Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/273

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TABLE D. Distribution of Divisions.

Western Theatre.

Eastern Theatre.

Other Theatres.

Total divisions or equiva- lents.

1914

Aug. begin.

97

26

.

123

Aug. end

93

30

123

Sept. "

93

3

.

123

Oct. " ..

1 06

32

138

Nov. "

104

34

.

138

Dec. " ..

98

40

.

138

1915

Jan. end

IOI

46

,

147

Feb. "

99

48

H7

March "

IOI

53

154

April

i5

56

161

May

1 06

64

I (Ital.)

171

June

1 06

64

I

171

July. ..

i5

65

I

171

Aug.

104

67

I "

172

Sept..

107

56

8 (Balk.)

172

Oct.

114

47

II

172

Nov..

117

46

9

172

Dec..

1 18

47

7 "

172

1916

Jan.

118

47

7 "

172

Feb..

121

47

4

172

March.

123

46

3 "

172

April

124

45

3

172

May

125

45

2

172

June

122

49

2

173

July. ..

123

52

2

177

Aug.

119

62

2 "

183

Sept..

128

68

2 "

198

Oct. .. .

128

75

2 "

205

Nov.

130

73

2 "

205

Dec.

135

72

2 "

209

1917

Jan.

139

71

3 "

213.

Feb..

144

68

3

215

March.

151

72

3

226

April

156

72

3

231

May

155

75

3

233

June

155

78

3

236

July. ..

148

85

3

236

Aug.

147

86

3

236

Sept..

149

82

3 (Balk.) 3 dtal.)

237

Oct.

147

81

3 (Balk.) 7 dtal.)

238

Nov.

153

74

3 (Balk.) 8 (Ital.)

238

Dec.

1 68

61

3 (Balk.) 6 (Ital.)

238

1918 Jan.

174

57

/ 3 (Balk.) \ 14 (Ital.) /

238

Feb.

185

49

J3 (Balk.)l 1 i (Ital.) /

238

March.

197

39

2 (Balk.)

238

April

202

34

I "

237

May

208

32

240

Otherwise, the equipment and organization of all the divisions assembled in France in March 1918 was the same: three infan- try regiments, each regiment with its three battalions, three machine-gun companies, and three light Minenwerfer detach- ments, the whole under an infantry brigade staff ; one field artillery regiment of two groups guns and one group howitzers (in all nine batteries), which (with sector artillery or reenforcing artillery) was under the divisional artillery staff; (one M.G. Sharpshooter detachment of 36 M.G.); three heavy and medium Minenwerfer batteries which, a little later, were reformed, with the light M.W. units, as infantry regimental companies. In the case of attack divisions, a group of three batteries of medium artillery was included organically and up to 40 or 45 army batteries at- tached for the purposes of a particular battle. In one respect only was material preparation wanting. Tanks were not looked upon with favour, only a few units being constituted.

All cavalry divisions in the W. were dismounted and acting as infantry in quiet parts of the line. They were in process of reconstitution as infantry under the name of Schutzen.

The divisions in line were under corps staffs which though long fixed in sector still retained the old numbers they had had in the open warfare of 1914-5, with a district or personal designa- tion (e.g. Gruppe Lille, Gruppe Conta) as well. Certain corps staffs numbered above 50, which had neither troops nor home regions of their own, had been created in 1915-6 as reserve head- quarters available for the control of particular operations. The corps or " group " were allotted to armies which from right to left (2 m. to Switzerland) were as follows: IV. (Flanders), VI. (Artois), XVII. (Artois), II. (Picardy), XVIII. (N. of Oise), VII. (S. of Oise), I. (Reims), III. (Champagne), V. (Verdun); and thence to the Swiss border a series of army groups (small armies) known as C., XIX. Army, A., B.

These armies were grouped in groups of armies (Heeres- gruppen) known by the names of their commanders Prince Rupprecht (IV., VI., XVII., II.), German Crown Prince (XVIII., VII., I., III.), Gallwitz (V., C.), Duke Albrecht (XIX., A., B.). During Aug. 1918 a Heeresgruppe Boehn was created, between Rupprecht and the German Crown Prince, comprising the XVIII., the IX. (staff brought over from Russia) and the VII., but did not last long. The XVIII. Army was then assigned to Rupprecht and the IX. staff was withdrawn, and the VII. re- turned to the German Crown Prince's group of armies.

Some 40 divisions remained on the eastern front to overawe the Soviet Government to " prevent the formation of an Anglo- Bolshevik front," and to occupy the corn lands of S. Russia. These were gradually " milked " of their best elements, and had a reduced artillery strength.

At this date (end of March 1918) the ration strength of the whole German army had increased to 7,917,1 70. The losses of the period April r 1917 to March 31 1918 which must include some at any rate of the casualties of the " Michael " offensive had been 257,748 killed, 37,004 died of disease, 138,070 missing, 679,777 wounded; and the " definitive " losses may be taken at 650,000. Comparison of these figures with those for 1916-7 gives a measure of the relief which was afforded to Germany by the success of her defence and the breakdown of the Entente's 1917 offensive. Only about 900,000 recruits had to be found instead of 1,600,000 as in 1916-7. Recruiting policy was accord- ingly less desperate. The 1919 class was called to the colours without haste though still two years in advance of the proper time trained carefully, and acclimatized to war conditions on the quiet Russian front, in the winter of 1917-8. It was regarded by Ludendorff collectively as the means of replacing the casual- ties to be expected in his great offensive. A great effort was made by drastic combing-out of industries not only to obtain comba- tants but also substitutes for every battle-fit man who was still serving in rear areas and on quiet fronts. Even the Alsatians and Lorrainers, hitherto employed almost exclusively on the eastern front, were to be brought over and incorporated in Rhineland units, in whose provincial patriotism it was thought that the Alsatians and Lorrainers might be brought to share. This was only an extension of a practice which had already been begun in 1916 of re-sorting the personnel of units according to their province of origin, as in the pre-war army.

The moral of the army was still good. In spite of war-weari- ness, it was felt that in one last effort peace could be won. For the first time the Germans enjoyed a numerical superiority and leisure for thorough battle training. If at home discontent was ready to break out in revolt, the effects were not at that period felt at the front, owing to an industrious propaganda, assiduous " welfare work," and largely to the disappearance of peace-time social barriers between men and officers the latter, indeed, being now for the most part either commissioned or made acting officers from the ranks.

The offensive of March 1918 was launched, and was successful, but at heavy cost, and it did not win the war. Others followed it, always with the same result. By the end of April the 1919 class was largely absorbed, and preparations were being made for the call-up of the 1920 class. By the end of July 1919 men were practically exhausted, and the now incessant battle casual- ties had to be made good by returned wounded. Meantime