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forming the composition of a " front," as well as those remaining in the composition of separate armies and even corps, formed the operating army.

The supreme command of all the forces was, in the event of the Tsar not wishing to assume it personally, entrusted to a supreme commander-in-chief, who had the right to order military activities according to his own independent judgment. No Government institution, nor any person in the empire, with the exception of the Tsar, had the right to give the supreme commander-in-chief orders, or to hold him to account. At the head of a " front " there was a commander-in-chief, and at the head of each " army " a com- mander, who also enjoyed very extensive responsibilities. The supreme commander-in-chief had to fix his attention mainly on the conduct of military operations. The question of the supply of his troops with all necessities, in the broadest sense of the word, was left to the care of the supply bodies of the War Ministry, who were entrusted with general requirements only. Besides the conduct of military operations, the supreme commander-in-chief retained the higher command in the exploitation of the net of railways in the theatre of military operations, a control which was highly important, in view of Russia's poverty in railways generally. The staff of the supreme commander-in-chief was very limited ; it consisted of 45 officers, 10 civil servants and 2 men of medical rank.

The commander-in-chief of a " front " was a man who controlled not only the military operations of his front, but was likewise responsible for the provision of all the requirements of the armies subordinated to him. To make it possible to carry out the second half of his duties there was subordinated to him a part of the terri- tory forming the theatre of military operations with all the materials in that territory ; this formed the rear of the army of the given front ; everything'that could not be procured on the spot had to be ordered, in good time, from the interior of the empire through the supply bodies of the War Ministry. His headquarters consisted of a staff and a series of commands, subordinated to the head of supply, who carried out all the plans of the commander-in-chief relating to domestic administration. The territory composing the rear of the army of the front formed one or more military districts, the com- manders of which were subordinated to the commander-in-chief through the head of supply. Lastly, the headquarters of the com- mander of an army was regarded and organized as the executive organ of operations.

The system created by these regulations did not suffer any material changes in the course of the first two years of the World War. It was only in 1916 that the personnel of the supreme commander-in- chief 's staff began to increase; it was found expedient to include in it a whole series of new departments for which no need was felt in the first two years of war.

The basis of the Russian military system was the regulation relat- ing to military obligation, which fixed the terms of military service. To turn fully to account one of the main advantages of Russia over the other European Powers, the numerical superiority of her reserve man-pcwer, and also to carry out other improvements, the general council of the general staff elaborated in 1911-2 a new scheme of compulsory service, which was approved by the imperial Duma and the Senate. According to this, military obligation was extended over the whole of a population which counted 150 million, the fit male population (between the ages of 18 and 43) consisting of over 26 million. This was the reservoir on which Russia could depend for the replenishment of her army in time of war. It could have been further increased by calling up the different classes even before their time, as well as by extending military obligations to the differ- ent races in the country and to men of over 43, but the two latter methods were difficult to carry out, owing to the conditions of Russian life.

The new organization of the army was completed in 1910. It brought many changes, but was not successful in fully realizing the scheme mentioned, as, in carrying out the fundamental part of the work, two grave limitations were set. These were that the new arrangement of troops must bring no change in the yearly contingent of recruits and in the amount of permanent expenses allocated for the maintenance of the army. These conditions resulted in the infantry being left with 4-battalion regiments and the field artillery with 8-gun batteries. These defects in organization were rectified later, but only during war itself.

The principal reform carried out in the infantry consisted rather in a considerable increase in the numerical composition of the field- infantry units than in a material strengthening of the cadres of the first-line units, who formed the kernel of the army in war time. Machine-gun and communication units were introduced. The re- casting of the peace organization of reserve units enabled 7 new field divisions to be created. Lastly, in the formation of the second-line units, with an order for mobilization, the so-called system of " secret cadre " was adopted. Under this system, when the troops passed to a war footing, from each first-line unit there were taken a certain number of officers and men, who formed the cadre on which the second-line units were built up. This system was applied also to the field artillery. The organization of the cavalry and horse artillery remained, on the whole, unchanged. Howitzers were introduced into the field-artillery organization, and a beginning was made with the

formation of heavy artillery. In technical resources the army was insufficiently supplied, owing to the lack of credits and the difficulty of manufacturing the necessary materials in home factories.

