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At the outbreak of the World War the Italian army was in a very unsatisfactory condition. Political leaders, and Parliament and public opinion generally in Italy, had for years held the view that the era of great wars was past, and that in any case pacific intentions gave a practical assurance of peace. For this reason it was judged sufficient to have an army which was strong enough to preserve order in the country and give to foreigners the impression that Italy was not completely disarmed. As a consequence the State had neglected the army, and its efficiency in comparison with those of its neighbours, to which continued attention had been paid and on which expenditure had continu- ally increased, had been gradually diminishing. In 1907, however, the Government of the day had been induced to nominate a commission to study the faults and gaps in the military organism and suggest means to remedy them. In 1910 this commission had presented a programme fitted to the financial capacity of the country and its ideas; that is to say, a very modest scheme. But the Government found that the proposals were excessive and decided to adopt a reduced programme. And, as if that were not enough, the Government was so slow in carrying out this programme that in 1914 it was not yet completed. It was in April of that year that Gen. Porro refused to go to the Ministry of War unless a new programme were adopted, involving the expenditure of 600 million lire, spread over a period of six years. The programme was cut down by two-thirds and Gen. Porro declined the war portfolio.

In 191 1 the Italo-Turkish War broke out. In the course of the war only two classes of reservists were called up, and as a result the units which were mobilized could not fill up with their own reservists. They were brought up to strength with men belonging to classes already under arms, and taken from units remaining in Italy, whose strengths were thus reduced to a miserably low level. Owing to the notable deficiency of the material detailed for mobilization the same system had to be followed in order to equip and refurnish the mobilized units. As a result the stocks in Italy were quickly reduced to a level quite inadequate for general mobilization. Little was done subsequently to fill the gaps, so that these remained.

The Army in August 1914. The situation of the Italian army at the beginning of Aug. 1914 was as follows. Its financial resources were very limited. The estimates f6r the year 19145 provided 428 million lire (17,120,000) which included not only ordinary main- tenance expenses, but extraordinary expenditure for the rearmament of the artillery, for fortifications, etc.

All citizens were liable to military service for 19 years, from the 2Oth to the 39th year. They were divided into three categories, and only those belonging to the first category underwent the full term of service (two years). Men of the second category received a few months' instruction. Men of the third category received no instruc- tion at all, and were destined for " third-line " service, even if they belonged to young classes. At the outbreak of war in 1914, owing to the large proportion of recruits yearly passed to the third ^category, there were in Italy, out of the total number of those of military age and fit for military service, only 1,400,000 men who had received military training. The rest, some 1,600,000 men, had received no military instruction of any kind.

The whole number of citizens liable to military service was divided, mainly according to age, between three organizations: permanent army, mobile militia, and territorial militia. The permanent army was composed of units existing on the peace basis. In peace-time it was composed of professional officers and non- commissioned officers, and of men of the first and second categories.

The force on the estimates for the financial year 1914-5 consisted of 14,000 officers and 275,000 men. The number of permanent officers was insufficient even for peace requirements. Reserve officers were taken from among the recruits of the levy who had passed certain examinations and who applied to serve as officers. They underwent regimental courses, and those taken completed their service as officers. Permanent and reserve officers together fell short by 13,000 of the number required for general mobilization. The greatest short- age was among the artillery officers, who could only total 56 % of the number required, and the sanitary services, who were more than 50 % short. Professional non-commissioned officers were almost entirely lacking. The law passed in 1910 in the hope of securing an adequate supply had not had the result hoped for. Most of the few who had adopted the army as a career were employed on special service out- side the units.

Strengths were very low, so that the smaller units had barely sufficient troops to assure the performance of the ordinary everyday duties of barrack or field life. The troops, and especially the infan- try, were continually employed in police duty ; units were often split up into small detachments; drafts had to be furnished for Libya. In the circumstances it is easy to understand how complete and systematic training was impossible. Combined training of all arms was out of the question for a great part of the army, the troops of the various arms being stationed in such a way that whole divisions had neither cavalry, artillery nor engineers in their districts.

