Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/1035

Rh

engineering education, its graduates appointed to the Corps of Engineers nevertheless require additional instruction in engi- neering subjects. To that end they are detailed as special students for about a year at the more advanced civilian en- gineering schools.

Graduate engineers appointed from civil life need military instruc- tion and are sent to the Engineer School of the U.S. army immediate- ly upon being commissioned. Subalterns of both classes, after com- pleting their basic military education, are assigned alternately to duty with troops and on civil construction, where their training is continued for several years in accordance with a scheme formulated by the chief of engineers. This whole procedure, which is possibly more formal than that prevailing in the British service, has the same end in view, namely, to give the officer a " well-rounded mental and professional development " which fits him for any service that war may entail. Selected officers of more mature age pursue advanced courses at the Engineer School and become eligible for the School of the Line, the General Staff School, and the Army War College, where they are instructed in the combined use of all arms of the service and the various duties of the general staff and the high command.

Under legislation effective June 3 1916, the Regular Army of the United States was reorganized and expanded. Provision was also made for a reserve to be composed of (a) local forces in each state, and (b) a reserve corps of officers and of enlisted men. The former were the state National Guards, but in an emergency were subject to service under the Federal Government. The Reserve Corps was answerable directly to the Federal Government. Under this Act the Corps of Engineers of the regular establishment was to consist of 505 officers of all ranks, and one band; 7 regiments (foot), and 2 battalions (mounted) of enlisted men. The increase was to be made by five successive increments, so that on April 6 1917, when the United States declared the existence of a state of war, the Corps of Engineers numbered only 256 officers and 2,228 enlisted men, the latter being organized in 3 regiments and one mounted company. There were, in addition, a few engineer troops organized as com- ponents of the National Guard.

During the World War, Congress passed a series of Acts affecting the military establishment and created a fourth element called the National Army, which name was applied to the organizations raised especially for the emergency, partly by voluntary enlistment and partly by the selective service law. In Aug. 1918, the distinctive appellations were discontinued and the 4 elements, viz. : the Regular Army, the National Guard, the Reserve Corps and the National Army, were merged and the single term " The United States Army " was applied to the entire military force.

At the time of the Armistice, Nov. II 1918, the standard combat regiment with its train had a strength of 49 officers and 1,695 en- listed men. At that time the engineer establishment consisted of 7 regiments (foot), 2 battalions (mounted), and 8 engineer trains derived from the regular establishment; 17 regiments with trains derived from the National Guard, and 31 regiments derived from the National Army, a total of 55 regiments, all assigned to divisions. There were also 6 regiments assigned directly, one to each corps headquarters. These 6 1 regiments were all of the pioneer-sapper type; but there were also special engineer troops allocated to various headquarters, both at the front and on the lines of communication, for the construction, maintenance and operation of railways; for the assemblage and maintenance of railway equipment ; for the con- struction, operation and maintenance of light railways; for the con- struction and maintenance of highways; for the construction of barracks, quarters, storehouses, wharves and other miscellaneous structures; for the production of lumber and timber products; for camouflage; for flash- and sound-ranging; for water supply, mining, quarrying, electrical and mechanical installations and operations; for surveying, printing, and the reproduction of maps and charts; for the operation of port facilities; for the operation of searchlights; for motor transport, chemical warfare, and " general service."

The " general service " force was composed of whites and cor- responded to the British labour battalions. There were in addi- tion certain labour units, called Pioneer Infantry, composed of ne- groes officered by whites. The special engineer troops were variously organized into regiments, independent battalions or independent companies, the strength of which was that of corresponding units of the standard Pioneer-Sapper regiments. The labour battalions usually consisted of 1,000 men with a proper complement of officers. Though originally organized under the Engineer establishment, the Motor Transport Corps, the Chemical Warfare Service and the Armoured Tank Corps later became separate organizations. The Railway Transport Corps was established as a separate service in France, but in America this branch remained under the general supervision of the chief of engineers.

