different rates, and the infantry of a division frequently had to be withdrawn and replaced by that of another while its artillery remained in position. The growth of the " dump " system of ammunition supply rendered the elaborate organization of horsed ammunition reserves largely uneconomical. Lastly, the range of guns permitting of artillery collaboration between adjacent divisional sectors especially for counter-battery work a common organization for the com- mand of the artillery of several sectors was bound to come into being.

In the British, French and German artillery, accordingly, the divisional field artillery was reduced to a strength suited for a divisional sector in trench warfare; this artillery went in and out of line with its division. The remainder of the field artillery was formed into a mass of " army reserve artillery," the function of which was to double, treble or quadruple the divisional artilleries in a battle area. This reserve, being wholly independ- ent both of the area organization and of the divisional formation, could be brought into action as required and for as long as re- quired. The medium and heavy artillery, similarly, was divided into two portions, but the change was here less obvious, as little or no artillery of these classes had belonged organically to divisions. The one portion was substantially fixed to the area, the other placed in army reserve and used to reenforce the area heavy artillery for battle periods.

The following diagram illustrates the evolution just described :

1914 1917

Medium

Army (in- Co elusive of artillery taken out of for- tresses).

and Heavy.

ps. (Divisional, where it existed. )

Field.

(Corps, Divi where it existed.)

t

sional.

Army Di reserve field.

1 visional field.

Army re- Corps heavy serve heavy. (sector).

! Neither the French nor the German first reserve columns sup- plied infantry ammunition.