Owing to the low strengths, the units of the permanent army, in order to reach a war footing, had to incorporate a large proportion of reservists. As the trained reservists of each class were relatively few in number, many classes of reservists had to be incorporated on mobilization. In this way the units had to be completed with men at once older and less recently trained than was the case with the armies of France and Austria-Hungary. Complete mobilization in Aug. 1914 would have meant calling up no fewer than 13 classes.

The mobile and territorial militia units were intended to be formed at given centres, on mobilization, from reservists only. The number of these units and their character was to be decided accord- ing to requirements, by royal decree. The mobile militia was designed to operate with the permanent army, but to perform more modest duties than the permanent units. In order to facilitate its organization in case of need, it was decided in 1910 to maintain in peace-time, attached to every line regiment, Alpine battalion and field-artillery regiment, a permanent mobile militia nucleus, to fill up with reservists in case of war and so form the new units. But in 1914 many of these nuclei were not yet formed, and the others were at such low strength as to constitute a mere pretence. Mobile militia units were very rarely embodied for training in peace-time, so that, everything considered, it would have been necessary to improvise the whole organization. In the case of the territorial militia, destined for use on lines of communication or for duty at home, there was still less preparation ; units were practically never embodied in peace-time.

Armaments were deficient both in quality and quantity. The infantry had an excellent rifle (1891 model), but the reserves and the output of the factories were not sufficient to meet the probable requirements of war. Machine-guns were almost entirely lacking. Only a few regiments had one section of two guns. Many artillery regiments were still armed with the old " rigid " gun. About 100 batteries had been armed with the Krupp 75-mm. Q.F. (1906 model), but before rearmament was completed it had been decided to adopt a new pattern (Deport 75-mm. 1911 model), and these were not yet ready. A considerable part of the mountain artillery was also unprovided with a quick-firing gun. The programme of 1910, providing for 40 batteries of heavy field artillery, had not been completed. Twenty-eight 4-gun batteries of 149-mm. field howitzers were all the heavy field artillery available. The siege train consisted only of a few big guns and 134 medium guns, gener- ally of an obsolete pattern. The supply of ammunition was scanty. Motor transport was deficient.

The supply of uniforms, equipment, material for artillery and engineers, as well as for sanitary services, was lacking in quantity and quality. To sum up, the condition of the Italian army at the out- break of war was as follows. The permanent army was lacking chiefly in instruction, machine-guns, heavy field artillery, siege train and material for air warfare. Strengths were very low, and the army had to mobilize with a very high percentage of reservists. Officers, both active and reserve, were too few, and there were scarcely any permanent non-commissioned officers. The units of mobile and territorial militias had to be altogether improvised, with the same bad results but on a larger scale as in the case of the permanent army. There was an enormous deficiency of animal and mechanical transport, of ammunition and of material of all kinds.

The Neutrality Period (Aug. igi4May 24 /p/5). Up to May 2 A 1915, when Italy joined in the war, an intense activity was displayed to make up the deficiencies of the army and enable it to meet with success its traditional foe. Rapid courses for officers were established in the recruiting-schools whereby the number of subaltern officers required to meet the immediate needs of the mobilized army was obtained. On Aug. I 1914, three classes were with the colours, those of 1892 and 1893 the two levies in course and the 1891 class which had been recalled for service. On Aug. 8 the 1889 and 1890 classes were called up; on Sept. 7 the young 1894 class, and in Jan. 1915 the 1895 class. Thus the force under arms was 700,000 men. Other classes were called up later on, but with certain limitations as to categories, employment, etc. Reservists were not called up by public notice but by individual summons. Thus existing units were strengthened and new ones formed. Progressively, all the army, army corps, and divisional commands were formed side by side with the territorial commands already in existence. The latter con- tinued to discharge their duties with the staff allotted to them for the period of the war. Provision was made with regard to staff and material required for the establishment of the principal offices charged with the various services.

Several regiments of the permanent army, provided for by the 1910 programme but not yet formed (chiefly field artillery), were organized. The majority of the mobile militia units provided for