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218 tion necessary in turning from the habits of peace to the trials of war is harder in proportion as youth has passed and the instruction ac- quired during the years of service with the colours has been effaced by time. If this applies to the French it is equally true of the Ger- mans. In the early days of the war, when of equal ages, the French and Germans found themselves on an equal footing; but where the Germans were younger they won.

Now, in any case, the French population consisting of 40 million souls, and the German of 70 million, in one mobilization class Germany had seven soldiers to France's four. But, further, it was especially in the 30 years prior to the war that the difference in the birth-rates made itself felt. One can say then without appreciable error that the last classes called to the colours gave eight to Germany and only four to France.

The army corps of the French Covering Force, in which 80 % of the personnel consisted of the three youngest classes, had a mean age of 22-22! years. The army corps of the interior, composed half of men of the younger classes and half of reservists, had a mean age of 25-26 years. The reserve divisions had a mean age of 31-32 years. The army corps of the German active army had a mean age of no more than 22 years in the Covering Force, and 2324 years in the interior, while the German reserve army corps had one of not more than 25-26 years. In brief, all the army corps of the Germans, whether active or of the reserve, were still under the influence of the lessons acquired during their active military service, while the French reserve divi- sions had everything to relearn.

Therefore, if one is to compare the strengths present in the Frontier battles, one must not count the divisions of French reserve any more than the reserve brigades which followed the active army corps, or only count them as of very small value. For battle purposes the numerical superiority must be considered in the first encounters to have been in favour of the Germans. But the reserve divisions quickly recovered themselves; their acclimatization was rapid. Already at the battle of the Meuse there was notable progress; at the Marne, where they were led vigorously, they called forth the respect of the enemy.

In 1914 France was organized to place under arms the whole population capable of carrying arms. It has already been remarked that the stages of evolution towards the ideal of 1793 were slow. Even after Sedan, Gambetta was able only to call up men by cate- gories first the unmarried, then married men without children. Only in 1905 did service become obligatory, personal and equal, and it was not until 1913 that the law was reached which saved France by giving, with equality, a strong peace army which could absorb the number of reservists and cover the mobilization and concentra- tion. It is important to note the fact that while on Aug. 22 1914 that is to say, three weeks after the order of mobilization the army corps of the Covering Force were complete, the army corps of the inte- rior were only just ready, the divisions of the reserve were not up to the mark, and the units of the territorial army were still valueless. This respite of three weeks which the French army enjoyed arose from two causes: the resistance at Liege and the extension which the Ger- mans gave to their enveloping manoeuvre. It may fairly be asserted that it was the reenforcement of the French Covering Force, much more than the value of the French fortresses, which caused the German staff to seek to gain the valley of the Oise by the right of the effect of the delay inherent in this place of attack.
 * he army before the attack. And the resistance of Liege aggravated

The evolution of the French army from 1910 to 1914 in respect of its strength, the reenforcement of the Covering Force and the peace-time order of battle, thus saved France in spite of the absence of a natural frontier which exposed her to the greatest difficulties, if not to actual defeat.

When the war of movement ended and trench warfare commenced, it was bitterly regretted that the factories had been emptied of all their mobilizable workers; the very principles which had governed the evolution of the army towards universal, personal and equal service were blamed. It was deplored that these men had not been left at work in their workshops whilst the others went to fight.

It may be that these reproaches were ill-founded. If the 559,000 men who on July I 1917 were in factories had remained there in Aug. and Sept. 1914 instead of going to the war, perhaps there would have been munitions in the arsenals, but perhaps also the French army might not have had need of them, because they would have been beaten by the numbers of the enemy.

It is. not justifiable, then, to say that the evolution of the army between 1910 and 1914 was on wrong lines. It was because the Ger- mans gave so wide a sweep to their enveloping movement that space and time allowed the French commander-in-chief to place on his left wing the V. Army and a group of reserve divisions, and to get in touch with the English army. This space and time Prussia had meant to refuse to France in 1871 in drawing the new frontier. To gain space and time had been the object of those who had organized the defences of the mutilated frontier ; it was the purpose, equally, of the troops of the Covering Force. To lessen the allowance of space and time required for the French army to mobilize and concentrate on the frontier was the constant preoccupation of the staff from 1875 up to the month of Aug. 1914.

The Covering Force. It is not possible here to deal with the organi- zation of the fortresses which gave a military frontier to France,

deprived as she was of every natural frontier. We shall limit our- selves to defining the operations which had for their object the crea- tion of a strong Covering Force. These operations determined the order of battle of the French army.

