Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/190

156

Waelhem and Lierre and the Chemin de Per redoubt were con- structed S. of the Nethe as a sort of bridgehead. Meanwhile the demands of the port were growing, and the city was becom- ing cramped within its enceinte. It was therefore decided about 1900 to extend the defensive system still further.

The scheme adopted by the legislative chambers in 1906 provided for:

(1) The creation of a principal line of defence, composed of detached forts about 5 to 1 1 m. from the limits of the Antwerp agglomeration, to shelter the city from bombardment by the artillery of that epoch. This line was, on an average, about 2 m. in front of the Rupel- Nethe water-line, thus placing the crossing points of this line out of reach of heavy field artillery. Its total perimeter was 59 m., 46 m. on the right bank and 13 m. on the left, of which 6 m. were protected by inundations.

The forts, 17 in number, were disposed about 3 m. apart, and, in principle, permanent redoubts were to be built in the intervals. The forts were armed with one or two cupolas for twin 15-cm. guns, two cupolas for single 12-cm. howitzers, and four or six cupolas for single 7'5-cm. guns. The redoubts had only one 7'5-cm. cupola. Forts and redoubts were constructed entirely of ordinary concrete, with vaults 2-50 metres thick at the crown and surrounded by wet ditches, 33 ft. wide. They all had traditores or " Bourges casemates " flanking the intervals with 7'5-cm. Q.F. guns. The garrisons varied from 100 to 500 men.

(2) The creation of an enceinte de sArete on the old fort line, the forts being organized for small weapons. Concrete redoubts were built at intervals of about 500 yd. and all these points d'appui were connected by a grille. This line of defence was to be 20 m. long and 5 to 7j m. removed from the first line of defence.

(3) The demolition of the elaborate enceinte built in 1859 in the immediate vicinity of the town.

(4) Additional defences on the Lower Scheldt, including several coast batteries level with Doel to sweep the reaches of the river up to the Dutch frontier.

These very extensive works had necessarily to be spread over several years, and in 1914, on the outbreak of hostilities, the transformation of the fortress had not been completed.

(1) Even if the organization had been carried through according to plan, the fortress would not have come up to the standards es- tablished by the siege of Port Arthur. The two positions of defence were too shallow in themselves and also too far apart to support one another. The points d'appui of these positions, in which the elements of permanent defence were concentrated on a small ground surface, very easy to locate, were conceived on a vicious principle. Mono- lithic concrete is not invulnerable to present-day siege artillery; the organs of defence should therefore be protected above all by their dissemination, by camouflage and by their irregular dispersion over a large surface on the principle of the Metz Feste.

The substructures and the armouring, constructed to resist theor- em, mortar, were not calculated to face 28-cm., still less 30-5 and 42- cm. projectiles. 1

(2) In July 1914 not one of the forts planned in 1906 was finished. Some lacked cupolas. Others had cupolas without concrete aprons, and these had to be improvised by pouring gravel, iron rods and cement round the cupolas. In some cases sacks of cement soaked with water, or even simple sandbags, had to suffice.

The transmissions and canalizations were not established either inside or outside the forts, neither was the machinery in place.

(3) For reasons of economy the 15-cm. cupolas had been provided with old guns, formerly on wheeled carriages, which had a range of not more than 8,800 yd. and used black powder. The most recent guns, amongst them those of the traditore batteries, hastily installed, were for the most part without laying instruments. Of the other guns available the most powerful was the 1889 model 15-cm. which hadarangeof 1 1 ,000" yards. 2 Older guns or howitzers, of 12 ori$cm. were also available, all using black powder. England sent six 4-7

. Q.F. guns, mounted on armoured railway trucks, and, in the last days of the siege, six 6-in. guns. No equipment for observation of fire and no observation posts existed, and the necessary survey work for firing by the map was incomplete. There were ten aero- planes and one balloon for the fortress and the field army together. The supply of ammunition was extremely modest, the is-cm. guns being provided with 800 rounds, the others with only 125. Some French ammunition was hurriedly obtained, but, not being designed for the guns, it speedily put them out of action.

