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Rh carried to a very high degree, but its application to practice was not perfect. The directing organs General Staff, Intendance were adequate and well trained.

In general it may be said that no army suffered from such unfavourable conditions for the formation and development of a sound and uniform military spirit as the Austro-Hungarian. All the more remarkable, then, is its actual performance in the World War, a performance which, in view of the handicaps, must be regarded as unique in history and can only be explained by the existence of a sentiment of military virtue, rooted in age-long traditions, which carried the army through to the very end.

Mobilization. In spite of the fairly evident attitude of Russia, it was hoped in Austria-Hungary that the crisis of 1914 would be confined to a war against Serbia and Montenegro. Three armies were formed in the south-east. But when on July 30 the first combats were taking place on the Drina and the strategic deployment was in full swing, Russia came on the scene. The mobilization, hitherto partial only, became general, and the bulk of the forces of the Dual Monarchy formed up in Galicia, nine corps proceeding thither direct while three corps already engaged against the Serbs, or about to do so, were drawn off to the north. Mobilization and concentration, as such, were carried out without a hitch, and the transfer of the II. Army to the N. also produced no delays worth mentioning.

Infantry during the War. The infantry worthily sustained its part as the " keystone of battle," and this is true not only of those serving with the colours at the outbreak of war but of reservists, Landwehr men, Landsturm men of all kinds who far surpassed expectations. Apart from inconsiderable changes, the infantry organization of 1914 was much the same as in 1910. The peace effective had, however, been augmented by the increase in the recruit contingent. New drill regulations had appeared in 1911, and new field-service regulations in 1912.

In Aug. 1914 the Common Army included 102 infantry regts., 4 Bosno-Herzegovinian regts., 4 Tirolese Kaiserjager regts. (all at 4 four-company battalions), also 29 Feldjager battalions, one Bbsn.- Herz. Feldjager battalion, and 6 frontier companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first reenforcement to replace casualties was provided for by 28 "march" regts., which followed the army into the field. The Austrian Landwehr had 37 inf. and 3 Tirolese Landesschtitzen regts., and the Honved, 32 inf. regts. all these being on a 3-battalion footing. The Austrian Landwehr possessed no "march" regiments, the Honved on the contrary had 16. On the outbreak of war, from the 1st and 2nd bans of the Landsturm there were formed 38 Austrian and 32 Hungarian Landsturm regiments, as well as many independent Landsturm units, the number of which was temporarily augmented later when the Landsturm age limits were extended to 18-55 years.

Battalion strength was about 1,000 rifles, except in march bat- talions, which varied from 800 to 1,000, and in Landsturm battalions which rarely exceeded 800.

Reinforcements were provided for in the war by sending up monthly one march battalion per regiment. Thus, in the course of the war, 48 march battalions were sent into the field for each in- fantry regiment. Five regiments (including the 3 Tirolese) of the Austrian Landwehr were organized as mountain troops. Indepen- dent Jager battalions were organized like infantry battalions, and had "march companies "as their reenforcement organ. Machine-gun detachments had been in process of formation for some years, and by 1913 all infantry battalions (and cavalry divisions) had them. The detachment was of 2 guns in the case of the infantry, 4 in those of the cavalry. In 1915 Landsturm machine-gun detachments were gradually formed for certain Landsturm battalions. In 1916 the number of guns in a detachment was doubled, in 1917 trebled. The last year also saw the introduction of the hand machine-gun (light machine-gun), each battalion forming a Zug of four Schwdrme (squads), each Schwarm having 2 guns.

The introduction of new methods and weapons in the war, of course, led in due course to the grenade, the shrapnel helmet and the gas mask being added to the infantryman's equipment. At the out- set of the war regiments and independent battalions had pioneer sections, but the available stores were inadequate and had at once to be increased. After 1916 the pioneer sections were expanded into " technical companies " (one per regiment or independent battalion) and consisting each of an infantry searchlight, a trench mortar and a bombthrower section. The usefulness of these units, which possessed also some bridging material, was three or four times as great as that of the original pioneer section. The telephone equipment, introduced in 1911 but treated as a stepchild, was augmented considerably in the war, and towards the end each regiment had a section and each battalion a squad (Schwarm) of telephones, the first named having 26 posts and 52 km. of cable, the second 6 posts and 12 km. of cable.

A further technical development was the introduction of the 37- mm. infantry gun.

Numerically, the organization of the infantry remained unchanged till the middle of 1915. In the second half of that year three Feld- jager, two Bosn.-Herz. Jager battalions, a combined infantry regiment and the iO3rd Regt. were formed, and also a number of fortress bat- talions for service in the Bosno-Herzegovinian forts. The last named, however, were dissolved in 1916.