In the first place there was built up one higher formation to which almost exclusively was entrusted the duty of forming a Covering Force to face Germany; the VI. Corps was this great unit. Alone, this army corps watched over the frontier in 1875. Next, Germany having placed in Alsace-Lorraine very large numbers, France, in order to keep the balance, had to augment the number of units of the VI. Corps. This, becoming too cumbersome, was divided into two - the VI. (headquarters Ch&lons) and the XX. (headquarters Nancy). At the same time the region of the VII. Corps (Besancon) was extended to the N. of Belfort as far as the Upper Moselle. This was the position in 1910, when, since Germany showed herself not only more and more aggressive but also more and more strong, it was decided to give the frontier, by the organization of the Covering Force, the means of gaining, if not space, at least the time necessary to put in position in a prearranged order of battle the great military units mobilized by France. For this purpose it was necessary to have the men whom the three years' law provided. When they were promised, a new order of battle was adopted. A new army corps, the XXL, was created, with the duty of providing the covering force in the region of the Vosges. The II. Corps (Amiens), which was a corps of the army of the interior, had its regional limits completely altered ; the district adjoining Belgium (Givet to Thionville) was allotted to it, and one of its divisions increased to three brigades furnished the Covering Force from Briey to Givet.

Each corps of the Covering Force became in a fashion the advanced guard of an army. The XXI. Corps was the advanced guard of the

I. Army ; the XX. Corps that of the II. Army ; the VI. Corps that of the III. Army; and the II. Corps became on Aug. 9 1914 the ad- vanced guard of the IV. Army. The I. Corps acted as an advanced guard to the V. Army, sent towards the Sambre, and on the other flank the VII. Corps, when strongly reenforced, became the army of Gen. Pau, operating towards Miilhausen. Behind this formidable system of the six corps of the Covering Force, the commander-in- chief under Plan 17 could put his armies into position. Immediately prior to the war, Gen. Joffre had improved in detail the measures taken for mobilization and concentration in order to avoid as far as possible any loss of time; he sought to gain even hours, in the hope of saving the corps of the Covering Force from having to give ground, by speeding up the intervening stages between the date of the open- ing of hostilities and the time at which the armies would be strategi- cally concentrated.

Strength. The French army in peace-time consisted of 21 army corps and three divisions of colonial troops available for service on the frontiers. Of these 21 army corps, the arrival of the XIX. Corps, stationed in Algeria, in time for the first battles was counted upon, though problematical. In addition there were 10 divisions of cavalry. On mobilization the units of the active army were brought to their war strength by the influx of reservists; there was created on an average one division of reserve for an army corps.

In the Frontier battle, Gen. Joffre had under his command not only the 44 divisions of the active army at home but also three active divisions drawn from N. Africa and the Alps, and 25 reserve divisions a total of 72 divisions of infantry and in addition 10 divisions of cavalry, giving a total of 2,669,000 men for the armies of the north-east.

By Sept. I 1914 the French army comprised: 21 army corps, 50 active divisions, 25 reserve divisions, 12 territorial divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, army troops, and line-of-communication troops. Altogether there were 62,145 officers and 2,689,000 men 1,135,000 rifles, 25,000 carbines, 106,200 sabres, 2,158 machine-guns, 4,098 field guns, 389 heavy guns, 192 mountain guns, 200 aeroplanes and 1 8 balloons.

If in addition to the troops which Gen. Joffre was able to place in the battle of the Frontiers, there are added the Belgian army of 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry division, the 4 British infantry divisions which in the first place Field-Marshal French brought, with one and a half divisions of British cavalry, the conclusion is reached that the loss of this battle was caused, not by dispropor- tionate numbers, but by various other factors, amongst which, as already noted, the initial lack of efficiency of the French reserve divisions must be given a prior place.

The order of battle of the French army comprised five armies, allowing four armies to be placed side by side in the first line, and one army in reserve behind the centre and left centre. Each army had at least one division of cavalry in reserve. On the left near the Belgian frontier there had been assembled a cavalry corps. Reserve divisions were placed in the centre of the battle front, between the

II. and III. Armies, to carry out the investment of the fortified region of Metz-Thionville or to bar the enemy from the Meuse heights between Verdun and Toul as required. Other reserve divi- sions were entrusted, concurrently with certain active forces, with the defence of the region of Ste. Genevieve, in front of Nancy and Frouard. A " group " of reserve divisions was brought to the right rear, and a similar group to the left rear of the long line. Belfort, Epinal, Toul, Verdun, Maubeuge received their war garrisons. Lille was declared an " open town by the Ministry of War. Lastly,