Page:EB1911 - Volume 27.djvu/710

HISTORY 1783-1789] 84. In the states the case was even worse. Some of them had been seduced into issuing paper currency in such profusion

that they were almost bankrupt. Great Britain, in the treaty of peace, had recognized the independence of the individual states, naming them in order; and her government followed the same system in all its intercourse with its late colonies. Its restrictive system was maintained, and the states, vying with each other for commerce, could adopt no system of counteracting measures. Every possible burden was thus shifted to American commerce; and Congress could do nothing, for, though it asked for the power to regulate commerce for fifteen years, the states refused it. The decisions of the various state courts began to conflict, and there was no power to reconcile them or to prevent the consequences of the divergence. Several states, towards the end of this period, began to prepare or adopt systems of protection of domestic productions or manufactures, aimed at preventing competition by neighbouring states. The Tennessee settlers were in insurrection against the authority of North Carolina; and the Kentucky settlers were disposed to cut loose from Virginia. Poverty, with the rigid execution of process for debt, drove the farmers of western Massachusetts into an insurrection (Shays's Insurrection) which the state had much difficulty in suppressing; and Congress was so incompetent to aid Massachusetts that it was driven to the expedient of imagining an Indian war in that direction, in order to transfer troops thither. Congress itself

was in danger of disappearance from the scene. The necessity for the votes of nine of the thirteen states for the passage of important measures made the absence of a state's delegation quite as effective as a negative vote. Congress even had to make repeated appeals to obtain a quorum for the ratification of the treaty of peace with Great Britain. In 1784 Congress actually broke up in disgust, and the French minister reported to his government—“There is now in America no general government—neither Congress, nor president, nor head of any one administrative department.” Everywhere there were symptoms of a dissolution of the Union.

85. Congress was evidently incompetent to frame a new plan of national government; its members were too dependent on

their states, and would be recalled if they took part in framing anything stronger than the articles. The idea of a convention of the states, independent of Congress, was in the minds and mouths of many; Thomas Paine had suggested it as long ago as his Common Sense pamphlet: “Let a continental conference be held. . . to frame a continental charter. . . fixing the number and manner of choosing members of Congress, members of assembly. . . drawing the line of business and jurisdiction between them.” To a people as fond of law and the forms of law as the Americans there was a difficulty in the way. The articles had provided that no change should be made in them but by the assent of every state legislature. If the work of such a convention was to be subject to this rule, its success would be no greater than that of Congress; if its plan was to be put into force on the ratification of less than the whole number of states, the step would be more or less revolutionary. In the end the latter course was taken, though not until every other expedient had failed; but the act of taking it showed the underlying consciousness that union, independence and nationality were now inextricably complicated, and that the thirteen had become one in some senses.

86. The country drifted into a convention by a roundabout way. The navigation of Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac needed regulation; and the states of Maryland and Virginia, having plenary power in the matter, appointed delegates to arrange such rules. The delegates met (1785) at (q.v.), and at Washington's house, Mount Vernon. Maryland, in adopting their report, proposed that Pennsylvania and Delaware

be asked to nominate commissioners, and Virginia went further and proposed a meeting of commissioners from all the states to frame commercial regulations for the whole. The convention met (1786) at (q.v.), Maryland, but only five states were

represented, and their delegates adjourned, after recommending another convention at Philadelphia in May 1787.

87. Congress had failed in its last resort—a proposal that the states should grant it the impost power alone; New York's veto

had put an end to this last hope. Confessing its helplessness, Congress approved the call for a second convention; twelve of the states (all but Rhode Island) chose delegates; and the convention met at Philadelphia (May 25, 1787), with an abler body of men than had been seen in Congress since the first two Continental Congresses. Among others, Virginia sent Washington, James Madison, Edmund Randolph, George Mason and George Wythe; Pennsylvania: Franklin, Robert and Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson; Massachusetts: Rufus King, Elbridge Gerry and Caleb Strong; Connecticut: William S. Johnson, Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth; New York: Alexander Hamilton; New Jersey: William Paterson; and South Carolina the two Pinckneys and John Rutledge. With hardly an exception the fifty-five delegates were clear-headed, moderate men, with positive views of their own and firm purpose, but with a willingness to compromise.

88. Washington was chosen to preside, and the convention began the formation of a new Constitution, instead of proposing

changes in the old one. Two parties were formed at once. The Virginia delegates offered a plan (see ), proposing a Congress, of two houses, having power to legislate on national subjects, and to compel the states to fulfil their obligations. This is often spoken of as a “national” plan, but very improperly. It was a “large-state” plan, proposed by those states which had or hoped for a large population. It meant to base representation in both houses on population, so that the large states could control both of them, and it left the appointment of the president or other executive and the Federal judges to Congress—so that the whole administration of the new government

would fall under large-state control. On behalf of the “small states” Paterson of New Jersey brought in another plan. It continued the old Confederation, with its single house and equal state vote, but added the power to regulate commerce and raise a revenue, and to compel the states to obey requisitions. The large states had a general majority of six to five, but the constant dropping off of one or more votes, on minor features, from their side to that of the small states prevented the hasty adoption of any radical measures. Nevertheless, the final collision could not be evaded; the basis of the two plans was in the question of one or two houses, of equal or proportionate state votes, of large-state supremacy or of state equality. In July the large states began to show a disposition to force their plan through, and the small states began to threaten a concerted withdrawal from the convention.

89. The Connecticut delegates, from their first appearance in the convention, had favoured a compromise. They had been

trained under the New England system, in which the assemblies were made up of two houses, one representing the people of the whole state, according to population, and the other giving an equal representation to the towns. They proposed that the new Congress should be made up of two houses, one representing the states in proportion to their population, the other giving an equal vote to each state. At a deadlock the convention referred the proposition to a committee, and it reported in favour of the Connecticut compromise. Connecticut had been voting in the large-state list, and the votes of her delegates could not be spared from their slender majority; now another of the large states, North Carolina, came over to Connecticut's proposal, and it was adopted. Thus the first great struggle of the convention resulted in a compromise, which took shape in an important feature of the Constitution, the Senate.

90. The small states were still anxious, in every new question, to throw as much power as possible into the hands of their