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The Policy in Execution. It is unnecessary to follow in detail the execution of -the infamous policy for the destruction of the Armenian population of Asia Minor. Suffice to say it was begun soon after the outbreak of war by concocting reports of Armenian revolutionary plots in support of the Allied Powers; and then, as far as possible, by a general disarmament of Ottoman Armenians. Though British operations in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, and Russian operations against the eastern vilayets, kept the Turks occupied in a military sense, they did not prevent Turkish activity against Armenians. During the spring and summer of 1915, indeed, when the fate of Constantinople and Turkey hung in the balance and inhabitants of the Imperial City daily scanned the Sea of Marmora for signs of an approaching British fleet, the Young Turk Government prosecuted their Armenian policy with the utmost rigour. But when the Gallipoli operations had plainly failed, and the outcome of the war was thought to be no longer in doubt, a Turkish defeat in Russian Armenia, attributed by Enver Pasha to the Armenians, was revenged upon the race by massacres of even greater ferocity. From first to last they were organized and carried out systematically. Massacres on the largest scale took place at Bitlis, Mush, Sivas, Kharput, Trebizond wherever, in fact, a considerable and more or less defenceless Armenian population existed. The people were butchered in masses, butchered in groups, drowned in the Black Sea and in rivers, burnt in buildings killed by whatever processes were found most ready and convenient. Girls were placed in Turkish harems. It should not be supposed, however, that no resistance was offered, that the Armenian people sold their lives cheaply. Although supposed to have been disarmed, weapons remained, and on numberless occasions, in untold villages and towns, a hopeless resistance inflicted severe losses on the attackers.

Deportation, too, became an easy indirect means of destroying Armenian life. On the long routes of eastern Asia Minor by which movement took place; on the subsidiary roads leading to these routes; at the great concentration centres on which the columns of suffering humanity were directed, the Armenian people died of hunger, exhaustion, exposure, disease, in tens of thousands, perhaps in hundreds of thousands. Only a com- paratively small proportion of those who set out reached the destination assigned them. The policy of transferring an Armenian population to Mesopotamia and Syria became in execution a wholesale means for destroying those who were despatched.

Estimated Loss of Armenian Life. The Armenian policy of the Young Turks failed, however, in that part ofTurkey-in- Asia lying between Erzerum and Bitlis and the Russian frontier. In this region, where the Armenian inhabitants were compar- atively numerous, they ,were able to pass into Trans-Caucasia, or were preserved by the advance of the Russian armies. Within the stricken areas of Asia Minor, too, many escaped many more than are generally supposed. Kurdish tribes gave friendly shelter; even Turks were not without compassion; the nature of the country, itself, afforded opportunities for escape and concealment on a large scale. And in the Anti-Taurus mountains were Armenian fastnesses unreached by Turkish forces.

Armenian estimates of the losses suffered by their people as the result of the Young Turk measures are liable to be excessive. It is in the nature of things that they should be. But if we place the loss of life directly and indirectly caused by massacre and deportation since the year 1914 as being in the neighbour- hood of three-quarters of a million we cannot be very far from the truth. In addition are what may be called the legitimate losses of war, and these, in proportion to the manhood of the Armenian race, were enormous.

As regards the Armenian population, not only of Asia Minor, but of Trans-Caucasia as well, from first to last Russia is believed to have sent 160,000 Armenian troops from Trans- Caucasia to her battle-fronts in Europe, of whom less than 30,000 survived. For operations in Asia Minor she subsequently raised an Armenian volunteer army, and swept into it refugees from Turkish territory. From 1914 to 1921 Armenians were

fighting incessantly in Asia for Russia; for the French in Cilicia and Syria, where many thousands were embodied; and for themselves in Trans-Caucasia. Probably not less than one- sixth of the males of the whole race perished in warfare, in addition to loss by massacre and deportation.

Russian Policy. A brief outline must now be given of the military operations of Tsarist Russia against the Ottoman Empire during 1914-6, for they deeply affected Armenia and the Armenians. For more than two centuries it had been the tradi- tional policy of Russia to obtain possession of Constantinople and the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In the last 40 years she had seen her line of approach through the Balkan Peninsula made impracticable. Correspondingly her line of approach from Trans-Caucasia had gained immensely in importance. She had further established her naval supremacy in the Black Sea over any Turkish force that could be con- centrated in those waters. With this as her policy, and in these circumstances, Russia, both openly and covertly, opposed all measures encouraging the development of Armenian national sentiment and aspirations, not only among the Armenian population under her rule in Trans-Caucasia, but also in Turkish Armenia. Tsarist Russia, in fact, desired Armenians in Turkey to remain a discordant disintegrating element in the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the eastern vilayets, until such time as she should be able to make further annexations. An inde- pendent Armenia, it thus appears, was impracticable during the existence of Tsarist Russia.

When war broke out between the Allied Powers and Turkey Russia recognized that the supreme opportunity for achieving her dearest ambition had arrived. Following the decision of the British and French Governments to send a military expedi- tion to the Dardanelles, she made a formal request to her Allies that her claim to possession of Constantinople and the Straits at the conclusion of the war should be admitted in advance. A week later the Western Powers agreed to the proposal, and the destiny of the greatest strategical position in the world, and with it the destiny of Armenia, seemed to be definitely settled.

Russian Invasion of Turkish Armenia, 1914. Russian troops crossed the frontiers on Nov. 4 1914, two days after the declara- tion of war, and advanced towards the great Turkish fortress of Erzerum. But the movement had no weight; it ceased after a few weeks of indecisive fighting, and the Turks launched a daring counter-offensive against Ardahan and Kars, in Russian Armenia. This reckless movement was ended, however, by the battle of Sarikamish (Dec. 29 1914 to Jan. i 1915) at which, and at the battle of Kara Urgan in the subsequent retreat, the Turkish army was almost destroyed. In revenge for the disaster, attributed by Enver Pasha and the Young Turks to Armenian elements in the Russian army, and to support and intelligence given by Armenians generally, exterminatory measures against the Armenian population of Asia Minor were redoubled at the beginning of April 1915. It was at this stage that the British and French Governments issued (May 24 1915) a declaration that they would hold Ottoman ministers personally responsible for the massacres.

Armenian Troops in the Russian Armies. Here it may be remarked that when Russia mobilized in Aug. 1914 for the World War, her Armenian troops, numbering, it is said, more than 120,000 men, were despatched to European fronts. When war with Turkey demanded great armies in Trans-Caucasia these troops were not available. But as a matter of policy Russia raised an auxiliary volunteer army of Armenians, including many thousands of refugees from Asia Minor, for service against the mortal enemy of their race. To these and other Armenians in the Russian armies of Trans-Caucasia natives of the region, inured to its climatic conditions, between them familiar with every road and mountain path, and animated by every incentive to fierce and resolute combat must be credited no small measure of the success which attended Russian arms against the Turks. Not without cause did Turkish leaders attribute their Caucasian disasters to their Armenian enemies.