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On Sept. 27 the German operations assumed the character of the beginning of a siege. The town of Malines received a violent bombardment and was evacuated. The artillery de- ployment of the attack was completed, and fire opened on the 28th.

The Army Group Beseler comprised at that time the 37th Landwehr Bde. between Alost and Termonde, where it had served in flank guard since Sept. 14; the 4th Ersatz Div. (arrived from Lorraine on the 26-27) between Termonde and the Wille- broeck canal; the Marine Div. between this canal and the Dyle about Malines; the III. Res. Corps from the Dyle to the Antwerp-Aerschot railway (5th R. Div. on left, 6th R. Div. on right), and the 26th Landwehr Bde. N. of Aerschot, with a group furnished by the III. Res. C. further to the right front at Westerloo.

The specialist troops, besides the medium and heavy artillery already alluded to, were two regiments and some additional units of pioneers, four railway companies, three kite balloons and a flight of aeroplanes, a survey section and two searchlight sections. General von Beseler himself was an engineer general and had been inspector-general of pioneers.

Field-Marshal von der Goltz, Governor-General of Occupied Belgium, had at his disposal some brigades, of which the ist Reserve Ersatz Bde. and the ist Bavarian Landwehr Bde. joined the Beseler Group directly, while the 4ist Landwehr Bde. watched the left rear between Alost and Ninove, and the 38th Landwehr Bde. the right front near Beverloo Camp.

Siege Operations. It at once became clear that the attack was being concentrated on the south front of the fortress. The attack project elaborated by the Germans in peace-time had made the east front the objective. On the other hand, an attack against the west front would have had the advantage of isolating the Belgians from Allied support. But von Beseler had not the necessary forces to prosecute a siege on this side while still covering the communications through Brussels against a sortie. In spite, therefore, of the fact that the Nethe and its inundations lay behind the fort line, he had decided to attack the south front. 1 Trusting in the thrice-proved powers of his weapons of attack, he set out to spare his infantry, to crush and throw into confusion the lines of defence by gunfire, ruin the mechanism of the organs of defence in the forts by methodic hammering, controlled by aircraft, destroy the guns in their cupolas and the garrison in their shelters more certainly than would have been possible if they had been dispersed before giving them a chance of fighting. These results attained, he would then cautiously advance his infantry and gain a footing in the shattered forts and pulverized lines of defence.

The Belgian troops were thus faced with the prospect of wait- ing stoically and in obscurity, without hope of riposte, under the fracas of a cyclopean bombardment, till the moment when they should be blown up or crushed at their posts.

Under such conditions they could not hold out very long. It was essentially a question of the number of mortars and the quantity of munitions possessed by the assailant and of the destructive power of each separate projectile. Actually this unequal struggle lasted 10 days and nights without truce, and this time was infinitely precious in retarding the moment when the Germans rid at last of the menace of the Belgian army on their right rear could freely and with better chances renew their great effort to reach and envelop the left flank of the Franco-British armies.

On Sept. 27 the Belgian field army was distributed on the most dangerous sectors as follows: The ist and 2nd Divs. between the Senne and the Nethe from Willebroeck to Lierre with the sth Div. in reserve N. of the Nethe; the 6th and 3rd Divs. between the Senne and the Scheldt; the 4th Div. at Termonde and the cavalry division about Alost-Wetteren to cover the communication between Antwerp and the sea.

On the morning of the 28th the German cannonade was let loose along the whole front between Termonde and Lierre. Under

1 His request for additional forces wherewith simultaneously to operate west of the Scheldt was refused by headquarters.

cover of this the infantry got into contact with the outposts of the fortress. The Belgian guns replied with vigour.

Between the Scheldt and the Senne Belgian detachments energetically repulsed their assailants (4th Ers. Div. and Mar. Div.), notably on the outskirts of Blaesveld (S.E. of Fort Breendonck). But E. of the Senne towards noon, the super- heavy artillery came into action and began by engaging Forts Waelhem and Wavre Ste. Catherine. 2 At Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine the first 42-cm. shell pierced a concrete vault 25 metres thick. At i P.M. the gallery of the gorge front was demolished. Other vaults, including those of the fire-control room, suffered the same fate; a cupola was jammed, and the left traditore battery crumbled into the ditch. The other forts suffered less. The firing, after a pause in the evening, con- tinued with intensity all through the night on most of the forts. On the 2gth, W. of the Senne renewed attacks, especially heavy about Blaesfeld, were repulsed. Between the Senne and the Nethe the cannonade was even more violent than on the previous day, both the trenches in the intervals and the per- manent works being engaged. From 5 A.M. Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine (which in fact was the point selected by von Beseler for the break-through) received 42-cm. projectiles at regular intervals of seven minutes, not counting those of 21 and 30-5 cm.

PLAN OP A FORT AT ANTWERP

SHOWING ALL HITS OF CALIBRES ABOVE 21 CM.

-HITS

It is difficult to imagine the terrible situation of a garrison sub- jected to such a bombardment. The arrival of a 42-cm. projectile is announced by a deafening roar. When it bursts in the masonry the whole mass of the fort snakes violently and seems to sink in the earth and to oscillate back to its original level. The blast throws men against the walls. Poisonous fumes and clouds of cement dust cause violent sickness and sometimes suffocation. Under such condi- tions, and in close confinement, it is easy to see why the men lost not only their powers of action but even, it seemed, their reason.

The men's quarters were destroyed, fires broke out, the air became unbreathable and the greater part of the garrison took refuge on the berm of the ditch. A 42-cm. projectile went through the dome of one 15-cm. cupola, exploded, and tossed the voussoirs to a dis- tance of about 30 feet. The second 15-cm. cupola was put out of action by a 30-5. The other cupolas were either destroyed by being laid bare or made inaccessible by the obstruction of their galleries. One magazine was hit by a shell and blew up. The double caponier of the capital was completely ruined.

By ii A.M. the fort had all its guns out of action and all means of defence destroyed. The survivors of the garrison were authorized to evacuate it as fire rendered it untenable. Forts

1 The artillery of medium and heavy calibre was deployed mostly along the Malines-Heyst-op-den-Berg road, the rest behind Malines, at ranges of 3,500 to 7,000 yd. from the two first and 5,000 to 9,000 from the two last-named forts. Of the super-heavy artillery two 30-5-cm. batteries (range 9,500 and 10,500 yd.) engaged Fort Wael- hem and Chemin de Fer or Duffel redoubt; a 30-5 battery (8,500 yd.) and a 42-cm. battery (11,300 yd.) attacked Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine ; an Austrian 30- 5-battery (range 8,800 yd.) Fort Konings- hoyckt, and a 42-cm. battery (range 9,000 yd.) Fort Lierre. All these were two-gun batteries except the Austrian, which had four. The ranges here given are approximate. For positions see map.

(C. F. A.)