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were formed, with this important innovation that, instead of incorporating the comparatively old reservists, they were formed of levy men and young reservists, viz. with the same elements as the permanent army. This measure practically meant the suppression of the mobile militia, especially as the reservists destined formerly to the militia were assigned indiscriminately to all first-line units. Finally, the air-service units were, one may say, actually created.

The number of machine-guns and of small and medium calibre guns was increased, and the conditions of the siege train were improved to some extent. Means of transport, ammunition, and sundry other material were greatly increased by bringing up to a maximum the output of the military factories and by placing big orders both at home and abroad. In this way the most striking deficiencies of pre-war times were as far as possible made good.

But this was not all. From the very beginning of the neutrality period units were stationed along the frontier " in advanced occupa- tion," and later on were grouped together under commands of the larger units which had been formed in the meantime.

It may be said, therefore, that when mobilization was officially announced (May 23 1915) a large portion of the army was already mobilized and assembled at the frontier. The mobilization of auxiliary services was, however, much belated in comparison with that of the combatant troops. This was due to causes connected with materiel as well as to the fact that the reservists detailed to such services could not be called up at so early a date. The mobiliza- tion plans existing in 1914, which presupposed conditions of forces and materiel quite different from those in which the army actually found itself, had to be modified substantially during the neutrality period. At the same time the troops underwent a continuous and intense training which remedied in part former deficiencies, espe- cially among the reservists, and imparted the first lessons of the war which had already been fought for months on the Allied fronts.

Notwithstanding all this, in May 1915 the Italian army was not yet in an ideal condition as regards numbers and materiel. There were still serious gaps in the number of officers, in the supply of machine-guns and of artillery, as well as in the engineers, the Air Service, etc. The responsibility, however, of this state of things cannot attach to those who reorganized the army during the neu- trality period ; for they had not only to prepare, in many cases they had to create from nothing. The state in which the army had been left for so many years could not be remedied in ten months.

From May zp/5 to November 1918. The momentous work accom- plished during the neutrality period did not cease when the war began, but continued in ever-increasing proportions while the army was engaged in fighting. The military authorities, efficiently sup- ported by Government and nation, not only succeeded in filling up the gaps caused by losses and in remedying the deficiencies shown by the army in 1915, but strengthened it in men, weapons and material, and formed numerous new units and special troops instructed in the use of modern means of warfare. The magnitude of the effort on the part of army and nation appears more evident when one takes into consideration the enormous loss of men, animals and material which Italy sustained during the retreat of Oct. 1917 (Caporetto), and which had to be covered most rapidly. In that unfortunate event the army lost in round figures 8,500 officers, 300,000 men, 70,000 horses and mules, 3,100 guns (among which were two-thirds of all her heavy guns and half of the medium calibres), 1,700 trench mor- tars, 3,000 machine-guns, 2,000 machine-pistols, about 1,000,000 rifles, 22 aviation parks, 1,500 motor lorries, an enormous number of motor-cycles, etc. It follows that, when examining the data relating to the Italian army in Nov. 1918, it must be borne in mind what that same army had lost a year before. It can then be realized that Italy's effort has been a double one and that her army has to a great extent been formed twice.

According to pre-war provisions, the Italian army consisted of 19 classes. During the war, however, by calling up the younger classes and keeping the older ones, the number of classes with the colours was increased. At the moment of the Armistice the army included 27 classes (from 1874 to 1900). The oldest men were 44 and the youngest 18 years old. These classes gave a total of 5,200,000 men, who at the beginning of Nov. 1918 were made up as follows: 2,500,- ooo in the army operating in Italy, in the Balkans and in France; 1,200,000 belonging to units, and detailed for services, in the coun- try; 1,500,000 losses (killed, discharged for wounds or sickness, prisoners). During the war no account was taken of the distribution of men as fixed by the old law in 3 categories and 3 army lines; all the men formed one single mass, and were distributed as follows : in the war zone, 21 classes, that is, men from 19 to 39 (these classes were detailed, according to age, to the first line, to the services of the first line, to the second line and to the services of the second line) ; on service between the war zone and the country (lines behind the army), 3 classes, that is, men of 40, 41 and 42 ; in the country, 3 classes, that is, men of 43 and 44 and recruits of 18 who were being trained for service. The provisions which contributed principally to increase the number of drafts from each class were the adoption of a lower standard of physical fitness for military service and the consequent revision of all those who in the years preceding the war had been declared unfit for service.