During the war 13,527 commissions were issued to officers of engineers, and on Nov. II 1918 there were 10,886 officers holding such commissions. The approximate total enlisted strength of engineer units was 285,000, of whom 233,000 were overseas, and 52,000 were in the United States and its insular possessions. Com- paring this with the British strength it must be remembered that,

on the one hand, in the American army the signal service is entirely distinct from the engineers; on the other hand, a certain amount of mechanical transportation is included, and the Americans made, early provision for a large number of navvies for general engineering operations. The strength of the latter are included in the figures given for the American engineering service. The Quartermaster Corps of the American army, which constitutes its general supply service, had also a large number of labour units, generally composed of negroes with' white officers.

The training of officers and enlisted men at temporary instruction camps was simplified by the fact that the officers were, in general, drawn from the engineering professions, and the enlisted men were drawn from various classes of artisans. The compulsory selective service law facilitated the assignment of each individual to that place in the military establishment for which he was best fitted by his peace-time occupation. The training in the instruction camps was therefore largely military, qualifying the personnel to appjy to their military tasks the knowledge they had acquired as civil- ians in their peace-time vocations. As in England, the voluntary- enlistment principle permitted a number of well-qualified en- gineers and technicians to join, early in the war, the infantry, artillery and other combat units where their special training did not come into play. Their services would have been of far more value in the engineering or other specialist units. (G. A. Y.)

Wessons from the War. It is possible to sum up a few of the lessons which the experience of the World War has taught.

There must be on the one hand the closest connexion and coopera- tion between the general staff and the engineers. The intentions of the commander must dominate the situation, and the engineering work must be coordinated so as to further such intentions, assist and develop them as far as possible. There must therefore be, on the part of the general staff, such early information on the subject to the chief engineer that he may not only work out his technical plans, but may consider whether the possibilities of engineering science may not be used to forward the end in view to an extent hitherto unsuspected by the general staff.

There must be constant cooperation with other arms, especially infantry, and this must form part of the training in peace.

There must also be close touch with the great civil-engineering institutions of the country. Apart from their great knowledge and experience of the developments of the profession of engineering they are in touch, in a way that can hardly be expected from military engineers, with the very latest developments of technical science, and with the ablest practical exponents of it on a large scale.

There must be the recognition that field defences, as such, are not the monopoly of the engineers. It is the business of the general in command, through his general staff, to decide when and where such defences should be constructed, and the senior officer of en- gineers should have a voice in the matter, but only in respect of technical matters involved. The training and duties of modern infantry enable that arm to carry out much of the required defensive work entirely without any engineer supervision or assistance, and they should be held responsible for such work. There is sure to be some work which is beyond the scope of infantry training, such as reinforced concrete, or the construction of " dug-outs," and this is clearly the business of the engineers, but in ordinary entrenchments, wiring and other obstacles, revetments, and light bridging, infantry must be trusted to do their own work.

The supply of engineering plant and stores must be under the engineers, and other arms should draw on them as required.

There should be both at the War Office and in the field a branch of the Intelligence Department dealing specially with engineering information. While there must be cooperation between the general staff, other arms and engineers in the fighting line, there must be the closest cooperation between the engineers there and the higher engineering authorities immediately in rear, i.e. the corps and army chief engineers, whose business it is to coordinate all technical operations.

As regards execution of work, whether by engineers or infantry, there must be (l) a carefully prepared scheme to ensure that each unit receives in good time clear instructions as to the nature and scope of work devolving on it; (2) rendezvous points must be care- fully selected, notified to all concerned, and reliable guides told off to lead the working parties to the proper place by the best routes; (3) a proper scheme for issue of tools and plant, with definite responsibility for the return of tools in due course.

As regards the tactical employment of engineers the following points are worth noting:

In the encounter battle it may be advisable to attach either an entire field company, or a large portion of one, to the troops making the attack, just as some engineers are always told off to accompany an advanced guard on the march, in order to clear away obstacles and to ensure that, while progress is not arrested, important tactical points gained are consolidated. But, inasmuch as once an engineer unit begins a work, it should not hand it over to another unit while under construction, it is best that as further engineer assistance is required, it should be done by engineer units being pushed forward, " leap frog " fashion, from reserves. Close watching of the tactical situation by the commanding engineer is a vital necessity.

In the deliberate attack, as in trench warfare, there are the three