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Rh The new type divisional organization has already been set forth, but within the infantry regiment itself there had been important changes, and there had grown up, besides, a great force of non-divisional troops, which were in some cases a pool from which allocations were temporarily made to armies as required, and in others were sector troops permanently allotted to particular parts of the front irrespective of the divisions occupying them. By now, the process of moving divisions into line and out to rest had become thoroughly established, though Verdun was the first battle in which the relief process was reduced to an almost mechanical system. The changes may best be dealt with by arms.

Artillery. It has been noted above that in the great reorgani- zation of the spring of 1915 the field artillery had been recast on the basis of the 4-gun battery. The number of batteries therefore shows a large increase in that year, corresponding to the creation of new divisions. But in the main, the number of field guns and howitzers remained at the same level as in the spring of 1915. It was in the heavy and medium artillery (these were not differentiated in Germany) that expansion, as distinct from regrouping, occurred. The fortress guns were made mobile by various methods and old field guns of 9 cm. were brought out and emplaced as position guns on the less important parts of the front, pending the production of modern weapons; and in these and other ways the number of batteries of " foot artillery " actually in the field was increased from about 150 in Aug. 1914 to about 1,100 by the autumn of 1915 and 1,200 by the summer of 1916. The batteries received various de- scriptions, which need not be given here; substantially, they were grouped as required under " battalion " staffs, and when actually in line were under control of the divisional artillery command of the sector. Thus was initiated a principle of organization which pres- ently became general in the belligerent armies and was applied to field artillery also that of dividing the artillery into a portion which belonged organically to divisions and moved in and out of line with them, and a portion which was under higher control ; this portion was partly emplaced in the various sectors as a normal allocation, partly kept in reserve to bring up the normal artillery strength of this or that sector to battle standard, as required.

Machine-guns. Probably no legend of the war period obtained a wider circulation or was averred with more authority than the assertion that Germany put into the field in 1914 an enormously superior force of machine-guns. The facts, however, were known throughout to the Allied intelligence staffs, and are, as regards 1914-5, in no way extraordinary.

At the outset, Germany had only just completed the equipment of the active infantry with two guns per 1,000 rifles the same scale as that of the British and French and Russian armies. The only difference was that they were employed in batteries, regimentally, instead of by sections battalion-wise as on the side of the Entente, and this no doubt produced a battle-field impression of inferiority on the British and French side since where German guns were used at all, they were used in mass. There were further some 16 (on mobiliza- tion 32) fortress machine-gun detachments, and II horsed machine- gun detachments allotted to the II cavalry divisions.

On mobilization, the majority of the reserve regiments were also provided with machine-gun companies, but for the armament of the remainder and of Ersatz and Landwehr units the fortress machine- gun detachments were called into the field at once. The first and second new reserves were sent into the field with one section of two guns per regiment. From all sources, the total of machine-guns in service at the end of 1914 was not more than 2,000, as against a peace establishment of 1,600.

But the Germans were the first to recognize the predominant r&le of the machine-gun in trench warfare. Manufacture was started on a scale then considered adequate, and during 1915 there were large additions. The regimental companies, where missing, were created, and further a number of " field sections " or " supplementary sec- tions " were formed and attached to regiments as required. Thus by the end of 1915 every regiment had, either in organic companies or in attached sections, a force of 9 to 12 guns, though it was not until after the middle of 1916 that the latter figure was reached universally.

Meantime, a new type of machine-gun organization had come into existence, the " M.G. Sharpshooter Troops," each troop having six guns. These were selected from the " sections " of 1915, specially trained, grouped in permanent " detachments " (Abteilungen) and attached to divisions as required for battle. Their debut was at Verdun in March 1916. By that date the number of guns in service had increased to about 8,000, and by the end of 1916 this figure was doubled.

At the period here considered, the light machine-gun, afterwards the primary armament of all German infantry, had hardly come into existence. Experiments had been made in the battle of Cham- pagne (Sept.-Oct. 1915) and elsewhere with units armed with the Madsen gun and styled " Musketenbataillone," but the results were not promising. The success of the French fusil mitrailleur and the

British Lewis gun, however, made action imperative, and towards the end of 1915, to save the time which would have been lost in trying out and manufacturing a new model, the service heavy machine-gun was lightened sufficiently for use as an infantry weapon. This was not issued on a large scale till the end of 1916.

