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220 ice. This reform placed at the disposal of the army an annual contingent of about 33,000 men. This increased considerably the effectives subject to recall on mobilization, and caused a complete reform of the army organization. The new organization was chiefly instituted from a desire of assuring during times of peace a direct liaison between the two principal arms infantry and artillery. This was achieved by the formation of a mixed brigade which was formed from a regiment of infantry and a group of field artillery.

On a war footing, under the reorganization now effected, there would be 6 army divisions and one cavalry division. This was the scheme under which the Belgian army found itself involved in war in 1914. It provided for an effective strength of 350,000 men, of which 100,000 were fortress troops; but this would not be reached before 1918, when the recruiting law would have been applied to 6 classes of militia. As in 1914 the total of 8 junior classes recallable to the coloars did not provide more than a total of 1 17,000 men, it was found that the field army, while mobilizing so vast a cadre, yet pos- sessed effective units of extreme weakness only. Further, at the outset of the campaign the infantry units did not count in soldiers but in cadres or half only of their strength. In fact the war sur- prised the Belgian army in the midst of reorganization, (i) The order for heavy Maxim machine-guns had only been completed in part; a certain number of companies in the field army were equipped with Hotchkiss machine-guns which were taken from the armament of the fortresses. Owing to the lack of a fixed regimental scale of tiansport, all machine-guns were carried in requisitioned transport and this paralyzed their use. (2) It was intended that the divisional artillery regiment would have a group of field guns and two groups of 9>5-in. howitzers. When war was declared there existed in the whole army only one group of howitzers; the artillery of the whole army was equipped only with 75-mm. guns. The adoption of a 15-cm. howitzer was still under consideration. (3) The number of cavalry regiments should have been raised from 8 to 12, but only 3 of the 4 new regi- ments had been created ; the cavalry divisions possessed 2 brigades instead of 3. (4) The Air Force possessed a single squadron of one dozen aeroplanes. The infantry were armed with the Mauser rifle of 1889 type, firing an ordinary pointed bullet.

After the battle of the Yser the Belgian army consisted of only 32,000 rifles. This excessive reduction of effectives caused the sup- pression of the mixed brigades. Each army division consisted of 3 mixed regiments (one regiment of infantry and one group of artillery). The 3rd Div. alone had 3 mixed brigades. It was with this com- position that the army spent the whole winter 19145. The excess of artillery permitted the placing of 2 regiments of this arm at the dis- posal of the 27th and 28th Divs. (British) in the Ypres salient.

A few days after mobilization the Government had decreed the calling-up of the 1914 class. This contingent, and voluntary enlist- ments at the outbreak of war, formed a feeding reserve of 50,000 men, who were at first collected in the depots around Antwerp and later taken to the district of the Pas-de-Calais after the evacuation of that fortress.

In the spring of 1917 the army was reorganized in view of its participation in the general offensive projected by Gen. Nivelle. The number of machine-guns employed was considerably increased. Ignoring a similarity of type of weapon, but keeping to a single type of machine-gun in each division, companies of 6 machine-guns were raised for each battalion of infantry. The adoption of the French light machine-gun at the rate of 6, and later of 9, weapons per company, allowed a reduction of the effectives in the company to about 180 men. As a result it was possible to increase the regi- ments to 4 battalions of 1,000 men in a brigade of 2 regiments of 3 battalions, each battalion being formed of 3 companies of infantry and one company of machine-guns. Later, the acquisition of a certain number of howitzers permitted each division to possess some fairly heavy material, and created further a brigade of 2 regiments of heavy artillery. Hence the composition of an army division in 1917 was: headquarters; 3 brigades of infantry of 2 regiments of 3 battalions; one brigade of artillery; one regiment of engineers of 2 battalions; one light group of 2 squadrons of cavalry, and one company of cyclists. Thus formed, the Belgian army at the front on Sept. I 1917 at the period of the British offensive at Ypres, had 168,000 men, of whom 5,700 were officers.

In order to maintain the strength now reached, and to prepare for the normal wastage of stationary warfare, it was decreed by law that personal service was obligatory for all Belgians between the ages of 1 8 and 40 years living outside the invaded territory.

The Belgian army found itself ready a year later in Sept. 1918 to join in the offensive attack in Flanders with 170,000 men, despite the fact that 30,000 were serving in the hospitals, in military fac- tories, in munition parks, and other subsidiary services.