(4) The fort garrisons were chiefly of the oldest classes. The Lebel rifle with which they were armed was strange to them and they were entirely ignorant of the machine-gun. The men of the fortress battalions which garrisoned the intervals had had no military

1 Twenty-eight cm. howitzers were used by the Japanese at Port Arthur 1904-5. The first German model of 30-5-011. siege howitzer was designed as early as 1898. (C. F. A.)

2 Its 3-kgm. shell was powder-filled. An orderfor8,oooH.E. shells had been placed in Germany in 1912, but the firm concerned failed to deliver them.

service for 10 years or more and their fighting value was very low. The cadres were entirely inadequate.

Unfinished works, conspicuous and concentrated, proof only against projectiles of 21 cm.; obsolete artillery, lacking in ob- servation-posts and in munitions; a garrison full of goodwill but with inadequate cadres and untrained in the handling of modern weapons such were the real means of defence of the legendary fortress of Antwerp in 1914.

None the less the Belgians displayed, from the moment when their territory was invaded, the utmost activity in preparing it. The unfinished forts were put in a state of defence by any means that came to hand. The aprons for the cupolas were banked up as best they could be. Distribution systems were created for motive power, lighting and telephones. The imme- diate foreground was cleared, though this did more harm than good, as it made the works very visible. The inundations were prepared. Forts and redoubts were united by continuous, wire. In the rear infantry trenches were constructed, but these in- evitably showed well above ground on account of the water- level in the soil, and the shelters, which were none too numerous, were made merely with logs. The reserve artillery of the fortress was established in battery positions, which gave an average of five old-pattern guns, firing black powder, per km. of front. 1 A supporting position along the whole length of the Nethe was put in hand. The old fort line, and even the enceinte (which had been only partially demolished), were also organized as far as possible.

The unfinished state of the fortress and the mediocrity of its armament formed a serious handicap to the important part which Antwerp was destined to take in the operations.

(1 ) As a great commercial metropolis, always abundantly supplied with products of all kinds, Antwerp was an obvious centre for mili- tary depots and stores. Containing all the army's arsenals and supply magazines, it was a base of operations from which the army could under no circumstances allow itself to be cut off.

(2) By reason of its situation Antwerp offered to the Belgian field army a stronghold from which it could sally forth at any time it chose, to threaten the lines of communication of the German armies operating in the north of France.

(3) Through Ostend and Zeebrugge Antwerp had easy means of communication with England. Under the shelter of the fortress and the Scheldt English troops could safely land in Flanders, act in liaison with the Belgian army, operate against the German lines of commMnication, protect the Pas de Calais coast with its sea traffic, vital to England, and prevent the Allied left wing from being turned and enveloped.

To fulfil these important missions the fortress should have been complete and well manned. Failing these two conditions, it was of no importance save for the presence of the Belgian field army within its walls.

The Belgian army had fallen back in the direction of Antwerp when, to avoid envelopment by the German I. and II. Armies, the Nethe position had to be evacuated (Aug. 18-20). Hence, too, after the sortie battles of Aug. 25 (Eppeghem, Hofstade, Werchter) and Sept. 9-12 (Aerschot, Haecht, Louvain) under- taken for the purpose of cooperating in the battle of the Frontiers and that of the Marne, the army returned in each case to the fortress, resolved to stay there as long as its communications with the sea were not in danger.

When the German I. Army wheeled through and past Brussels on its way to France, it dropped the III. Res. Corps (v. Beseler) to face northward as a flank-guard against the Belgian field army at Antwerp. With some additions and changes, Beseler's force 2 remained on the defensive, fulfilling this duty on the line Grimberghen-Over de Vaert-Aerschot.

On Aug. 25 and again on Sept. 9 it had to meet serious sorties of the field army in Antwerp, and on the second of these occa- sions its situation was at one time critical. After this, for a few days, the front was quiet. But towards Sept. 20 reports began to come in of important German transport moves and of a quantity of very heavy artillery moving on the roads leading

1 The artillery of the field army of course excluded.

2 Till Sept. 8 Beseler remained under command of I. Army. From Sept. 8 to Sept. 10 his force was under the VII. Army head-

Snarters. Finally on Sept. 17 the force wasdesignated"Armeegruppe eseler." (C. F. A.)