Trench Mortars (Minenwerfer). At the outset of the war, the trench mortar (adopted as the result of the siege of Port Arthur) was a close combat weapon of siege warfare handled by sappers; in this r61e it figured at the sieges of Liege and Antwerp, where its bombs were highly effective. It was, however, the needs of trench warfare which brought it prominently to the front. As in other armies, the infantry felt the want of some short-range weapon which would enable them by curved fire to destroy and to harass the opposite trenches, and the creation of trench-mortar units soon followed. The Germans had here a real advantage in that they already possessed experience of the design and manufacture of these weapons, and for a considerable period they had the upper hand in this respect. The standard organization was by sections of heavy, medium, and light Minenwerfer which belonged to the pioneer arm, which were permanently assigned to divisions and were allotted within the division as required. Other Minenwerfer units were grouped in battalions and constituted a G.H.Q. reserve. Later the light Minenwerfer sections were permanently assigned to regiments, the others continuing as divisional troops.

Infantry organization as such remained unaltered, though the establishment was reduced in 1916, in order to meet the demands for men which were created by machine-gun and Minenwerfer expansion. At the same time a process began which in the long run proved injurious to quality but for the moment justified itself, the forma- tion of " Assault " or " Storm " battalions. These were created, in anticipation of the Verdun offensive, in the winter of 1915-6, and were so successful that presently all infantry regiments and even battalions and companies raised their own assault detachments or squads. In the assault battalions proper, all trench warfare means were combined within the unit infantry guns, trench mortars, machine-guns and light flamethrowers. The separation of this elite from the bulk of the infantry was recognized by privileges and distinctions of dress. The net result, however, was to deprive the infantry of a leaven of first-class men, who in 1918 could no longer be spared from the ranks pf their units. Towards the close of the war, therefore, the assault battalions were broken up one by one, and all assault units came to be regarded as schools of offensive tactics rather than as battle units.

Cavalry. Little change had occurred in the cavalry between 1914 and 1916. Divisional cavalry was gradually reduced. All the cavalry divisions which had figured in the campaign of the Marne were sent E. by 1915, and there they played a conspicuous part in the operations both mounted and in the trenches. At the period now being considered (middle of 1916) they were still true mounted forces, though employed in the line like others. Cavalry regiments were each provided with a machine-gun squadron in 1915.

Pioneers. Besides the Minenwerfer and chemical-warfare troops which had come into existence, other special services had been added to the pioneers, notably a large number of searchlight sections. Survey and sound-ranging units formed part of the artillery and not, as in the British service, pf the engineers. The proportion of the pioneers themselves (British "field companies R.E.") was also augmented, and much use was made in 1915 of semi-permanent "Infantry Pioneer Companies" which were in reality infantry working parties detailed for particular pieces of constructional work, and retained as units till these were completed. From 1916, a large number of new Landsturm battalions were formed, as labour battalions.

The possibility of Rumanian intervention had been foreseen for some time, and in preparation for it four new divisions had been created by regroupings in the eastern theatre. These were the ipsth, igyth, iggth and 2ooth; all these were principally composed of Jager battalions assembled in regiments, and the last named, like the Alpenkorps, was specialized for mountain work. A little later the Qist, 92nd, 9jrd Divs.were formed in Poland for quiet parts of the front. Several mixed Landwehr brigades were also expanded into Landwehr divisions for the same service. At the same time the 1917 class was called up gradually (May- Aug. 1916) for training, 15 months before the normal time, and the product of the March comb-out of industry was brought under training at the same time.

These measures, however, were not sufficient. To meet the pressure on all fronts not only men were needed, but, still more, increased flexibility of manoeuvre, and it became essential, therefore, to create new battle-worthy divisions. These were obtained partly by regrouping, and partly in the early months of 1917 by creating another batch of wholly new divisions.

During the crisis itself, which extended from July i to Dec., and then, with a brief respite, from Feb. to May 1917, it was