In the middle of 1914 the Russian army was composed as follows: Of infantry there were 70 field divisions (ist, 2nd and 3rd Guard; 1st, 2nd, 3rd and the Circassian Grenadiers; 1st to sad infantry; 1st to nth Siberian), each with 4 regiments of 4-battalion strength ; 18 light or " rifle " brigades (Guard; 1st to 5th; 1st to Ath Finnish; 1st and 2nd Circassian; ist to 6th Turkestan and Kuban-Plastun brigade; 16 light brigades of 4, and 2 light brigades of 3 2-battalion regiments; the Kuban-Plastun brigade had 6 Plastun battalions. In war time there would be formed another 36 second-line infantry divisions (53rd to 8sth infantry and I2th to I4th Siberian) ; in addi- tion, certain infantry brigades of varying establishment would be so formed as to be able to expand into divisions. Of cavalry there were 24 divisions (ist and 2nd Guard; 1st to I5th and Circassian cavalry; ist and 2nd Cossacks, 1st to 3rd Circassian Cossacks, ist Turkestan Cossacks), each consisting of 4 (6-squadron or 6-sotnia) regiments, excepting the ist Guard Div., which had 7 regiments; 8 independent brigades (Guard; 1st to 3rd cavalry;' 4th Cossack), each having 2 or 3 regiments; and a few smaller units. In war time the number of cavalry units was not increased ; the number of Cossack cavalry units was supplemented by the formation of Cossack units of the 2nd and 3rd class from reserve men. In each infantry division was included an artillery brigade (6-8 batteries); in every light brigade an artillery group (3 batteries). The cavalry and Cossack divisions had attached horse artillery groups of two 6-gun batteries. All the troops mentioned were, in peace-time, formed into 37 army corps (Guard; Grenadier; I. -XXV. Army; I. -1 1 1. Circassian; I. a"nd II. Turkestan and I.-V. Siberian). The normal corps consisted of two infantry and one cavalry division. Several corps had no cavalry at all; others had two cavalry divisions and an extra light brigade. In war time cavalry divisions fell out of the corps strength, and were worked as independent cavalry, by divisions. The army corps was supplied with corps cavalry, mostly of Cossack units of the second and third class. On the strength of every corps there was, besides the field-gun establishment, one mortar (howitzer) division of two 4-gun batteries and one sapper detachment. There were also several heavy-artillery units as well as pontoon battalions, railway, trans- port and air units, which were distributed in war time, according to a special plan, among the armies. Draft-finding units of infantry, artillery and engineers were formed only on mobilization by creating cadres from the corresponding field units. As for the cavalry cadres, draft-finding units were already maintained in peace-time as reserve cavalry regiments and divisions.

All the troops indicated above were not, in peace-time, evenly distributed over the territories of the empire, but were mostly concentrated on the frontiers, on the western frontier in particular. This system of distribution had been in existence from olden times, owing to the lack of railways and a desire to protect the frontiers as much as possible. The system, however, greatly complicated mobilization, as the principal sources for war expansion were nearer to the centre of the empire, and therefore, with an order for mobiliza- tion, the necessity arose of carrying out a considerable movement of drafts over long distances. In proportion as the net of railways developed, ensuring a quick supply of troops from the centre to the frontiers if -required, one could observe a withdrawal in the perma- nent quarters of the troops from the frontier regions nearer to the sources for completion. This change was particularly marked in 1910, when 7 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, with 2 staffs of corps, were moved from the western frontiers to the interior of the empire. This withdrawal aroused alarm at the time in France, and suitable explanations had to be made.

The whole territory of the empire was, for military-administrative purposes, divided into military districts (12 in number), at the head of which was the commander of the troops of the district. The distribution of the corps in the military districts was as follows :

1. St. Petersburg M. District Guard, I., XVIII. , XXII. Corps

2. Vilna II., III., IV., XX. Corps

3. Warsaw VI., XIV., XV., XIX., XXIII.

Corps

4. Kiev IX., X., XL, XII., XXI. Corps

5. Odessa VII., VIII. Corps

6. Moscow Grenad.V., XIII., XVII. , XXV. 7- Kazan XVI., XXIV.

8. Caucasus I. C., II. C., III. C.

9. Turkestan I. T., II. T.

10. Omsk loth Siberian Rifle Div.

11. Irkutsk II. Sib., III. Sib.

12. Pri-Amur I. Sib., IV. Sib., VI. Sib.

The local administration in Cossack districts was organized on a special basis. Of Cossack " armies " i.e. autonomous forces on Russian territory there were II, namely the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Orenburg, Ural, Siberia, Semerechensk, Trans-Baikal, Amur and Ussuri.

The Russian army was placed on a war footing in 1914 on the " mobilization plan of 1910." A new mobilization plan, revised in certain respects, and known as " mobilization plan No. 20," had been drawn up in 1913, but in July 1914 full effect had not yet been