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tries, as agriculturalists and miners met with much opposition. Many of the men of this class, of course, had been the subject of appeal after appeal to tribunals for exemption and had little military service to their credit. Why then, it was contended, should they be released before men who had served four and five years in the army? Pivotalism indeed was called " favouritism." But it should be remembered that the maximum number of " Pivotal Men " to be released was fixed at not more than 150,000 (a figure which included the " Demobilizers " as well) and that they were granted priority solely for the purpose of assisting in the reorganization of the various industries and thereby of increasing the capacity to provide employment for the less highly qualified men. On the other hand, it is true that some men of 19 and 20 years of age, with little or no technical experience, were certified as " Pivotal " by the Ministry of Labour and given early release, while some bona fide " Pivotal Men " were not released until long after the general demobilization period had begun.

As early as January 1915 the question of demobilization had been given consideration. It was not, however, until February 1917 that a draft scheme was drawn up. This scheme, appli- cable to troops serving in France only, was a mere outline, but formed the basis of the detailed " Regulations " finally adopted. It provided that men should be withdrawn individually from units (in an order of priority previously determined but depend- ing in the main on individual industrial qualification) and formed into special parties called " Dispersal Drafts." These drafts would be sent to appropriate " Dispersal Stations " in the United Kingdom and there demobilized; each draft for a par- ticular " Dispersal Station " being, so far as possible, composed of men whose homes were in the " Dispersal Area " (the United Kingdom being, for demobilization purposes, divided into 18 special areas called " Dispersal Areas ") in which the " Dispersal Station " was situated. When, by this process of individual withdrawal of personnel, a unit had been reduced to a " cadre " strength such strength depending upon the number of men that would be required to bring home the unit's vehicles, animals and regimental equipment-*-it would be brought to the United Kingdom and disbanded or re-formed, as the case might be, and the remaining demobilizable personnel sent for dispersal.

The scheme did not receive War Cabinet approval until November 1917, but Cabinet sanction was taken for granted; and in March 1917 an Army Order was issued providing that the " Industrial Group " of each soldier, his particular trade or calling, and whether he was married or single, should be recorded either in his Army Book 64 (if he was serving in a theatre of war) or his Army Form 6103 (if he was serving at home or in an overseas garrison). The purpose of this Order, of course, was to provide an authentic record of each soldier's_pre-war occupation, which would serve as a basis in apply- ing the industrial priority principle. But the priority which, in the national interest, ought to be granted, on demobilization, to men of particular industries and professions had also to be determined. This was a matter for the Ministry of Labour, not the War Office; and a departmental " Demobilization Priority Committee " was therefore convened for the purpose of drawing up an industrial priority schedule. A further committee was set up, for the purpose not only of securing executive coordination but of determining, during the demobilization period, such revised instructions on pri- ority as might be deemed necessary on public grounds or from the state of employment in particular industries.

In December 1918 Parts I. and II. of Army Demobilization Regu- lations were issued and circulated under cover of Army Order 7 of 1919. These Regulations set forth every detail of the dispersal procedure. Of the actual executive machinery set up in connection with the scheme it may be said that it worked throughout with unfailing smoothness and precision, in spite of arbitrary and unex- pected fluctuations in the rate of dispersal. One detail of procedure must also be specially noted. In the original scheme of which the basic principle was priority according to individual industrial qualifi- cation it was provided that ten per cent of each dispersal draft should consist of men who, irrespective of their civil qualifications, had served longest in the theatre of war or overseas command con- cerned. After the Armistice, however, the demand for a speeding-up of the rate of dispersal became so insistent that the strict order of the Regulations could not be adhered to. The hands of the military authorities were forced and many new classes of men were made eligible for early release. The result was that the promised ten per cent of long service men could not always be included in dispersal drafts; and the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief in France

wrote pointing this fact out and insisting that, as the original scheme had been explained to the men, it might seriously affect their dis- cipline if it were departed from.

After the Armistice, of course, demobilization became a matter of immediate public concern, and as a General Election was pending the demand for more speedy release acquired a political significance. The initial slowness in the rate of dispersal was, to a great extent, inevitable, and was due to shortage of transport and to finely strung lines of communication in the theatres of war; but it must also be remembered that the War Cabinet order to accelerate the speed at which demobilization was proceeding was not given until December 8 1918. Certain influential critics however preferred to attribute the early delays to a malignant unwillingness of the army authorities to let the men go; and considerable unrest was aroused not only amongst the public but amongst the troops themselves. Many letters were, in fact, received in the War Office from individual sol- diers complaining that their commanding officers were deliberately refraining from taking steps to effect their demobilization.

The agitation continued and the situation was verging on the critical. Difficulties with the soldiers occurred at Folkestone and elsewhere. Something had to be done to stem the flood of discontent. On January 29 1919 an Army Order was issued abolishing the principle of industrial priority and substituting that of release on grounds of age or length of service. The good effect of this order was instantaneous. Yet the new Army Order wrought no fundamental change. The principle of release by age and length of service had always been recognized and had been embodied in the original scheme. The machinery of dispersal was in no way altered; the transport problem was not solved; in short, the maximum rate at which dispersal could be carried out remained as before. Just so many men as were released under the new Army Order could have been released under the old rules. And that the demand for release was as acute as ever was proved by the statistics of letters received at the War Office. After the issue of the Army Order the weekly numbers of letters received asking for the release of particular sol- diers increased rapidly in one branch only, from 4,821 for the week ending Jan. 25 1919 to 17,506 for the week ending May 10 1919. In view of these facts, it would appear difficult to explain the sudden soothing effect of the Army Order. But indeed the reason is not far to seek. The Order was accompanied by a Royal Warrant (Army Order 54 of 1919) increasing the rates of pay of men in the army, and the increases were on a generous scale. The mere changing of the principle underlying the releases would have been ineffectual was, indeed, unnecessary. What was needed was some unmistakable proof that the military authorities were not acting in any arbi- trary or obstructive manner. The idea had got abroad that men were being deliberately retained; and the issue of the warrant, coupled with the frank statement (accompanying Army Order 55) by the Secretary of State for War, threw a very different light upon the whole matter.

The total number of men (inclusive of Royal Air Force personnel) demobilized from November II 1918 to September 29 1920 -the date for which the last official Bulletin was issued was 196,920 officers and 3,866,668 other ranks. (E. S. H.*)

II. THE FRENCH ARMY

Although the decree of Aug. 23 1793 brought into being the principle of the nation in arms, it was not until after the war of 1870-1 that the principle of personal service for all was estab- lished in practice (law of July 27 1872). Thenceforth no one could take the place of another. Inequalities in peace-time serv- ice, however, still existed, through the operation of the ballot and certain concessions allowed to men on account of family circumstances, or educational qualifications. In 1889 a second stage was reached. Military service in peace-time was reduced to three years, but many categories of citizens, e.g. students and supporters of families, would serve only six months. In the event of war every citizen between the ages of 20 and 45 would be called, as all having served would be able to participate in the first engagements.

By the law of March 21 1905, the inequalities in the duration of military service in peace-time disappeared. Henceforth in France military service was declared personal and equal for all in peace-time as in war. Service in peace-time, however, was reduced to two years. The reduction of the duration of service to two years, together with the decrease of the French birth-rate, placed the French army in peace-time in conspicuous inferiority by comparison with the German army on a peace footing; and in 1910 an increasing volume of opinion demanded a return to three years' service.

In 1913 the German danger was apparent to the great majority of the French people. After bitter and prolonged discussions,