Page:EB1911 - Volume 28.djvu/395

Rh far to ensuring the possibility of such combined action. However, Gneisenau was very remiss in not immediately reporting this vital move and the necessity for it to the duke, as it left the Anglo-Dutch inner flank quite exposed. Gneisenau apparently selected Wavre, not with the intention of assisting his ally, but rather to re-establish his own line of communication, and the presence of the Prussians on the field of battle of Waterloo must be put down to the immortal credit of Blücher and Grolmann, his quartermaster-general. Gneisenau at this crisis in the affairs of the allies does not appear to have subordinated everything to co-operation at all cost with Wellington, and he allowed supply considerations and the re-establishment of his communications to over weigh the paramount necessity of arranging concerted action with his ally. Probably Wellington's failure to co-operate at Ligny had heightened the Prussian chief-of-staff's unworthy suspicions of the good faith and soldierly qualifications of the British marshal; and it was well for the allies that Blücher was able to resume command before Napoleon had time to profit from the dissensions that would probably have arisen had Gneisenau remained in control. The casualties in the hard-fought battle of Ligny were very heavy. The Prussians lost about 12,000 men and 21 guns, and the French 8500; in Ligny more than 4000 dead lay on an area of about 400 sq. yds., and in one of the hamlets of S. Amand there lay, almost to a man, the gallant 82nd of the line (Girard's division). So close was the fighting that most of the 20,000 casualties lay on about 2 sq. m. of ground. It was a really Napoleonic battle.

Despite D'Erlon's misadventure the emperor had the game still in his hands, for Ney's failure had actually placed the Anglo-Dutch army in a precarious position. So true is it that a tactical failure encountered in carrying out a sound strategical plan matters but little. Again Napoleon's plan of campaign had succeeded. The emperor having beaten Blücher, the latter must fall back to rally and re-form, and call in Bülow, who had only reached the neighbourhood of Gembloux on June 16; whilst on the other flank Ney, reinforced by D'Erlon's fresh corps, lay in front of Wellington, and the marshal could fasten upon the Anglo-Dutch army and hold it fast during the early morning of June 17, sufficiently long to allow the emperor to close round his foe's open left flank and deal him a deathblow. But it was clearly essential to deal with Wellington on the morrow, ere Blücher could again appear on the scene. Wellington was by no means so well acquainted with the details of the Prussian defeat at Ligny as he ought to have been. It is true that, before leading the final charge, Blücher dispatched an aide-de-camp to his colleague, to tell him that he was forced to retire; but this officer was shot and the message remained undelivered. To send a message of such vital importance by a single orderly was a piece of bad staff work. It should have been sent in triplicate at least, and it was Gneisenau's duty to repeat the message directly he assumed temporary command. Opposed as they were to Napoleon, Gneisenau's neglect involved them in an unnecessary and very grave risk.

Napoleon was unwell, and consequently was not in the saddle on the 17th as early as he would otherwise have been. In his

absence neither Ney nor Soult appears to have made any serious arrangements for an advance, although every minute was now golden. During the night more reinforcements arrived for Wellington, and on the morning of June 17 the duke had most of his army about Quatre Bras. But it was 24 hours too late, for Blücher's defeat had rendered the Anglo-Dutch position untenable. Early in the morning Wellington (still ignorant of the exact position of his ally) sent out an officer, with an adequate escort, to establish touch with the Prussians. This staff officer discovered and reported that the Prussians were drawing off northwards to rally at Wavre; and about 9 a Prussian orderly officer arrived from Gneisenau to explain the situation and learn Wellington's plans. The duke replied that he should fall back on Mt S. Jean, and would accept battle there, in a selected position to the south of the Forest of Soignes, provided he was assured of the support of one of Blücher's corps. Like the good soldier and loyal ally that he was, he now

subordinated everything to the one essential of manœuvring so as to remain in communication with Blücher. It was 2 on June 18 before he received the answer to his suggestion.

Early on the 17th the Prussians drew off northwards on three roads, Thielemann covering the withdrawal and moving via Gembloux to join hands with Bülow. The French cavalry on the right, hearing troops in motion on the Namur road, dashed in pursuit down the turnpike road shortly after dawn, caught up the fugitives and captured them. They turned out to be stragglers; but their capture for a time helped to confirm the idea, prevalent in the French army, that Blücher was drawing off towards his base. Some delay too was necessary before Napoleon could finally settle on his plan for this day. The situation was still obscure, details as to what had happened on the French left were wanting, and the direction of Blücher's retreat was by no means certain. Orders, however, were sent to Ney, about 8, to take up his position at Quatre Bras, and if that was impossible he was to report at once and the emperor would co-operate. Napoleon clearly meant that Ney should attack whatever happened to be in his front. If confronted by a rear-guard he would drive it off and occupy Quatre Bras; and if Wellington was still there the marshal would promptly engage and hold fast the Anglo-Dutch army, and report to the emperor. Napoleon would in this case hasten up with the reserve and crush Wellington. Wellington in fact was there; but Ney did nothing whatever to retain him, and the duke began his withdrawal to Mt. S. Jean about 10 The last chance of bringing about a decisive French success was thus allowed to slip away.

Meanwhile Napoleon paid a personal visit about 10 to the Ligny battlefield, and about 11  he came to a decision. He determined to send the two cavalry corps of Pajol

and Exelmans, and the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, with Teste's division (VI. Corps), a force of 33,000 men and 110 guns, to follow the Prussians, penetrate their intentions and discover if they meditated uniting with Wellington in front of Brussels. As Exelmans' dragoons had already gained touch of the III. Prussian corps at Gembloux, the emperor directed Marshal Grouchy, to whom he handed over the command of this force, to “proceed to Gembloux.” This order the marshal only too literally obeyed. After an inconceivably slow and wearisome march, in one badly arranged column moving on one road, he only reached Gembloux on June 17, and halted there for the night. His cavalry gained contact before noon with Thielemann's corps, which was resting at Gembloux, but the enemy was allowed to slip away and contact was lost for want of a serious effort to keep it. Grouchy did not proceed to the front, and entirely failed to appreciate the situation at this critical juncture. Pressing danger could only exist if Blücher had gone northwards, and northwards, therefore, in the Dyle valley, he should have diligently sought for traces of the Prussian retreat. Had Blücher gone eastwards, Grouchy, holding the Dyle, could easily have held back any future Prussian advance towards Wellington. Grouchy, however, went to Gembloux as ordered. By nightfall the situation was all in favour of the allies; for Grouchy was now actually outside the four Prussian corps, who were by this time concentrated astride the Dyle at Wavre. Their retreat having been unmolested, the Prussians were ready once more to take the field, quite twenty-four hours before Napoleon deemed it possible for the foe defeated at Ligny.

On the other flank, too, things had gone all in favour of Wellington. Although the emperor wrote to Ney again at noon, from Ligny, that troops had now been placed in position at Marbais to second the marshal's attack on Quatre Bras, yet Ney remained quiescent, and Wellington effected so rapid and skilful a retreat that, on Napoleon's arrival at the head of his supporting corps,