The organization of the Belgian military system which developed after the war as a permanent element in the institutions of the country may be summarized here. The royal decree of July 1917 made army service universal and obligatory, but till the end of the war it had been possible to apply it only to those Belgians living in the uninvaded territory ; that is to say, to a very small Traction of the annual contingent. Immediately after demobilization it was decided that all men of the classes 1914-5-6^-7-8 of the invaded portion of the country who had not served during the war should be called in succession under arms, each military contingent following the other

at about 6 months' interval. This measure was in 1921 in process of being carried out.

The term of service with the colours was that ordered by the law of 1912, viz.: Infantry and engineers, 1 5 months; field artillery, 21 months; horse artillery, 24 months. However, "breadwinners," i.e. the married men or those of good conduct who supported families, were allowed to return to their homes after 4 months of instruction only.

In Oct. 1920 the Minister of War, yielding to the pressure of public opinion which favoured a reduction of military expenses, de- cided that in the transitory period until the completion of training of the backward classes, i.e. until 1922 (having regard to the fact that during this period 2 whole classes would be under arms), the terms of active service were to be reduced for the time being to 10 months for infantry, 12 months for engineers and fortress artillery, 17 months for cavalry and horse artillery.

The Peace and War Organization. The constitution of " army divisions " (practically equivalent to army corps) is as shown below. Certain modifications, however, were under consideration in 1921 with a view (a) to augmenting the number of machine-guns, with the final object of forming a machine-gun battalion per infantry divi- sion, (b) to developing the technical services, (c) to increasing the aviation and the heavy artillery of the army.

Army divisions (6 in number) consist each of 2 infantry divisions and other troops. The infantry division consists of 3 infantry regi- ments, one artillery regiment, and one engineer battalion. The corps troops, as they may be called, consist of a battalion of cyclists, a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of heavy artillery, and a battalion of engineers.

There is one cavalry division consisting of 3 brigades (each of 2 regiments) with divisional troops (one group horse artillery, one group of motor automatic guns, two battalions cyclists, one cyclist company of engineers).

Army troops not assigned to army divisions are: a brigade of 3 heavy-artillery regiments, an air force of one balloon battalion and 2 aeroplane squadrons, a telegraph battalion, a searchlight battalion, a bridging battalion and a railway battalion. (R. VAN O.)

IV. THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Under the Imperial Russian Government, the Ministry of War, on its military side, included (a) the chief council of the general staff, which controlled all questions relating to the devel- opment of the armed forces of the empire and the use of them in the event of war, and (b) the general staff itself, which controlled the conditions of military service and the inner life of the army. The chief council of the general staff was only formed in 1905, after the Russo-Japanese War. This allocation of the more important questions to a special body, presided over by the chief of the general staff, was a measure highly important for ensuring the carrying-out of basic reforms and improvements. At first the head of the general staff was exempted from subordination to the War Ministry and reported directly to the Tsar on ques- tions under its jurisdiction, but after 3 years the existence of 2 bodies reporting on military matters was acknowledged to be inconvenient, and the chief council of the general staff was again included in the composition of the War Ministry. In it there were gradually concentrated questions relating to the constitu- tion of the army and the working-out of war plans. The first head of the Russian general staff was Gen. Palitsin, who occupied this position from 1905 to the end of 1908; he was subsequently succeeded by Gens. Sukhomlinov, Mishlaevsky, Gerngros. Jilinsky and Jenushkevitch; the last named was appointed only a few months before the outbreak of the World War. With the advent of war, the troops assigned for military operations were entirely removed from the control of the War Ministry; the con- trol of them was organized according to a special " Order for the control of troops in the field in war time." This order was con- firmed by the Tsar on July 16-29 1914. *' m y 3 days before the declaration of war on Russia on the part of Germany. The order mentioned fixed the organization of the higher command, the arrangement of the rear of the troops assigned for military operations, as well as the duties, rights and sphere of jurisdiction of the commands in the field.

The highest troop division in peace time in Russia was the corps. Though the corps often formed part of the military district, this unit had rather a territorial than an operative character, and its commanding personnel served only as the basis for forming the higher commands in war time. The order on command in the field provided for the grouping of the corps in armies, and of armies into larger combinations, called " fronts." The whole of the troops, those