In Jan. 1916 the iO4th Regt., and the 4th-8th Bosn.-Herz. Jager battalions were created. In June the frontier companies were ex- panded into battalions and in Sept. the 5th Bosn.-Herz. regt. was formed. In Jan. 1917 the 29th and 37th reserve infantry regts., the losth logth infantry regts., and some combined " half-regiments " were created from various sources.

The creation of all these units was more or jess in the nature of a temporary expedient imposed by the necessity of manning an ever-growing front. It was evidently desirable to systematize the process of expansion, and therefore in Oct. 1917 a complete reorga- nization of the infantry was taken in hand, concurrently with a reorganization of the infantry division itself. All regiments were now uniformly organized on a three-battalion footing, and from the fourth battalions available and the four newest Bosn.-Herz. Jager battalions, new three-battalion regiments were created. At the beginning of 1918, therefore, there were 138 infantry, 4 Tirolese Kaiserjager, and 8 Bosn.-Herz. regts., each of three battalions. In May 1918 a I39th regt. was added. The number of Feldjager bat- talions, the (four) Bosn.-Herz. Jager battalions and the frontier Jager battalions remained the same.

In the Austrian Landwehr there was no change in numbers, but in the spring of 1917 the regiments were renamed Schiitzen regiments, the Tirolese Landesschiitzen became Kaiserschiitzen, and the two Austrian regiments, 4th and 27th, formed as mountain troops, were renamed 1st and 2nd mountain regiments. The Hungarian Land- wehr (officially styled Honved after the spring of 1917) formed in the course of the war 17 new regiments, numbered 300-316. At the end of the war the Landsturm formations in existence were 15 regi- ments, 41 independent battalions, 4 Tirolese battalions, and in Hungary 8 regiments and 16 independent battalions. Lastly there were 91 Austrian and 65 Hungarian Landsturm line-of-communica- tion battalions.

Storm Battalions. Patrols (squads) of picked men trained to grenade work and employed for special enterprises were already in existence in the spring of 1916, especially on the Isonzo front. These were followed in the latter part of 1917 by storm troops proper, and at the beginning of 1918 each infantry division headquarters pos- sessed a storm battalion and each cavalry division headquarters and each independent infantry brigade a corresponding unit, all these being formed from the storm troops of regiments, brigades, etc.

High mountain and guide companies were formed to train guides for troops engaged in the more difficult Alpine work. These num- bered 20 and 13 respectively at the end of the war. Cyclist units existed even before the war (Jan. 1912), four companies from certain Jager battalions being assembled as a unit. This unit did very well, and in the war cyclist battalions were created in the Hungarian Honved, in both Landsturms (and in the Navy). Early in 1918 the three battalions were named 1st and 2nd, and Honved cyclists.

Cavalry. The Austro-Hungarian cavalry was, according to the ideas and standards prevailing before the war, superbly trained. Officers, men and horses were first-class. But the ideas and standards were out-of-date. The principle of using cavalry as a battle-arm still prevailed, whereas the Russian cavalry, having absorbed the lessons of the most recent wars, rarely showed themselves in big masses, but worked in mixed groups consisting of cavalry, machine-gun detach- ments, artillery and cyclists.

In 1910 Austria-Hungary had possessed eight cavalry divisions of the Common Army, to which in 1912 were added two Honved cavalry divisions, and on the outbreak of war a gth Cav. Div. formed in the Austrian Landwehr. The regiments were: 15 Dragoon, 16 Hussar, II Ulan, 6 K.K. Lwhr. Ulan (these renamed mounted Schiitzen in 1917), 10 Hungarian Honved Hussar regts., and smaller units in Tirol and Dalmatia. At the outbreak of war Hungary formed 10 Hussar half-regts. of Landsturm. In each regiment further 1st and 2nd reserve squadrons were formed. The bulk of this mounted force was grouped in II divisions (at 4 regiments per division) and the rest, including the reserve squadrons, allotted in pairs or threes as divisional cavalry to the infantry divisions or corps. The r&le of the cavalry divisions was exploration and screening, that of the divisional squadrons liaison and local scouting with the infantry. In both cases the performance of these functions met with unexpec- tedly great difficulties owing to the thoroughly modern tactics em- ployed by the Russian cavalry, which employed all the methods of dismounted fire fighting and rarely came to open mounted shock. This imposed at once a restriction in the cavalry methods of the Austrians. Little stress had been laid on fire fighting in peace, but when position warfare set in in 1915, and still more when horses became scarce in 1917, mounted work fell more and more into the background. The equipment was revolutionized. The soldier was provided with wire cutters, grenades, obstacle material, etc. Already in the spring of 1915 the unserviceable uniforms of peace-time had given way to grey. The useless sabre was replaced by the bayonet.

Thus, and in other ways, the arm rapidly adjusted itself to the new conditions. Even in the winter 1914-5 certain formations had