The supply of drafts was provided for in the following manner. Up to the beginning of 1917 men called or recalled to colours, or

returning after medical treatment, were instructed or assembled in the depots from whence they were posted direct to the fighting units. At the beginning of 1917 each infantry brigade was given a reserve battalion from which gaps in the battalions of the brigade were filled up. The reserve battalion was, in its turn, replenished by march units detailed in the war zone (battalions, regiments, bri- gades) which received men from hospitals, etc., or from the interior of the country. During the last year of the war matters were so arranged that the men, however restored, returned to their own unit through the above-mentioned channel. This system was applied also to the Bersaglieri, to the Alpine troops, and to the infantry machine-gunners. The supply of drafts to other arms and to the various services continued to be secured under the system in force previous to 1917, that is, from the depots in the country. The scarcity of officers, especially of experience, with which the army entered the campaign, was continually aggravated by losses, and was felt during the whole period of the war. The gaps in the higher grades were filled by promotion, and the Italian army soon secured a prominent place among the belligerent armies in respect of the youthfulness of its generals. A certain number of battalion, com- pany or battery commanders were taken from the cavalry officers. Vacancies in the lower grades were filled by means of rapid courses with the corps, the big units, and the recruiting schools in the country. Towards the end of the war only the latter system of recruiting was resorted to, and participation in the courses, which was first voluntary, became compulsory for all those who had gone through a certain curriculum of study.

When the army began its campaign it consisted of 14 army corps, 25 divisions of infantry, 4 divisions of cavalry, all in Italy. Its maximum strength was reached in Oct. 1917 with 26 army corps, of which one was in Albania; 65 divisions of infantry, of which 2 were in Albania and one in Macedonia (the Macedonian division consisted of 4 brigades and had therefore the strength of a corps) ; 4 divisions of cavalry. At the end of the war the army consisted of 24 army corps, of which one was in Albania and one in France; 57 divisions of infantry, of which 3 were in Albania, one in Macedonia and 2 in France ; 4 divisions of cavalry. The army corps were grouped in a number of armies which increased from 4 at the beginning of the war to a maximum of nine.

The infantry strength at the beginning of the war was 560 bat- talions; on Oct. I 1917 it was 800 battalions; on Oct. I 1918 it was 700 battalions. The infantry battalion at the beginning of the war consisted of 4 companies, or 1,000 men, armed only with rifles. The few machine-guns available had been allotted to the regiments, generally 2 guns per regiment, rarely four. At the end of the war each battalion consisted of 3 companies of rifles (each with 2 machine-pistols), one company of machine-gunners (with 8 heavy machine-guns), one section of bombardiers (with 4 Stokes mortars, or 4 torpedo mortars), one section of sappers. The total strength of the battalion was 780 men.

While each battalion was transformed, each regiment was allotted a section of 37-mm. guns and a section of flame-ejectors.

Each brigade received two Companies of heavy machine-guns, while four were assigned to each division. Taking into account only the heavy machine-guns, the infantry started the campaign with about 700 machine-guns. On Oct. I 1917, these had increased to 7,000, and on Oct. I 1918, to 12,000. In 1916 special Alpine bat- talions were formed, all consisting of men on skis, clothed and equipped in white and organized so that they could act independent- ly, but they were not given many opportunities for action on skis. In 1917 assault groups were formed consisting of " arditi " young and very active men who had undergone a most intense and severe training in gymnastics, bomb-throwing, and marching behind artillery or machine-gun barrage. These groups formed a splendid and characteristic attacking force used chiefly for surprise actions and desperate raids. Each group was of practically the same strength as an infantry battalion, but had a larger number of machine-guns and machine-pistols, and a few flame-ejectors. The " arditi " were armed with carbine, dagger and hand grenades. Each army corps had its own assault group and in 1918 a special army corps consisting exclusively of " arditi " was formed. In the same year each infantry regiment formed its own assault platoon (plotone d'assalto). During the war the infantry formed 17 groups of auto- machine guns each consisting of 4 or 6 guns and 5 companies of motor machine-guns each having 6 guns. No tank units were formed because the nature of the Italian front did not call for their use.

The most important transformation undergone by the cavalry during the war was the dismounting of two divisions which were used on the Isonzo and Carso fronts from the spring to the end of 1916; later on these divisions were mounted again. In the earlier stages of the war the cavalry supplied its machine-gun sections to the infantry. With its surplus reservists it furnished afterwards dismounted machine-gun companies which were used at the front.

In May 1915 the field artillery was the best armed among the different special corps and, therefore, underwent less and minor modifications. At the beginning of the war there were 360 batteries of 4 guns, on Oct. I 1917 there were 440 batteries of 4 guns, on Oct. I 1918 there were 490 batteries of 4 guns. No change was made with regard to the guns the75-mm. 1906 model and the 1911 model of the same calibre. Both guns were of the deformation pattern. The